Event ERA23FA252

Factual narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 31, 2023, at 1435 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 180, N3178D, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The airline transport pilot was seriously injured, and the passenger was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. On the day of the accident, the pilot departed, Farmers Pride Airport (9N7), Fredericksburg, Pennsylvania, about 0815 on a 3-leg, cross-country flight. Before the pilot’s departure from 9N7, the airport owner observed the pilot servicing his airplane with fuel. ADS-B track data and photographs provided from the pilot’s cellular telephone revealed that, after departing 9N7, he flew for about 1.2 hours before landing and parking the airplane about 0930 at Brokenstraw Airport (P15), Pittsfield, Pennsylvania. The airport’s owner recalled seeing a “Cessna 180 or 185” and was certain that the airplane was not serviced with fuel. The airplane departed P15 about 1028 and flew for about 1.2 hours before the pilot landed and parked at a private grass strip in Rowlesburg, West Virginia. In a telephone conversation, the property owner said that he was not on the property that day, but that fuel was not available at his airstrip. The airplane departed the grass strip on the final leg of the flight about 1324. The pilot was receiving visual flight rules flight following services when he announced his intention to divert to Capital City Airport (CXY), about 9 statute miles ahead of the airplane along its route of flight, and about 30 miles from 9N7. Within 5 miles of CXY, the pilot announced that the airplane had sustained an “engine failure.” The airplane was aligned for landing on runway 08 when it collided with terrain and a utility vehicle 1 mile short of the runway in a highway interchange toll plaza. The ADS-B track data was incomplete, and the time for engine start, run-up, taxi, takeoff, and initial climb for each of the three flights that day could not be accounted for. (See Figure 1.) Figure 1. – ADS-B Flight Track Depictions In written statements, several witnesses described the engine sound as, “erratic… sputtering… cutting in and out… [and] losing power, then it would come back and go off again” as the airplane passed overhead approaching the accident site. The pilot was interviewed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspectors three weeks after the accident. He stated that he filled the airplane’s fuel tanks to the “brim,” ensuring the full 55-gallon useable fuel load. The pilot stated that, according to the airplane’s Hobbs meter, the first leg was 1.3 hours in duration, the second was 1.4 hours, and that he did not service the airplane with fuel at either stop. The pilot said that, while en route on the final 165-nautical-mile leg, he considered stopping at Carlisle Airport (N94), Carlisle, Pennsylvania, for fuel, but decided to continue an additional 15 miles to CXY due to his concern about fuel availability at N94. Records revealed that fuel was available and dispensed at N94 on the day of the accident. Shortly after passing directly over top of N94 at 3,500 ft in a cruise configuration, the airplane’s engine lost power. The pilot’s remedial actions failed to restore engine power, and he selected an interstate highway for his forced landing site but he was unable to recall events after that. The pilot added that he completed 3 takeoffs and climbs to cruise altitudes that varied between 3,000 ft and 5,500 ft mean sea level, and that his estimated fuel requirements were based on a fuel consumption rate of 12 gph. Interpolation of the airplane’s nominal climb and approach speeds over the distances not captured by ADS-B data revealed the day’s total flight time was about 4.0 hours. At the pilot’s estimated 12 gph consumption rate, the fuel consumed would have been 48 gallons, not including the increased consumption of 16.5 gph during climb (based on the airplane manufacturer’s estimate). In addition, the manufacturer’s POH Figure 14. Take-Off and Climb Chart stated that an additional 1.5 gallons of fuel would be used for each engine start, warm-up, and takeoff, which would have added an additional 4.5 gallons of fuel consumed. The airplane contained 55 gallons of usable fuel. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held airline transport pilot, flight engineer, and flight instructor certificates with multiple ratings in both single- and multi-engine airplanes. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on October 6, 2022, and he declared 31,000 total hours of flight experience on that date. The pilot’s logbook reflected 58 hours of Cessna 180 experience. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe engine had a “Top Overhaul” performed 7 months and 31 aircraft hours before the accident. The work included the installation of new cylinders, piston pins, pushrods, and 2 ‘serviceable’ rocker arms. According to the pilot, he’d been performing recommended break-in procedures, which included running the engine “pretty hard.” AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe engine had a “Top Overhaul” performed 7 months and 31 aircraft hours before the accident. The work included the installation of new cylinders, piston pins, pushrods, and 2 ‘serviceable’ rocker arms. According to the pilot, he’d been performing recommended break-in procedures, which included running the engine “pretty hard.” WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe airplane came to rest upright against a utility bucket truck facing about 