CEN24LA102

On January 29, 2024, about 2250 central standard time, a Cessna 172H airplane, N8805Z, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Terrell, Texas. The pilot and the passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported the purpose of the flight was to build flight time. Before the departure from the Arlington Municipal Airport (GKY), Arlington, Texas, the pilot had 12.75 gallons of 100 low lead fuel added to the airplane and he stated that this resulted in both wing fuel tanks being “topped off.” The airplane departed from GKY about 1950, en route to the East Texas Regional Airport (GGG), Longview, Texas. Upon arrival at GGG, the airplane landed, came to a full stop, and proceeded to back-taxi for takeoff. The airplane departed from GGG about 2120 for the Terrell Municipal Airport (TRL), Terrell, Texas. The airplane landed at TRL about 2230 and came to a full stop. The pilot reported that he attempted to refuel the airplane but the fuel pumps were “out of order.” The pilot said that he then checked the remaining fuel on board with a fuel measurement stick, and the right wing fuel tank had about 4 gallons of fuel, and the left wing fuel tank had about 12 gallons of fuel. The pilot decided to fly to the Mesquite Metro Airport (HQZ), Mesquite, Texas, to refuel the airplane instead. The pilot stated that, after starting the engine, he noticed that the airplane had a “rough sounding” or “weak” idle with the throttle at the idle cutoff position but that the engine sounded stronger when the throttle was advanced. The pilot stated that he then taxied the airplane and performed the pretakeoff engine run-up using the checklist. Shortly after taking off from runway 18, when the airplane was about 400 to 450 ft above ground level, the engine sustained a total loss of power. The pilot successfully restarted the engine, but it immediately lost total power again. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat field with trees, and the airplane came to rest upright. Both wings and the fuselage sustained substantial damage and the engine was separated from the firewall. After the forced landing, the pilot reported that he observed a “steady stream” of fuel leaking from the “left side.” During the wreckage recovery operation, recovery personnel found about 2 gallons of fuel in the left fuel tank and about 0.25 gallon of fuel in the right fuel tank. Both fuel tank caps were found installed, and the fuel selector handle was found in the both position. There were no visible signs of fuel leakage on the airframe or on the ground. Postaccident examination revealed that the wing fuel tanks were not breached and that the fuel system was intact from the tanks to the fuel strainer inlet line at the firewall. Testing of the left and right fuel tank quantity transmitters with a multimeter revealed that the resistance values were not within the manufacturer’s specifications. No mechanical anomaly was noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was equipped with a fuel selector handle in the cockpit labeled “left,” “right,” “both,” and “off” to enable the pilot to select that the fuel be supplied from the left, right, or both wing fuel tanks, respectively, or to turn the fuel supply off. By design, when the fuel selector handle is manipulated by the pilot, it mechanically moves the position of the valve. Postaccident testing revealed fuel selector valve moved when the fuel selector handle was manipulated by hand, but the detents in each position were weak. Testing of the fuel selector valve included blowing compressed through the fuel strainer inlet line at the firewall with the fuel selector handle at each of its four positions and observing the resultant air flow behavior at the left and right fuel tank lines. The testing revealed that the fuel selector valve was installed 180° from the correct orientation. That is, when the fuel selector handle was in the “left” position, the valve was open to the right fuel tank line, and when the handle was in the “right” position, the valve was open to the left tank line. Likewise, when the fuel selector handle was in the “both” position, the valve was off, and when the fuel selector handle was in the “off” position, the valve was open to both wing fuel tank lines. Based upon a review of the airframe maintenance records, it was undetermined when the fuel selector valve was installed incorrectly; there was no record of any recent work having been performed on the valve. In response to follow-up questions, the pilot reported that, during the flight from GGG to TRL, he had the fuel selector positioned to the left tank for about 50 minutes then moved it to the both position before landing and before the accident takeoff.