Event CEN24LA206

Factual narrative

On May 31, 2024, about 1245 mountain daylight time, a Piper PA-24-250 airplane, N7500P, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Colorado Springs, Colorado. The pilot was not injured, and the passenger received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that after a cross-country flight at 10,500 ft msl, he had descended and was approaching to land at the City of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport (COS). When the airplane was abeam the runway numbers on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, about 7,500 ft msl, he noticed that the engine sounded as if it was no longer producing power. He confirmed the loss of power and attempted to restart the engine by switching fuel tanks to a different fuel tank. Power was not restored, and the pilot executed a forced landing to a field short of the approach end of runway 13 at COS. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. Data downloaded from the airplane’s engine monitor confirmed that the airplane’s engine lost power as evidenced by a sharp reduction in both exhaust gas (EGT) and cylinder head (CHT) temperatures on all cylinders. The engine monitor also recorded a loss of fuel pressure that coincided with the drop in EGT and CHT. A postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The engine was able to be rotated, and valvetrain continuity, suction, compression, and ignition were confirmed. The carburetor was removed and disassembled with no anomalies noted. The electric fuel pumps operated when connected to a battery. The airplane’s fuel system was examined and no anomalies were found. According to airport first responders, the fuel selector was positioned to the left main fuel tank, there was fuel present in the airplane’s wings, and that the left fuel gauge indicated just over ½ tank of fuel remaining. The recovery company reported that 23 gallons of fuel was drained from the airplane when they recovered the wreckage, but a detailed listing of which tanks contained fuel was not available. The pilot reported in a telephone interview that he did not use carburetor heat at any time during the accident flight or during troubleshooting procedures. When he was about 20 minutes from his destination, he descended to about 9,000 ft. msl and switched to the fullest fuel tank. He also adjusted settings as appropriate for the approach. When in the traffic pattern, once he realized that the engine had lost power, he said attempted to restore engine power using the emergency procedures from the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) including switching fuel tanks and activating the airplane’s electric fuel boost pump. When engine power was not restored, he switched back to the previous tank as it should have contained the most fuel. Review of the POH revealed that the normal approach and landing procedures state: “Carburetor heat should not be applied unless there is an indication of carburetor icing, since the use of carburetor heat causes a loss in engine power which may be critical in the event of a go-around, and can induce detonation in this situation.” The POH stated in the “Emergency Procedures” section that in the event of an engine failure the first step would be to switch fuel tanks, and if this did not restore engine power the pilot should: 1. Check fuel pressure and turn on electric fuel pump, if off. 2. Push Mixture control to full rich. 3. Apply carburetor heat. 4. Check ignition switch. At the time of the accident the temperature and dewpoint at COS were 21°C (70°F) and 8°C (46°F) respectively. According to FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-35, Carburetor Icing Prevention, this temperature and dewpoint were within the range of susceptibility for serious carburetor icing at glide power settings. The pilot reported that after a cross-country flight at 10,500 ft mean sea level (msl), he had descended and was approaching to land. When the airplane was abeam the runway numbers on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern, about 7,500 ft msl, he noticed that the engine sounded as if it was no longer producing power. He attempted to restore power but was not successful and executed a forced landing to a field which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. Postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. First responders stated that the airplane’s wing contained fuel, the fuel selector was positioned for the left main fuel tank, and that the left fuel gauge read just over ½ tank of fuel remaining. The recovery company confirmed the presence of fuel in the airplane but could not provide a detailed report of how much fuel each fuel tank contained. The pilot reported in a telephone interview that he did not use carburetor heat at any time during the accident flight or during troubleshooting procedures. When he was about 20 minutes from his destination, he descended to about 9,000 ft. msl, and switched to the fullest fuel tank. He also adjusted settings as appropriate for the approach. When in the traffic pattern, once he realized that the engine had lost power, he said attempted to restore engine power using the emergency procedures from the pilot’s operating handbook (POH), including switching fuel tanks, and activating the airplane’s electric fuel boost pump. When engine power was not restored, he switched back to the previous tank as it should have contained the most fuel. Review of the POH revealed that the normal approach and landing procedures state: “Carburetor heat should not be applied unless there is an indication of carburetor icing, since the use of carburetor heat causes a loss in engine power which may be critical in the event of a go-around, and can induce detonation in this situation.” The POH stated in the “Emergency Procedures” section that in the event of an engine failure the first step would be to switch fuel tanks, and if this did not restore engine power the pilot should: Check fuel pressure and turn on electric fuel pump, if off. Push Mixture control to full rich. Apply carburetor heat. Check ignition switch. The temperature and dewpoint at the accident airport were conducive to serious icing at glide power settings. Given the lack of mechanical anomalies found and the recorded temperature and dewpoint being within a range conducive for carburetor icing, the likely reason for the loss of engine power was due to carburetor icing. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Temp/humidity/pressure-Conducive to carburetor icing-Effect on equipment