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DCA94MA053

1994-04-27 · STRATFORD, Connecticut, United States · Fatal · 1 aircraft · Status: Completed

Airport BDR

Aircraft involved

Probable cause & findings

The failure of the captain to use the available ILS glideslope, his failure to execute a go-around when conditions were not suitable for landing, and his failure to land the airplane at a point sufficient to allow for a safe stopping distance; the fatalities were caused by the presence of the nonfrangible blast fence and the absence of a safety area at the end of the runway. (NTSB Report AAR-94/08)

Factual narrative

SEE NTSB BLUE COVER REPORT NTSB/AAR-94-008 The captain had ILS glideslope data available during the approach but did not fly the ILS glideslope. The partial obscuration of the airport environment, due to ground fog, contributed to the captain's failure to recognize that the airplane was high on both his approach and landing. The destruction of the airplane and the resulting occupant injuries were a direct result of the collision with the blast fence. FAA interaction & communication with local communities, although persistent, were unsuccessful in gaining support for runway safety area improvements and for the installation of approach lighting for runway 6. The passenger seats had been improperly assembled using unapproved parts, and seat belts had been installed incorrectly. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12

Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file NTSB_1994_DCA94MA053.txt. Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb. Full investigation docket on data.ntsb.gov ↗.

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Related research

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