080°. The engine compartment was displaced to the right and displaced aft into the cockpit area. The firewall and instrument panel were destroyed. A significant amount of structure was cut and moved by rescue personnel to extract the occupants. A mechanic confirmed control continuity from the flight controls to all the flight control surfaces before removing the wings to transport the wreckage. The exam and the recovery of the airplane from the site were supervised by an FAA aviation safety inspector. First responders reported to the FAA inspector on scene that there was no evidence of fuel or fuel spillage at the site, but that there was an odor of fuel present. The fuel tanks were intact; about one pint of fuel was drained from the right fuel tank, and the left tank contained no fuel. Trace amounts of fuel were found in the main fuel supply line between the fuel selector and the carburetor. The fuel filler ports were each placarded with “USABLE 27.5 GAL.” Both blades of the constant speed propeller were secure in their respective hubs. One blade was bent aft about 90° at a point about 11 inches outboard of the blade root. The second blade displayed an aft bend and slight twist along its entire length. The engine exhibited minimal impact damage. The No. 5 cylinder valve cover displayed a hole in the side, the starter was separated from its attachment point, and the oil pan had a hole at the drain plug. The throttle control cable remained attached to the carburetor throttle control arm, which was separated from the carburetor. The carburetor control linkage was actuated, and fuel sprayed out of the accelerator pump feed pipe. Other than removal of the carburetor, the engine was retained in its as-found condition before run testing at Continental Aerospace Technologies’ analytical testing facility. The impact-damaged air induction system was replaced with a like system. The impact-damaged oil cooler was replaced with a suitable replacement. Removal of the original oil cooler revealed that the gasket was installed backwards, which partly blocked the oil passage. The original carburetor, magnetos, ignition harness, and spark plugs were used in the test run. During the test run, the engine produced 2,450 rpm at 27.7 inches of manifold pressure. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION§ 91.151 Fuel requirements for flight in VFR conditions. (a) No person may begin a flight in an airplane under VFR conditions unless (considering wind and forecast weather conditions) there is enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed-. (1) During the day, to fly after that for at least 30 minutes; or (2) At night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. (b) No person may begin a flight in a rotorcraft under VFR conditions unless (considering wind and forecast weather conditions) there is enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, to fly after that for at least 20 minutes. The pilot fully serviced his airplane to its 55-gallon-usable fuel capacity before departing on the 3-leg, cross-country flight. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) captured 3.6 hours of flight; however, the approaches and initial climbs on each leg were below ADS-B coverage, and the flight time and fuel consumption rates during those portions were estimated. About 30 miles from his home airport on the 3rd and final leg of the flight, the pilot announced his intention to divert to a nearby airport. Before reaching the airport, the pilot announced that the airplane had sustained a loss of engine power. The airplane was aligned with and about 1 mile from the runway when it collided with terrain and a utility vehicle in a highway interchange toll plaza. Including the 3 takeoff climbs and other segments of the flights that were below ADS-B coverage, the airplane flew for an estimated 4.0 hours. The pilot estimated the airplane’s fuel consumption to be 12 gallons per hour (gph). A chart in the airplane’s pilot operating handbook (POH) revealed that the airplane would have used an additional 1.5 gallons of fuel for each engine start, warm-up, and takeoff. Combined, these numbers suggested that, on the day of the accident, the airplane consumed at least 52.5 of the 55 gallons on board, without including the increased (16.5 gph) consumption rate during all 3 climbs as calculated by the airplane manufacturer. The pilot stated that he considered stopping for fuel about 40 miles from his home airport but was concerned about the availability of fuel at that airport, so he continued the flight. Records showed that fuel was available at the airport. Examination of the airplane at the scene revealed only trace evidence of fuel and no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A test run of the engine also revealed no anomalies. Given the amount of fuel on board at the time of departure, the estimated flight time and fuel consumption rate, and the lack of mechanical anomalies found after the accident, the loss of engine power was likely the result of fuel exhaustion. The extent of the pilot’s preflight fuel planning could not be determined, nor was it determined whether the pilot visually verified the airplane’s fuel levels before departing on each leg of the flight. The accident may have been prevented if the pilot had been more closely monitoring the airplane’s fuel state as the flight progressed. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Fuel planning-Pilot
• — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot
• — Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid level