ERA14LA440
2014-09-15 · St. Petersburg, Florida, United States · Serious · 1 aircraft · Status: Completed
Airport SPG
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
A total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion, which resulted from the pilot’s improper preflight fuel planning and in-flight fuel management.
Factual narrative
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 15, 2014, about 1030 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-180, N15833, was substantially damaged when it collided with trees and terrain, following a total loss of engine power while maneuvering for landing at Albert Whitted Airport (SPG), St. Petersburg, Florida. The foreign rated pilot-rated passenger seated in the left front seat and the pilot-rated passenger seated in the right rear seat were seriously injured, the pilot seated in the right front seat and the passenger seated in the left rear seat received minor injuries. The airplane was owned by Advanced Technology Training, LLC and operated by a private individual under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed. The flight originated from Tallahassee Regional Airport (TLH), Tallahassee, Florida, about 0830. According to the pilot, a few days prior to the accident he completed a "check-ride" in the accident airplane. He, along with the pilot-rated passengers, were planning to fly from an airport near New Orleans to an airport in New York via several planned stops along the way, including going to Key West, Florida. The day prior to the accident, the airplane had been fueled with almost 40 gallons of fuel, at the Pensacola International Airport (PNS), Pensacola, Florida, prior to their flight to TLH, which landed the evening prior. The pilot further stated that on the morning of the accident flight, he completed the pre-flight checklist and was "comfortable" that the fuel was sufficient for their flight to SPG. He further reported that while enroute he followed the "normal" leaning procedure utilizing the exhaust gas temperature gauge. As they neared the destination the pre-landing checklist was completed and the left fuel tank was selected as it was the "fuller" fuel tank. About 350 feet above ground level, they advanced the throttle to reduce the rate of descent, at which time it was noted that the engine was not operating. The pilot reported that the next recollection was being conscious in the airplane after impact.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot, age 48, held a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land issued August 29, 2014, which was issued on the basis of his British issued pilot license. He also held a second-class airman medical certificate issued June 29, 2014, with no limitation. The pilot reported 260 total flight hours; however, did not report the total amount of hours in the accident airplane make and model. According to documentation provided by the British government, the pilot-rated passenger in the left front seat and the pilot-passenger in the rear seat were licensed pilots in the United Kingdom; however, no Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificates were located at the time of the accident.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The four-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear airplane, was manufactured in 1972, serial number 28-7305158. It was powered by a Lycoming O-360-A4A, 180-hp engine and driven by a Hartzell fixed-pitch propeller. Review of copies of maintenance logbook records showed an annual inspection was completed November 8, 2013, at a recorded tachometer reading of 4372.16 hours, and an engine time since major overhaul of 441.2 hours. The tachometer was observed at the accident site and indicated 4418.25 hours.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 1050 recorded weather observation at SPG, located 1 mile to the south, of the accident location, included wind from 170 degrees at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 29 degrees C, dew point 22 degrees C; barometric altimeter 30.15 inches of mercury.
WRECAKGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Initial examination of the airplane and engine by an FAA inspector revealed that the airplane came to rest upright on the nose and right main landing gear, in a neighborhood park. The left wing was impact separated and was located in the vicinity of the main wreckage and initial tree strikes. Flight control continuity was confirmed to the elevator from the control column located in the cockpit. The wing flaps were in the full extended position. The fuel selector valve, located in the cockpit, was selected to the left fuel tank position. The left wing fuel tank was intact, and contained approximately 12 ounces of fuel. The right wing tank was intact, and contained about 80 ounces of fuel. No blight was observed on the vegetation in the vicinity of the wreckage except for an approximate 6 inch circle located near the initial ground impact location.
VIDEO RECORDING
A camera was located within the wreckage and FAA inspectors downloaded the video prior to NTSB notification. The downloaded data included two video files that were transmitted electronically to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory. Both video recordings were taken out the right rear window of the airplane. Audio enhancement techniques for both video files produced no useable information regarding any conversation between the pilot and any of the airplane occupants. According to a photograph taken by one of the occupant's camera, the GPS showed that the flight had a groundspeed of 95 knots. When the photograph was taken, indicated the flight was at 2,000 feet above mean sea level and 26.2 miles from the destination airport. The photograph also revealed that the left wing fuel quantity gauge indicated approximately 5 gallons of fuel. The right wing fuel quantity gauge indicated no fuel.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Examination of fuel records at TLH revealed that the pilot did not purchase fuel after it arrived on September 14, 2014. However, fuel records were located at a fixed base operator (FBO) at PNS, time stamped September 14, 2014, at 1506. According to a copy of the fuel ticket 25 gallons of fuel was requested in each fuel tank, and the fuel receipt indicated 39.8 gallons of fuel was purchased, which according to FBO personnel, topped off, or completely filled, the fuel tanks. According to the pilot's operating handbook, the airplane's fuel capacity was 50 gallons, of which 48 gallons were usable. The fuel consumption rate in cruise varied between 8.1 gallons per hour (gph) and 10.5 gph depending on the power setting and utilizing the lean procedures provided by the engine manufacturer. The fuel required for the taxi, full-power takeoffs, climbs, and landing approach during the two flights were not computed. The airplane had flown approximately 4 hours since being fueled; however, the investigation could not conclusively determine the altitude, route of flight, or power setting utilized during either of the two flights. The pilot reported that he completed a preflight inspection and was "comfortable" that the amount of fuel on board was sufficient for the flight. He and the pilot-rated passengers then departed on the personal flight. The pilot reported that, while preparing to land, he selected the left wing fuel tank because he believed it was "fuller" than the right wing fuel tank. When the airplane was about 350 ft above ground level, he noted that the engine was not producing power. At this point, the airplane had been flown about 4 hours since being fueled. During the subsequent forced landing, the airplane impacted trees and terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the cabin, fuselage, and left wing. Both wing fuel tanks remained intact, and no signs of in-flight or postaccident fuel leakage were found. A photograph taken while in-flight about 26 miles from the destination airport revealed that the left fuel tank gauge indicated about 5 gallons of fuel and that the right fuel tank gauge indicated no fuel. Postaccident examination revealed that the left wing fuel tank contained about 12 ounces (about 0.09 gallon) of fuel and that the right wing fuel tank contained about 80 ounces (about 0.63 gallon) of fuel. According to the airplane manufacturer, the fuel tanks had a total capacity of 50 gallons, 2 gallons of which were unusable. It is likely that the pilot did not conduct adequate preflight planning and in-flight fuel management to ensure that there was sufficient fuel for the flight and that all of the usable fuel was exhausted during the flight, which resulted in a total loss of engine power on final approach to the destination airport. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.
- C Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid level - C
- C Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid management - C
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Fuel planning-Pilot - C
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Pilot - C
- — Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Tree(s)-Contributed to outcome
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2014_ERA14LA440.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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