On a Collision Course: Unveiling Wireless Attacks to the Aircraft Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Semantic Scholar · Article (USENIX Security Symposium) · 1cca8bf390448c1364ec6df57d8d1b3cdcb62e76 · Published 2024-01-01 · USENIX Security Symposium · 5 authors
Abstract and citation only, verbatim from Semantic Scholar; full text lives there. All credit to the authors and USENIX Security Symposium.
Abstract
The first working RF attacks on TCAS are introduced, demonstrating how to take full control over the collision avoidance displays and create so-called Resolution Advisories of arbitrary aircraft on a collision course and potential countermeasures and mitigations that should be considered by aircraft and system manufacturers in the future.
Authors
- G. Longo
- Martin Strohmeier
- E. Russo
- Alessio Merlo
- Vincent Lenders
Keywords
- Computer Science
- Engineering
Citation
G. Longo, Martin Strohmeier, E. Russo , et al. (2024). On a Collision Course: Unveiling Wireless Attacks to the Aircraft Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). USENIX Security Symposium. Semantic Scholar ID 1cca8bf390448c1364ec6df57d8d1b3cdcb62e76. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1cca8bf390448c1364ec6df57d8d1b3cdcb62e76 ↗