CEN24LA108

Factual narrative

On January 31, 2024, about 1722 central standard time, a Piper PA-28-180, N2184T, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Conway, Arkansas. The flight instructor and student pilot were not injured. The flight was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The student pilot reported that before the flight, the airplane was serviced with 48 gallons of 100 low lead fuel, and he and the flight instructor visually checked the fuel during their preflight inspection. During the flight, he performed one touch-and-go landing, then continued in the traffic pattern. While on the downwind leg, he reported that the flight instructor explained the airplane’s fuel system and how to change fuel tanks. Then while performing the pre-landing checklist, the flight instructor directed him to change from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Before turning on the base leg, he noted that the engine was not responding to his throttle inputs. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and performed a forced landing to a field. After coming to rest, the student pilot positioned the fuel selector handle to the OFF position and exited the airplane. He also reported that he had accumulated 13.3 hours of flight training in the last 12 months, of which 1.2 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The flight instructor reported that during the instructional flight he was explaining various details about the airplane. They had completed one touch-and-go landing and were on the downwind leg when their preset fuel reminder alerted on the GPS. He directed the student to turn on the fuel pump and position the fuel selector to the left tank. During the pre-landing procedures, the student alerted him that the engine sustained a loss of power. He performed a forced landing to a field, then “shut off” the airplane and exited. He added that he did not direct the student to switch the fuel selector to OFF after the accident and he did not recall any postaccident discussion about the fuel selector. During the accident flight, he did not observe the position of the fuel selector since it was on the opposite side of the student’s leg on the side wall of the airplane. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the nose landing gear had collapsed, and the right wing sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector documented the position of the fuel selector, and it was positioned toward OFF, but was not completely seated in the detent. The FAA inspector’s examination of the airplane and fuel system determined that the fuel selector valve worked as expected with a steady flow of fuel when positioned to the left tank and right tank positions. There was no fuel flow when positioned to the OFF position. When the handle was moved to the same position where it was found after the accident, there was a “slight stream of fuel” produced. There were no other preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies identified that would have precluded normal operation of the engine. The flight instructor and student pilot were conducting an instructional flight in an airplane in which the student had only accumulated 1.2 hours of flight time. During the flight, the student performed one touch-and-go landing, then continued in the traffic pattern. While on the downwind leg, their preset fuel reminder to switch fuel tanks alerted on the GPS. At the direction of the flight instructor, the student turned on the fuel pump and repositioned the fuel selector handle to what he thought was the left fuel tank position. Shortly after, the student noted that the engine would not respond to throttle inputs and had sustained a loss of power. The flight instructor took control of the airplane and performed a forced landing to a field. During the landing, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the right wing sustained substantial damage. The student reported that during the egress he turned the fuel selector handle to the OFF position. The flight instructor stated that he did not direct the student to switch the fuel selector to the OFF position after the accident and he did not recall any postaccident discussion about the fuel selector. Postaccident examination of the airplane found that the fuel selector handle was positioned toward the OFF position, but it was not completely seated in the detent. A subsequent detailed examination determined that the fuel selector valve worked as expected with a steady flow of fuel when positioned to the left tank and right tank positions. There was no fuel flow when positioned to OFF. When the handle was moved to the same position where it was found after the accident, the fuel flow was restricted and would not have provided enough fuel flow for the engine to increase power when the throttle was advanced. There were no other preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Given that the loss of engine power occurred shortly after changing the fuel selector handle, it is likely that the student pilot inadvertently placed the fuel selector toward the OFF position, thus resulting in fuel starvation after the available fuel in the fuel system forward of the fuel selector to the engine had been exhausted. The flight instructor was unable to confirm the fuel selection during the flight because the selector handle was installed on the sidewall behind the student’s left leg. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.

• — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incorrect action performance-Student/instructed pilot
• — Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid management
• — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Identification/recognition-Instructor/check pilot
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Student/instructed pilot