NTSB CAROL · Event
Event DEN05LA055
Registry · N618MN
FAA Aircraft Registry record.
Make / Model
CESSNA 172N
Year of manufacture
1977 · 28 years old at event
Engine
LYCOMING 0-320 SERIES (180 hp)
Seats / Engines
4 seats · 1 engine
Last airworthiness date
19790316
ADS-B equipped
Yes — Mode-S A80D96
Registrant of record
EACK KENNETH B
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The dual student's improper flare and the flight instructor's inadequate supervision.. A contributing factor was the inadequate communication between the flight instructor and the dual student,
Factual narrative
On February 2, 2005, approximately 1450 mountain standard time, a Cessna 172N, N618MN, piloted by a commercial certificated flight instructor, was substantially damaged during a hard landing at Fort Collins-Loveland Municipal Airport (FNL), Loveland, Colorado. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The instructional flight was being conducted under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91 without a flight plan. The flight instructor and his student reported no injuries. The local flight originated at 1430. According to the written statement submitted by the flight instructor, he and his student were performing a touch-and-go landing on runway 15. During the landing flare, the flight instructor requested that the student perform a go-around and the student acknowledged. The instructor stated that the student added full power and "fully and abruptly moved the control yoke to its full forward limit." The instructor stated that he attempted to take control of the airplane; however, the nose gear impacted the runway and the airplane bounced. The instructor stated that he was able to land the airplane, following the bounce. He brought the airplane to a complete stop approximately 15 feet off of the left side of the runway. According to the written statement submitted by the student pilot, he performed what he felt was a "normal landing." He stated that he "held back the yoke"; however, the airplane bounced "slightly above normal" and touched down again. The student stated that upon the application of the brakes, the airplane began to "yaw to the left." The nose landing gear assembly collapsed and the firewall was wrinkled. A postimpact examination of the airplane systems, conducted by the FAA, revealed no anomalies. In two separate telephone interviews, both the flight instructor and the student were asked about the discrepancy between their statements. The flight instructor stated that the accident sequence was as he had stated in his written statement. He felt the student was not remembering approximately 20 seconds of the landing sequence. The student stated that the accident sequence was exactly as he had stated in his written statement. The student also stated that the purpose of the flight was to perform touch-and-go landings, not go-arounds. The student stated that the hard landing was only his third landing. He was unaware of what a go-around procedure was. According to the flight instructor, they were performing a touch-and-go landing. During the landing flare, the flight instructor requested that the student perform a go-around and the student acknowledged. The instructor stated that the student added full power and "fully and abruptly moved the control yoke to its full forward limit." The instructor stated that he attempted to take control of the airplane; however, the nose gear impacted the runway and the airplane bounced. The instructor stated that he was able to land the airplane, following the bounce. He brought the airplane to a complete stop approximately 15 feet off of the left side of the runway. In two separate telephone interviews, both the flight instructor and the student were asked about the discrepancy between their statements. The flight instructor stated that the accident sequence was as he had stated in his written statement. He felt the student was not remembering approximately 20 seconds of the landing sequence. The student stated that the accident sequence was exactly as he had stated in his written statement. The student also stated that the purpose of the flight was to perform touch-and-go landings, not go-arounds. The student stated that the hard landing was only his third landing. He was unaware of what a go-around procedure was. The airplane was substantially damaged. A postimpact examination of the airplane systems revealed no anomalies. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2005_DEN05LA055.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (go-around). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- NASA NTRS 2025 · Conference Paper
A Training Study to Improve Monitoring During A Go-Around
As part of an FAA program to improve go-around (GA) safety, we were asked to determine if we could improve the performance of the Pilot Monitoring (PM) during a GA maneuver.
- Flight Safety Foundation 2024 · FSF / AeroSafety World
Go-Around Safety Forum Findings
Foundation Go-Around Safety Forum technical findings — examines why pilots fail to execute go-arounds when criteria are met (stabilized approach gate not met, energy state out of envelope, traffic con…
- Semantic Scholar 2022 · Article (Journal of Safety Research)
Go-around accidents and general aviation safety.
INTRODUCTION Changes in General Aviation (GA) accident rates, specifically in the go-around phase, are examined by comparing the number of accidents, the proportion of fatal accidents, and the proport…
- Semantic Scholar 2021 · Article (Aerospace)
Classification and Analysis of Go-Arounds in Commercial Aviation Using ADS-B Data
Go-arounds are a necessary aspect of commercial aviation and are conducted after a landing attempt has been aborted. It is necessary to conduct go-arounds in the safest possible manner, as go-arounds …
- NASA NTRS 2021 · Accepted Manuscript (Version with final changes)
Go-Around Criteria Refinement for Transport Category Aircraft
Presently, airline pilots are trained to go around if, when lower than 500 ft above the ground, they are outside of a handful of parameters such as airspeed, position, and rate of descent.
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Conference Paper
Validation of Proposed Go-Around Criteria Under Various Environmental Conditions
This paper evaluates the effects of environmental conditions on touchdown performance under varying approach states and validates proposed go-around criteria developed using data from a previously con…
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