Event CEN21LA136

Factual narrative

On February 18, 2021, about 1905 central standard time, a Gates Learjet 55, N559RA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Jeffersonville, Indiana. The captain and first officer were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand cargo flight. The Royal Air Cargo flight, was being operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan from Southwest Florida International Airport, Fort Myers, Florida, to Clark Regional Airport (JVY), Jeffersonville, Indiana. The airplane sustained damage to the landing gear, lower fuselage, wings and ventral strakes. According to the airplane manufacturer the strakes are critical for aerodynamic stability and would adversely affect the flying characteristics of the airplane. The captain reported that the takeoff, climb, and en route portions of the flight were normal, with the first officer acting as the pilot flying. As they approached the destination, he and the first officer briefed and set up for the instrument landing system approach (ILS) to runway 18, expecting to break out of the overcast cloud layer and execute a visual approach to runway 36 due to more favorable winds. Upon exiting the overcast, he activated the airport’s pilot-controlled lighting system and the first officer saw the runway. Both pilots stated that they believed the runway that they saw was runway 36. They maneuvered the airplane visually toward the runway that was in-sight and executed a landing. The captain stated that, upon touchdown, it became clear that they had inadvertently landed on runway 32. In his report, the captain said that both he and the first officer were aware that runway 14-32 was closed. The first officer stated that while flying to JVY they activated the pilot-controlled lighting and saw a runway light up. They visually lined up and landed on the runway that they saw and believed to be runway 36; however, it was actually runway 32. Both pilots reported that the only runway lights that they saw during the approach were the lights on runway 32, and there were no visible indications that the runway they approached was closed. Both pilots also stated that, during the visual approach, they did not verify that the final approach course was aligned with the intended runway. The airport manager confirmed that runway 32 was closed and that a notice to airmen (NOTAM) had been issued to that effect. In addition, the Automated Weather Observing System recording, available to the pilots via the aircraft communication radio, was appended with the runway closure information. The runway was closed due to the large amount of snow that they had received. About 4 inches of snow that had yet to be cleared from the runway. The airport manager noted that the runway lights were on due to the snowplow operations as an aid in determining the location of the runway edge. There were no plow trucks on runway 32 at the time of the accident because they had stopped for a dinner break, but he confirmed that the runway lights were left on during this time. He noted that, depending on the direction the airplane was coming from, the lights for runway 36 may not have been visible due to the snow berms along the runway edge obstructing their view from the side. Information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) confirmed that a NOTAM referencing the closure of runway 14/32 was in effect at the time of the accident. Both pilots reported that, as they approached the airport, they saw runway lights and set up for a visual approach to that runway. They believed the runway they saw was runway 36, but it was in fact runway 32, which had been closed due to snow. A notice to airman had been published to that effect. In addition, the airport’s automated weather observing system recording was appended with the runway closure information. The pilots continued the approach and landed on runway 32. The airplane struck a snow berm at the edge of the intersection with runway 36, the landing gear broke from the airplane, and the airplane slid to a stop. The lower fuselage, wings and ventral strakes sustained substantial damage. Runway 32 was closed due to a large amount of snow that was in the process of being cleared. About 4 inches of snow remained. The runway lights were on at the time of the accident to aid the snowplow operators in determining the location of the runway edge; however, there were no plows on runway 32 at the time of the accident. The lights for runway 36 may not have been visible due to the snow berms along the runway edge obstructing their view from the side. Based on the available information, the flight crew inadvertently selected the wrong runway for landing and did not identify the error because they failed to compare the intended runway heading with the final approach course. Contributing to the accident was the fact that the runway 32 lights were left on. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Identification/recognition-Flight crew
• — Environmental issues-Physical environment-Runway/land/takeoff/taxi surface-Snow/slush/ice covered surface-Contributed to outcome
• — Environmental issues-Operating environment-Airport facilities/design-Runway lighting-Contributed to outcome