NTSB CAROL · Event
Event IAD04CA015
Registry · N11253
FAA Aircraft Registry record.
Make / Model
WACO ASO
Year of manufacture
1931 · 73 years old at event
Engine
CONT MOTOR W670 SERIES (250 hp)
Seats / Engines
3 seats · 1 engine
Last airworthiness date
19780718
ADS-B equipped
Yes — Mode-S A036C4
Registrant of record
PATTERSON JOHN MILES II
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The pilot's inadequate remedial action to wake turbulence. A factor was the pilot's failure to recognize that the takeoff conditions were conducive to wake turbulence.
Factual narrative
On April 9, 2004, at 1923 eastern daylight time, a Waco ASO, N11253, was substantially damaged during takeoff at Lexington-Bluegrass Airport (LEX), Lexington, Kentucky. The certificated private pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for local personal flight, conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported that he had initiated the takeoff roll from a position on the runway where an MD-80 had previously touched down. When the pilot began the takeoff roll, the airplane's tail elevation was normal until it "spontaneously" went higher. The pilot lowered the tail; however, it again went higher, and the propeller hit the runway. The pilot again tried to lower the tail, but it went higher still, with a "heavier contact of the propeller," and the airplane then nosed over. The pilot also noted that, "there seemed to be some lateral turbulence during the takeoff." According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the pilot initiated the takeoff attempt on runway 22, at intersection C. The airplane rolled approximately 200 feet, then nosed over. Two additional FAA inspectors confirmed that the accident airplane entered the runway just after an MD-80 had landed, and when the pilot began his takeoff roll, the MD-80 had just taxied clear of the runway. Runway 22 was 7,003 feet long and 150 wide, and intersection C was about 1,500 feet from the approach end. Winds recorded at the airport, about 15 minutes before the accident, were from 020 degrees true at 3 knots. According to FAA Advisory Circular 90-23F, "Aircraft Wake Turbulence," wing vortex circulation "is outward, upward and around the wing tips," and "vortices from larger (transport category) aircraft sink at a rate of several hundred feet per minute, slowing their descent and diminishing in strength with time and distance behind the generating aircraft." In addition, "when vortices of larger aircraft sink close to the ground (within 100 to 200 feet) they tend to move over laterally over the ground at a speed of 2 to 3 knots." The advisory circular also noted that, "a tailwind condition can move the vortices of the preceding aircraft forward into the touchdown zone," and that, "the light quartering tailwind requires maximum caution." It also stated that pilots should be "particularly alert" in conditions where vortices could remain in a touchdown area, and in capital letters stated, "WHETHER OR NOT A WARNING OR INFORMATION HAS BEEN GIVEN, THE PILOT IS EXPECTED TO ADJUST AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AND FLIGHT PATH AS NECESSARY TO PRECLUDE SERIOUS WAKE ENCOUNTERS." The pilot initiated his takeoff roll from a runway position where a transport airplane had previously touched down. When the pilot began the takeoff roll, the transport airplane had just cleared the runway. During the takeoff roll, airplane's tail elevation was normal until it "spontaneously" went higher. The pilot lowered the tail; however, it again went higher, and the propeller hit the runway. The pilot again tried to lower the tail, but it went higher still, with a "heavier contact of the propeller," and the airplane then nosed over. The pilot also noted that there "seemed to be some lateral turbulence during the takeoff." At the time of the accident, there was a 3-knot, quartering tailwind. According to FAA Advisory Circular 90-23F, "Aircraft Wake Turbulence," a light quartering tailwind "requires maximum caution." In addition, "Whether or not a warning or information has been given, the pilot is expected to adjust aircraft operations and flight path as necessary to preclude serious wake encounters." Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2004_IAD04CA015.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (wake turbulence, turbulence). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- arXiv 2026 · arXiv preprint
Right in Time: Reactive Reasoning in Regulated Traffic Spaces
Exact inference in probabilistic First-Order Logic offers a promising yet computationally costly approach for regulating the behavior of autonomous agents in shared traffic spaces.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2025 · Journal article (IJAAA)
The Reasons for the Silence of First Officers: A Qualitative Study
This study explores the reasons why first officers choose to remain silent in the cockpit or refrain from reporting errors after a flight.
- Semantic Scholar 2024 · Article (BMC Medical Education)
Augmented reality visualization for ultrasound-guided interventions: a pilot randomized crossover trial to assess trainee performance and cognitive load
Augmented reality (AR) technology involving head-mounted displays (HMD) represents a significant innovation in medical education, particularly for training in guided invasive procedures.
- arXiv 2024 · arXiv preprint
Automatic Control With Human-Like Reasoning: Exploring Language Model Embodied Air Traffic Agents
Recent developments in language models have created new opportunities in air traffic control studies. The current focus is primarily on text and language-based use cases.
- Semantic Scholar 2024 · Article (The Ultrasound Journal)
Evaluation of point-of-care ultrasound training among healthcare providers: a pilot study
The use of Point-of-Care Ultrasound (POCUS) has become prevalent across a variety of clinical settings. Many healthcare professionals have started getting hands-on training.
- arXiv 2024 · arXiv preprint
Random Graph Set and Evidence Pattern Reasoning Model
Evidence theory is widely used in decision-making and reasoning systems. In previous research, Transferable Belief Model (TBM) is a commonly used evidential decision making model, but TBM is a non-pre…
Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