CEN12CA509

Factual narrative

Upon arrival at his destination airport after an uneventful IFR flight, the pilot set up for a visual left downwind to land. The initial flare and touchdown was smooth at 85 knots. The airplane then floated and bounced twice, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest about halfway down the runway. An examination of the airplane showed the nose gear was separated from the airplane, resulting in substantial damage to the engine firewall. The pilot reported that he should have slowed to about 70-75 knots for touchdown to avoid floating and subsequent bounced landing. In a telephone interview with the NTSB IIC, the pilot stated that he was a corporate jet pilot and he flew light reciprocating-engine aircraft only a few times a year. His perspective was that in flying corporate jets, computations of final approach speeds are more precisely determined and executed by the pilot. Final approach speeds in the light airplane category are determined more so by an airspeed range depending on the wind conditions and gross weight. He offered that his higher than optimal approach speed was a result of not having recent experience in flying light airplanes. He stated that he had not flown a light aircraft for six months prior to this event. Upon arrival at his destination airport after an uneventful instrument flight rules flight, the pilot entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for a visual landing. The initial flare and touchdown were smooth at 85 knots. The airplane then floated and bounced twice, the nose gear collapsed, and the airplane came to rest about halfway down the runway. An examination of the airplane showed that the nose gear was separated from the airplane, resulting in substantial damage to the engine firewall. The pilot reported that he should have slowed to about 70 to 75 knots for touchdown to avoid floating and the subsequent bounced landing. The pilot stated that he was a corporate jet pilot and that he flew light reciprocating-engine aircraft only a few times a year. His perspective was that in flying corporate jets, computations of final approach speeds are more precisely determined and executed by the pilot. Final approach speeds in the light airplane category are determined moreso by an airspeed range depending on the wind conditions and gross weight. He offered that his higher-than-optimal approach speed was a result of not having recent experience in flying light airplanes. He stated that he had not flown a light aircraft for 6 months prior to this event. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.

• F Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Experience/qualifications-Recent experience w/ equipment-Pilot - F
• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
• C Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Incorrect use/operation - C