Event ERA23LA261

Factual narrative

On June 6, 2023, about 2017 central daylight time, a Dassault-Breguet Falcon 10, N87RT, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Panama City, Florida. The pilot, copilot, and three passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The flight departed Cobb County International Airport (RYY), Atlanta, Georgia about 1932, and was destined for Northwest Florida Beaches International Airport (ECP), Panama City, Florida. According to the pilot, all the airplane’s systems (steering, engines, electrics, hydraulics, and avionics), worked normally for the taxi, takeoff, and enroute portions of the flight. The pilots set up for a straight-in ILS RWY 16 instrument approach to ECP, where night visual meteorological conditions prevailed. During the approach, the landing gear and wing flaps extended normally, and the flight crew noted that the hydraulic pressures and quantities were normal. The pilot described that during the landing, the airplane touched down about 2,500 ft from the approach end of the (10,000-ft-long) runway. The pilot then extended the airbrakes (speed brakes) and placed both engines into reverse idle. The pilot further described that the thrust reversers did not deploy and the system disagree horn annunciated. The pilot then applied normal braking and felt no deceleration. He verbalized “no brakes” and the copilot immediately tried his brakes with no effect. The pilot pulled the emergency brake handle into the first notch, which also had no effect. The pilot then pulled the handle into the second stop position (full emergency brakes), with the same result. The pilot tried recycling the brakes and thrust reversers, again, still with no effect. He elected not to abort the landing at that point because he was unsure of the position the thrust reversers (deployed or stowed) and because the airplane was approaching the end of the runway. The pilot then tried to shut down both engines with the throttles but was unable because the thrust reverser handles were still up. The pilot stated that he did not consider telling the copilot to pull the fire handles (another means of shutting down the engines) because the airplane was exiting the prepared surface of the runway and he was distracted by approaching obstacles. The pilot used the rudder to maneuver the airplane between two runway approach lighting support poles, but the airplane’s wings struck the poles, which damaged the inboard portions of the wings back to both engine inlets. The airplane bounced over a mound in the grass and then traveled into deep, soft sand where the landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to rest. The pilot subsequently moved the throttles to cut off the engines and all of the airplane occupants exited the airplane uneventfully. The pilot used the cockpit fire extinguisher to put out a small fire that had started on the left wing and airport fire and rescue personnel arrived shortly thereafter. Following the accident the pilot was taking photographs of the cockpit and noted that the thrust reverser emergency stow switches were in the unguarded, up/stow position. The pilot stated that he was surprised by this observation, noting that he had done thrust reverser checks during taxi out many times in the past and had never forgotten to cycle the switches back to the normal position. After reviewing the airplane’s systems with the operator’s chief pilot, he confirmed that the disagree horn would only sound when the thrust reversers were in the stow configuration and then attempted to be deployed. The pilot further described the series of events that occurred during the accident by stating: The thrust would normally be held to reverse idle by an interlock until the buckets had fully deployed but with the stow switches in STOW, I was reminded that you can pull the reverse levers higher, i.e. to a higher rpm. So, if I initially thought I had the reversers deployed but they were not, any further throttle movement would result in more forward thrust. I couldn’t figure out how both normal and emergency brakes could have failed simultaneously, but with 100 [knots indicated airspeed] and higher forward thrust, I overwhelmed the braking system immediately upon application. By not returning the emergency stow switches to normal, I had made the brakes have to overcome much more energy than normal. Postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed crush damage to the leading edges of both wings and slats. The slats were in an extended position and the flight spoilers/speed brakes were deployed. The flaps were fully extended, and the left inboard flap was partially separated from its normal mounting position. The mid-spar was also damaged. The horizontal and vertical stabilizers, as well as the rudder and elevator were not damaged. The forwardmost fan blades of both engines displayed damage consistent with foreign object debris contact. The nose and right main landing gear had collapsed, and the left main landing gear had broken in half at the oleo strut and was separated from its normal mounting location. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were observed during the examination. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) that would record a minimum of 30 minutes of analog audio onto a continuous loop tape. The CVR was recovered from the wreckage and forwarded to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for examination and download. The outer casing of the recorder was removed, and the crash-protected casing surrounding the magnetic tape was opened. The tape was severed near the erase head and portions of the tape showed other signs of physical distortion. The tape was repaired, flattened, and loaded onto a new reel. Audio data from the tape was then successfully digitized using established lab procedures. The recording contained four channels of audio information and included over-the-air communications between the aircraft and air traffic control using a callsign of N20CF. The accident airplane had previously been registered as N20CF; however, the registration was changed to N87RT in 2017. Thus, the audio information contained on the tape was from 2017 or earlier. The CVR did not contain data from the accident flight and none of the recovered audio was pertinent to the accident investigation. The airplane’s thrust reversers were installed under a supplemental type certificate (STC). Review of the Left and Right Thrust Reverser Automatic Throttle Retarder and Emergency Stow System Check contained in Airplane Flight Manual Supplement No. 1 provided by the STC holder revealed that the checklist included, “Reverser throttles…STOW POSITION” and EMERGENCY STOW switch guard…DOWN.” Review of the “Falcon 10/100” checklist found in the cockpit revealed that it was marked “For Training Purposes Only” and for an airplane that was not equipped with thrust reversers. Upon arriving at the destination airport, the business jet touched down about 2,500 ft beyond the threshold of the 10,000-ft-long runway. The pilot extended the airplane’s flight spoilers and attempted to activate the thrust reversers, but the airplane did not decelerate as expected and a warning horn sounded. The pilots then attempted to apply normal followed by emergency braking, both of which were ineffective in slowing the airplane. The airplane subsequently overran the runway and struck several approach lighting stanchions, coming to rest after the landing gear collapsed. The airplane’s occupants were uninjured, but the airplane was substantially damaged during the accident sequence. Following the accident, the captain noticed he had forgotten to move the thrust reverser emergency stow switches to their normal operating position after completing a preflight check. The warning horn heard during the landing was an indication of the stowed thrust reverser switches. The ineffective braking likely occurred because of the engines’ increased thrust output due to the attempted application of the thrust reversers with the switches in the stowed position. A postaccident examination of the wreckage confirmed that there was no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane checklist found in the cockpit was marked “For Training Purposes Only” and for an airplane that was not equipped with thrust reversers. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Aircraft-Aircraft power plant-Engine exhaust-Thrust reverser-Incorrect use/operation
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Preflight inspection-Flight crew
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of checklist-Flight crew