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Atlas / NTSB / ERA11LA200

NTSB CAROL · Event

Event ERA11LA200

2011-03-19 Hollywood, Florida, United States Airport · HWO None 1 aircraft Status: Completed

Registry · N9692D

FAA Aircraft Registry record.

Make / Model

PIPER PA-18A 150

Year of manufacture

1959 · 52 years old at event

Engine

AMA/EXPR UNKNOWN ENG

Seats / Engines

1 seats · 1 engine

Last airworthiness date

19930628

ADS-B equipped

Yes — Mode-S AD8037

Registrant of record

VAN WAGNER AERIAL MEDIA LLC

Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).

Aircraft involved

Probable cause & findings

A total loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

Factual narrative

On March 19, 2011, about 1515 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-18A “150”, N9692D, registered to and operated by Van Wagner Aerial Media LLC, was landed hard during a forced landing, following a reported total loss of engine power, at North Perry Airport, Hollywood, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 banner tow flight. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, was not injured. The flight originated about 1 hour 20 minutes earlier from North Perry Airport. The pilot stated that after departure he flew a banner for the prescribed time and proceeded to return to North Perry Airport where he intended to drop the first banner and pick up a second banner. About 1 mile before arrival at the airport, he moved the fuel selector to the left tank position and placed the mixture control to the full rich. After dropping the first banner he remained in the banner traffic pattern and deployed a hook for the second banner. He turned base and final then descended in order for the hook to catch the banner tow rope suspended between poles. He slowly added full power and rotated to begin to climb but the engine, which powered up some, “completely shut off”, with no sputtering noted. At that time the airplane was between 50 and 100 feet above ground level. He immediately applied forward elevator control input and verified that the mixture was full rich and the fuel selector was on the left tank. Prior to touchdown, he applied aft elevator control input but there was no response and the airplane landed hard. Personnel from the operator arrived immediately after the crash and secured the airplane which included moving the fuel selector from the left to off position, and moving both magneto switches from on to off positions. The battery was placed from the on to off position, and the throttle control which was in the full forward position was moved to the idle or throttle closed position. The mixture control which was leaned out slightly was moved to the idle cut-off position, and the carburetor heat which was extended approximately 1/2 inch, was pulled out to 3/4 inch extension. With the fuel selector in the off position, the fuel strainer was checked and only drips of fuel were noted. The fuel selector was placed in the left and right positions and fuel flowed normal. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness inspector reported the airplane impacted the ground west of runway 18R, slide 23 feet, nosed up striking the propeller, then came to rest upright. Both wings and fuselage sustained substantial damage. An adequate quantity of fuel was noted in the left, and two right fuel tanks. No fuel leakage was noted at the accident site. During recovery of the airplane fuel leakage was noted from the right fuel vent. Following recovery of the airplane, with FAA oversight, fuel was noted in the carburetor bowl. Throttle control cable continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the carburetor. With the engine installed in the airframe, a replacement propeller was installed, and the engine was started and operated to 1,500 rpm. During the engine run, the fuel selector was moved to the left and right positions with no engine discrepancies noted. A surface observation weather report taken at the accident airport at 1453, or approximately 22 minutes before the accident, indicates in part that the temperature and dew point were 26 and 14 degrees Celsius, respectively. Federal Aviation Administration Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-09-35, dated June 30, 2009, related to carburetor icing prevention, indicates that based on the temperature and dew point readings about the time of the accident, the conditions were favorable for serious icing at glide power. The pilot departed on a banner tow flight with an adequate supply of fuel, and flew for about 1.5 hours before returning to the departure airport. He dropped the first banner, descended, then climbed to pick up the second banner. As he applied power, the engine initially responded, but then it lost power about 50 to 100 feet above ground level with no sputtering noted. The pilot applied forward elevator control input and verified that the mixture was full rich and that the fuel selector was on the left tank. Prior to touchdown, he applied aft elevator control input, but there was no response, and the airplane landed hard. Operator personnel reported that both magneto switches were in the on position, the fuel selector was in the left tank position, the carburetor heat was pulled slightly, the throttle was full forward, and the mixture control was slightly leaned. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the inboard and outboard fuel tanks contained fuel; however, the amount in each tank was not quantified. However, the amount was adequate to sustain engine power. No fuel was found in the fuel strainer; however, fuel was in the carburetor bowl. A replacement propeller was installed, and the engine was test run and it operated satisfactorily. The conditions about the time of the accident were favorable for serious carburetor icing at glide power. The reason for the lack of fuel in the fuel strainer and the loss of engine power could not be determined. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

  • C Aircraft-Aircraft power plant-(general)-(general)-Failure - C
  • C Not determined-Not determined-(general)-(general)-Unknown/Not determined - C
  • Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Temp/humidity/pressure-Conducive to carburetor icing-Effect on operation

Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file NTSB_2011_ERA11LA200.txt. Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb. Full investigation docket on data.ntsb.gov ↗.

Related research

What the literature says.

Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (icing, stall). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.

Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