GAA16LA086

Factual narrative

***This report was modified on January 26, 2017. Please see the public docket for this accident to view the original report.*** On December 10, 2015, about 1705 central standard time, a Hawker Beechcraft Corp 390, N50VM, was substantially damaged during a landing attempt and subsequent hard landing at Chicago Executive Airport (PWK), Wheeling, Illinois. The pilot/owner, second pilot, and five passengers were not injured. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which originated at Monmouth Executive Airport (BLM), Farmingdale, New Jersey, about 1545. The airplane was privately owned and operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilots each provided statements regarding the event. The first pilot (who was the owner) stated that he was acting as pilot-in-command for the flight, having recently attained a single-pilot type rating in the airplane make and model, and the second pilot was acting as a "co-pilot/mentor." The second pilot stated that he had been asked to join the pilot on the flight for a "sense of security," since he had several years of experience and was type-rated in the airplane make and model. During the flight, the first pilot manipulated the flight controls, and the second pilot handled radio communications with air traffic control (ATC). The first pilot stated that they obtained the automated weather information for the airport, which reported wind from 250 degrees at 16 knots (kts), with gusts to 29 kts. According to the pilot, after stating to the second pilot that he was uncomfortable with the crosswind (they were landing on runway 16), the second pilot said he was comfortable and would land the airplane; the second pilot then encouraged the first pilot to attempt the landing and he would help. The second pilot stated that he told the first pilot several times to go around if he didn't feel comfortable at any point in the approach. Shortly thereafter, another pilot on the radio frequency reported to ATC that the wind was gusting to 50 kts. ATC then called the accident airplane to confirm that they had heard the wind report, and the second pilot, who was still handling the radio communications, confirmed that they had. The first pilot stated that, about 45 ft above the runway, the airplane experienced a strong gust of wind and the second pilot "grabbed" the flight controls "without calling out, 'my plane.'" The left wing impacted the ground, and the second pilot initiated a go-around. The second pilot stated that he had called for a go-around prior to taking the flight controls, but that the first pilot "seemed to be frozen." The second pilot then reconfigured airplane for landing on runway 30, and the first pilot stated that the aural "wind shear" warning was sounding throughout the approach. Upon touchdown, the airplane's right main landing gear exited the runway surface, then impacted the raised curb between the grass and taxiway surface. The first pilot resumed control, and taxied the airplane off of the taxiway. Examination revealed substantial damage to the right wing. Both pilots reported that the airplane had no preaccident mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. In a written statement after the accident, the first pilot said he did not feel comfortable landing in the wind conditions present at the time of the accident, and, as pilot-in-command, he should have diverted to another airport with more favorable conditions. The 1652 automated weather observation at PWK included wind from 250 degrees at 16 kts with gusts to 28 kts, 10 miles visibility, an overcast cloud layer at 3,500 ft, temperature 11 degrees C, dew point 4 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.51 in of mercury. The observation included a peak wind from 260 degrees at 41 kts, recorded at 1640. The first pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine land and instrument airplane as well as a type certificate in the accident airplane make and model. He reported 1,330 total hours of flight experience, of which 28 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. All 28 hours had been accrued in the 30 days before the accident. The second pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land as well as several type ratings, including in the accident airplane make and model. He reported 4,500 total hours of flight experience, of which 1,250 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. PWK was equipped with three runways:16/34, 12/30, and 6/24. Runway 16/34 was 5,001 ft long by 150 ft wide; runway 12/30 was 4,415 ft long by 75 ft wide; and runway 6/24 was 3,677 ft long by 50 ft wide. The airport was equipped with an air traffic control tower, which was operating at the time of the accident. According to the airframe manufacturer, the maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane was 25 kts. Based on the ATIS information received before landing (250 degrees at 16 knots with gusts to 29 kts), the crosswind component at the time of the accident was between 16 and 29 kts for a landing on runway 16, and between 12 and 22 kts for a landing on runway 30. At the peak wind recorded by the automated observation, the crosswind component was about 41 kts for runway 16, and about 31 kts for runway 30. The first pilot, who was the owner of the light jet and had recently received a type rating in the airplane, was acting as pilot-in-command for the flight and was seated in the left seat. A second pilot, who was also type-rated and experienced in the airplane make and model and was accompanying the first pilot as a mentor, was seated in the right seat and handled radio communications throughout the flight. As they neared the destination airport for an approach to runway 16, the pilots received the most recent weather information, which included wind from 250 degrees at 16 knots (kts) with gusts to 29 kts. Shortly thereafter, another pilot on the frequency reported wind gusts of 50 kts upon landing. The first pilot expressed concern about landing in such windy conditions, but the second pilot encouraged him to continue. About 45 ft above the runway, the airplane experienced a strong gust of wind; the left wing impacted the ground, and the second pilot initiated a go-around.  The second pilot then reconfigured the airplane for a landing on runway 30; the aural "wind shear" warning was sounding throughout the approach. Upon touchdown, the airplane's right main landing gear exited the runway surface and impacted the raised curb between the grass and taxiway surface. Both pilots reported that there were no preaccident airplane anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The maximum demonstrated crosswind component of the airplane was 25 kts. Given the reported wind conditions about the time of the accident, the crosswind component was at least 16 to 29 kts during the first landing attempt, and may have been greater based on the pilot report of gusts. Thus, the pilots should not have attempted the landing, because the gusts had the potential to exceed the airplane's maximum demonstrated crosswind component. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.

• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Copilot - C
• C Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Lateral/bank control-Not attained/maintained - C
• C Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Directional control-Not attained/maintained - C
• F Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot - F
• F Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Identification/recognition-Copilot - F
• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Gusts-Decision related to condition