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Cessna released Single Engine Service Bulletin SEB99-18 Revision 1, Fuel Quantity Indicating Systems Inspection, on April 30, 2001. The document, which is mandatory per Cessna, was applicable to the accident make and model airplane. The document discussed the purposes of the inspection, which was to be performed every 12 months, and stated, in part: To inspect the fuel quantity indicating system for verification that each fuel tank quantity gauge indicates empty when the fuel tank contains only unusable fuel and indicates full when the fuel tank is fuel. Noncompliance with this service bulletin may result in an incorrect fuel quantity indication. Failure to resolve incorrect fuel quantity indications as well as improper preflight inspections and inflight planning by the pilot could allow depletion of the airplane fuel supply and subsequent loss of engine power. The FAA does not mandate compliance with manufacturer’s service bulletins for 14 CFR Part 91 operations. A review of the airframe maintenance records did not find any annotation of work performed in relation to SEB99-18 Revision 1 in the 12 months before the most recent annual inspection, which was performed on January 25, 2024. According to information provided by airport personnel, the airport did not have self-service fuel pumps; all fueling operations were conducted with a fuel truck and a technician. To request after-hours fuel services (after 2000 local time), pilots could call a telephone number listed on the airport website and in the FAA Chart Supplement information for TRL. Airport personnel received no after-hours fueling request for the evening of the accident. An underground fuel farm on the airport property that was no longer in use had signage indicating that it was out of order. Per the Owner’s Manual for the Cessna 172H, the airplane’s total fuel capacity was 39 gallons, or 19.5 gallons per wing fuel tank, with 0.5 gallon unusable fuel per tank. The pilot departed about 3 hours before the accident for the purpose of building flight time. He performed one landing, taxi back, and takeoff at an airport en route, then landed at another airport after its published attended hours, intending to refuel the airplane. The pilot was unable to refuel due to his mistaken belief that the airport had self-service fuel pumps that were “out of order.” (The airport had no self-service pumps, but an unused underground fuel farm was marked with signage indicating it was out of order.) Airport personnel indicated that they provided after-hours fueling service upon request but that they did not receive any such request on the evening of the accident. The pilot stated that he checked the remaining fuel on board with a fuel measurement stick and that the right wing fuel tank had about 4 gallons of fuel and the left wing fuel tank had about 12 gallons of fuel. The pilot decided to fly to a different airport to refuel the airplane. Shortly after takeoff, about 400 to 450 ft above ground level, the engine sustained a total loss of power. The pilot performed a forced landing to a flat field with trees, and the airplane came to rest upright. Both wings and the fuselage sustained substantial damage and the engine was separated from the firewall. After the forced landing, the pilot reported that he observed a “steady stream” of fuel leaking from the “left side.” However, during the wreckage recovery operations recovery personnel found about 2 gallons of fuel in the left fuel tank and about 0.25 gallon of fuel in the right fuel tank. (The unusable fuel quantity for each wing fuel tank was 0.5 gallon.) There were no visible signs of fuel leakage on the airframe or on the ground. Postaccident examination revealed that the wing fuel tanks were not breached and that the fuel system was intact from the tanks to the fuel strainer inlet line at the firewall. Testing of the left and right fuel tank quantity transmitters with a multimeter revealed that both were out of the manufacturer’s specifications; this would result in erroneous fuel indications on the cockpit fuel quantity gauges. No mechanical anomaly was noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. Based on the low quantity of fuel recovered from the airplane at the accident site and the lack of evidence of any fuel leakage, it is implausible that that the airplane had 16 gallons on board at the time of takeoff, as the pilot reported. It is likely that the pilot based his fuel quantity assessment on viewing erroneous fuel quantity indications during the flight, and that the total loss of engine power resulted from fuel exhaustion. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, the fuel selector valve was found to be installed incorrectly, such that manipulation of the fuel selector handle in the cockpit resulted in opposite positioning of the valve; for example, moving the handle to the “left” position opened the valve to the right fuel tank line, and moving the handle to the “both” position closed the valve. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12