NTSB CAROL · Event
Event ERA17LA311
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The pilot's inadequate preflight planning and improper takeoff technique, which resulted in an exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall.
Factual narrative
On September 3, 2017, about 0920 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-300, N544DG, was substantially damaged when it collided with water during takeoff at Merritt Island Airport (KCOF), Merritt Island, Florida. The private pilot and three passengers were not injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Marsh Harbour International Airport (MYAM), Marsh Harbour, Bahamas.The pilot reported that prior to the flight, he fueled the airplane to a total of 80 gallons of 100-low-lead aviation gasoline. He then completed a preflight inspection of the airplane and subsequent engine run-up prior to takeoff, with no anomalies noted. The pilot added that although the automated surface observation system reported the wind from 350° at 5 knots, the wind was light and variable at the time of the accident. Additionally, an airplane was in the airport traffic pattern and using runway 11, so the pilot elected to depart in that direction. The pilot initially stated that he extended the flaps "two notches" and rotated the airplane at 80 knots, about two-thirds down the 3,601-foot asphalt runway. He later stated that the flaps were retracted during the takeoff attempt. A witness, who was a flight instructor at a fixed-based-operator, was standing near a hangar and observed the accident takeoff. The witness stated that his attention was drawn to the accident airplane as it used more of a ground roll during the takeoff attempt than what he was accustomed to seeing. Specifically, the airplane did not rotate until about 2,300 feet down the runway. The nose initially pitched up about 5° and the airplane climbed about 20 to 30 feet above ground level. Then, as the airplane approached trees, the nose pitched up about 15° and the left wing dropped, consistent with a stall. The witness added that the pilot initially reported the engine "quit," but the witness heard engine noise throughout the takeoff, until the airplane impacted the water. Review of airport surveillance video revealed that the airplane had not lifted off as it traveled off the right side of camera view, about 600 feet prior to the departure end of the runway. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The inspector rotated the propeller and confirmed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity to the rear accessory section of the engine. During rotation, the inspector noted saltwater emitting from the exhaust. The inspector did not attempt a test-run of the engine as saltwater remained in the engine and had corroded one of the magnetos. The pilot provided weights of the occupants and baggage, and estimated 75 gallons of fuel onboard at takeoff. Based on information provided by the pilot, the airplane was about 117 lbs. below its maximum takeoff weight of 3,600 lbs. The witness estimated 12 bags on board and their combined weight more than double the 100 lbs. that the pilot reported; however, the bags were wet after the accident and could not be accurately weighed. Additionally, the airplane held a total of 94 gallons of useable fuel and the exact fuel load during the takeoff attempt could not be determined. The recorded weather at an airport located about 8 miles southeast of the accident site, at 0853, was: wind from 330° at 6 knots; visibility 10 miles; few clouds at 6,500 ft; temperature 26° C; dew point 24° C; altimeter 30.09 inches of mercury. Review of a pilot's operating handbook for the make and model airplane revealed that at 80° F, with flaps retracted, at 3,600 lbs., with a 3-knot tailwind, at sea level, the airplane required about 2,900 feet to clear a 50-foot barrier. The data assumed a liftoff speed of 64 knots and a barrier speed of 69 knots. The private pilot attempted to take off for the personal flight with three passengers from a 3,601-ft-long asphalt runway. Video footage and a witness confirmed that the airplane did not rotate and become airborne until it was near the end of the runway. The nose initially pitched up about 5°, and the airplane climbed about 20 to 30 ft above ground level. As the airplane approached trees, the nose pitched up about 15° and the left wing dropped, consistent with a stall. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Pilot estimates regarding occupant/baggage weights and the available fuel on board suggest that the airplane was slightly below its maximum allowable takeoff weight. However, although the exact baggage weight and fuel load during takeoff could not be determined, witness estimates of baggage weight and the airplane's total capacity for usable fuel suggest that the airplane was likely at or above its maximum gross weight. The pilot reported that he rotated the airplane at 80 knots. He also initially reported that he attempted the takeoff with "two notches" of flap extension but subsequently stated that the takeoff was with the flaps retracted. Although performance data indicate that the takeoff could be accomplished in about 2,900 ft at maximum gross weight with flaps retracted, the pilot likely did not fly the airplane at the optimal airspeeds recommended in the pilot's operating handbook for the airplane make and model, which were 64 knots at rotation and 69 knots at an altitude of 50 ft. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Weight/balance calculations-Pilot - C
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Performance calculations-Pilot - C
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
- C Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Angle of attack-Not attained/maintained - C
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2017_ERA17LA311.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (stall). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- NASA NTRS 2026 · Conference Paper
Computational Analysis of Steady State Aerodynamics of Transonic Truss-Braced Wing Configuration in Deep Stall
This study presents a computational investigation of steady state aerodynamics of the Subsonic Ultra-Green Aircraft Research (SUGAR) Transonic Truss-Braced Wing (TTBW) configuration over a wide range …
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Automating Bird Diverter Installation through Multi-Aerial Robots and Signal Temporal Logic Specifications
This paper tackles the task assignment and trajectory generation problem for bird diverter installation using a fleet of multi-rotors.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Variation of Critical Crystallization Pressure for the Formation of Square Ice in Graphene Nanocapillaries
Two-dimensional square ice in graphene nanocapillaries at room temperature is a fascinating phenomenon and has been confirmed experimentally.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Polycrystallinity enhances stress build-up around ice
Damage caused by freezing wet, porous materials is a widespread problem, but is hard to predict or control. Here, we show that polycrystallinity makes a great difference to the stress build-up process…
- arXiv 2022 · arXiv preprint
Enhanced Prediction of Three-dimensional Finite Iced Wing Separated Flow Near Stall
Icing on three-dimensional wings causes severe flow separation near stall. Standard improved delayed detached eddy simulation (IDDES) is unable to correctly predict the separating reattaching flow due…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2021 · Journal article (JAAER)
Analysis on the Negative Emotional, Physiological, and Cognitive Responses Elicited from of the Activation of a Stall Alarm
Failing to identify an aerodynamic stall can lead to the inability of an aircraft to sustain flight. To warn pilots of an impending or fully-developed stall, many aircraft have safety devices installe…
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