CEN23LA017

Factual narrative

On October 23, 2022, about 1705 mountain daylight time, a Cirrus SR-22 airplane, N25HW, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Loveland, Colorado. The pilot and five passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that the airplane encountered low-level wind shear crossing the runway threshold. As he was about to flare for landing, the airplane “got hit with [a] strong crosswind from the right” causing it to drift toward the left side of the runway. He reported that he initiated a go-around; however, the engine coughed and lost power. ADS-B data revealed the flight departed St. George Regional Airport (SGU), St. George, Utah, about 1406. The pilot proceeded on a northeast course toward the Northern Colorado Regional Airport (FNL), Loveland, Colorado, and climbed to an altitude of about 13,350 ft mean sea level. At 1705:27, the airplane crossed the runway 33 threshold at FNL. About 3 seconds later, the airplane began drifting toward the left side of the runway. The final ADS-B data point was recorded at 1705:32 about 10 ft from the left side of the runway pavement at that time. The airplane came to rest upright near the automated weather observing system (AWOS) installation located about 300 ft off the west edge of the runway and about 1,000 ft from the approach threshold. Both wings and the empennage were damaged during the impact sequence. Postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any anomalies consistent with an inability of the engine to produce rated power. Flight control continuity was established from each control surface to the corresponding cockpit control. Engine data downloaded from the onboard avionics indicated that the cylinder head and exhaust gas temperatures (EGT) were stable with exception of the No. 3 cylinder EGT, which provided intermittent and erroneous data during portions of the flight. Shortly before the end of the data, the remaining engine parameters (e.g. fuel flow, manifold pressure, and oil pressure) increased over a span of about 4 seconds, and then decreased consistent with the runway excursion event. The most recent routine surface weather observation was recorded about 9 minutes before the accident. At that time, the wind was from 060° at 19 knots, gusting to 27 knots. When the tower controller cleared the pilot to land, about 2 minutes before the accident, he advised the pilot that the wind was from 060° at 30 knots. At 2305, the AWOS recorded wind from 060° at 23 knots, gusting to 31 knots. A similar wind observation recorded one minute later, recorded the wind from 060° at 26, gusting to 31 knots. The pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that the maximum allowable crosswind velocity depends on pilot capability and airplane limitations. Landings in a 20-knot direct crosswind had been demonstrated according to the POH. The pilot reported that the airplane encountered low-level wind shear as it crossed the runway threshold while landing. He stated that as he was about to flare for landing, the airplane encountered a strong crosswind from the right causing it to drift toward the left side of the runway. He initiated a go-around; however, the engine made a “coughing” sound and lost power. ADS-B data revealed that, about 3 seconds after crossing the runway threshold, the airplane began drifting toward the left side of the runway. The final data point was recorded about 2 seconds later, as the airplane was about 10 ft from the left side of the runway. The airplane impacted the terrain and came to rest upright about 300 ft off the side of the runway and about 1,000 ft from the approach threshold. Postaccident airplane examination did not reveal any anomalies consistent with an inability of the engine to produce rated power. Flight control continuity was established from each control surface to the corresponding cockpit controls. At the time of the accident, the pilot encountered a 90° direct crosswind, gusting to 31 knots. The pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that the maximum allowable crosswind velocity depends on pilot capability and airplane limitations. However, demonstrated crosswind landings were limited to 20 knots. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.

• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot
• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Windshear-Contributed to outcome
• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Crosswind-Decision related to condition
• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Gusts-Decision related to condition