NTSB CAROL · Event
Event IAD04LA043
Registry · N1XG
FAA Aircraft Registry record.
Make / Model
GREAT LAKES 2T-1A-2
Year of manufacture
1981 · 23 years old at event
Engine
LYCOMING AEIO-360 SER (180 hp)
Seats / Engines
2 seats · 1 engine
Last airworthiness date
19810312
ADS-B equipped
Yes — Mode-S A00216
Registrant of record
CLASS A COACHES LLC
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The pilot's misidentification of the runway, which resulted in the airplane striking an obscured runway marker. Factors were the tailwheel airplane's reduced forward and lateral visibility during landing rollout and inadequate maintenance of the airport facility, including the failure to replace missing runway boundary markers and a confusing mowing pattern adjacent to the runway.
Factual narrative
On August 22, 2004, about 1500 central daylight time, a Great Lakes 2T1-A2, N1XG, was substantially damaged while landing at Standard Field (1M6), Elkton, Kentucky. The certificated commercial pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The personal flight, which departed Russellville-Logan County Airport (4M7), Russellville, Kentucky, was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According to a written statement submitted by the pilot, he and a friend, who was piloting a second airplane in a "loose formation," were landing at Elkton as part of a multi-stop pleasure flight. The pilot reported that he flew to a 2-mile "initial" for the airfield, then flew directly over runway 13. About half-way down the runway, he broke left, and entered a left downwind for the runway. The second pilot continued up the runway, then also broke left, and fell in behind the first pilot. As the first pilot approached the runway, he saw a mowed area that ran the full length of the field. During the landing rollout, the right main landing gear struck an "unknown" object, and the airplane nosed over. The object was later determined to be a barrel that had been obscured by tall grass. The second pilot reported in a written statement that he and the pilot flew over the airport in order to observe the runway. While on the short final leg of the approach, the second pilot noted that there appeared to be only one marker to denote the beginning of the runway. It also appeared to him that the entire fenced area was the landing area, so he elected to land just to the [left] of the "imaginary centerline." After landing, during rollout, the second pilot turned his airplane slightly right to observe the airplane in front of him, and saw that it had nosed over. About the same time, the second pilot heard a loud noise, and his airplane "bounced slightly." The pilot was sure he had struck something, but hadn't seen it. After the pilots exited their airplanes, they determined that the first pilot's airplane had struck an orange barrel, cut in half lengthwise, and placed on the ground as a runway left-side boundary marker. The second pilot's airplane had struck a 2- by 4-inch stake, about 6 feet to the left of the barrel, that was sticking out of the ground about 8-10 inches, with electrical conduit boxes attached for future airport runway lighting. Both the barrel and the conduit stake were obscured by grass. According to a written statement submitted by an official from the airport commission, the turf runway was 75 feet wide and 2,930 feet long, with orange plastic barrels serving as runway boundary markers, placed at 300-foot intervals. On a diagram, the official indicated that, at the time of the accident, the third and fourth barrels on the left side of the runway were missing, and the accident airplane struck the sixth barrel. After the accident, the two missing barrels, as well as the one struck by the accident airplane, were replaced. The airport official also stated that grass mowing was conducted "as needed," so that the runway grass remained 3 to 5 inches in height, which usually represented a 7- to 10-day interval, depending on the amount of rain. Grass outside the runway markers was mowed every other time the runway was mowed, and weed trimming around the barrels occurred every three or four times the grass was mowed. The airport official further noted that about one-third of the airport property had been mowed on the day before the accident. In a diagram, he depicted the mowed area as approximately L-shaped, containing the length of the field to the left (outside) of the runway and the approach end of runway 13, up to and including the second set of runway marker barrels (the first set indicated the beginning of the runway.) The rest of the runway had last been mowed 8 days prior to the accident. According to the 2004 Kentucky Airport Directory published by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, runway 13/31 at Standard Field Airport was 120 feet wide by 2,800 feet long. The Federal Aviation Administration Airport Facility Directory listed runway 13/31 as being 75 feet wide by 2,930 feet long. Weather, at an airport located about 16 nautical miles to the southwest, at 1452, included winds from 220 degrees true, at 6 knots. Two airplanes, in loose formation, made a left break over the runway, entered the traffic pattern, and completed a landing to the turf runway. Although visible from the air, both the runway marker and stanchion were obscured by overgrown grass during the landing rollout. During its rollout, the second airplane struck an electrical conduit mounted on a stanchion, and sustained minor damage. The runway boundary marker was half of a plastic barrel, cut lengthwise, and the stanchion was about 6 feet outboard the boundary marker, 8-10 inches high. Although visible from the air, both the runway marker and stanchion were obscured by overgrown grass during the landing rollout. Boundary markers were supposed to be located about 300 feet apart, on each side of the runway; however, two consecutive left-side runway boundary markers were missing. The left-side runway boundary markers ran almost the entire length of the airport property, about in the middle of the airport's width. One-third of the airport property had been mowed the day before the accident. The mowed area was approximately L- shaped, and included the length of the field to the left of the runway, and the approach end of the runway, up to the second boundary marker. The rest of the runway had last been mowed 8 days prior to the accident, and the pilots thought they were landing on an "imaginary centerline" in the middle of the airport. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2004_IAD04LA043.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2026 · Journal article (IJAAA)
From Reactive to Predictive: A hybrid Trust-Mediated Adoption Framework for Data-Driven Maintenance in Distributed-Authority Aviation Environments
Modern aviation maintenance operates within increasingly data-intensive technological environments, yet the operational integration of predictive maintenance into routine decision-making remains incon…
- Semantic Scholar 2025 · Article (Applied Sciences)
Decision-Making Framework for Aviation Safety in Predictive Maintenance Strategies
The implementation of predictive maintenance (PM) in aviation presents unique challenges due to strict safety requirements, complex operational environments, and regulatory constraints.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
Low-Resource Automatic Speech Recognition Domain Adaptation – A Case-Study in Aviation Maintenance
With timeliness and efficiency being critical in the aviation maintenance industry, the need has been growing for smart technological solutions that optimize and streamline the different underlying ta…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
A New Trajectory in UAV Safety: Leveraging Reinforcement Learning for Distance Maintenance Under Wind Variations
In the field of aviation, safety is a critical cornerstone, and the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems is deeply connected with this principle.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Just Culture in Aviation: A Metaphorical Study on Aircraft Maintenance Students
Just Culture, a sub-dimension of safety culture, has been a prominent and debated topic in aviation safety in recent years.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Performance PRISM: A Comprehensive Framework For Performance Measurement In Aircraft Maintenance
Aircraft maintenance is governed by rigorous safety requirements and high operational complexity, demanding robust performance measurement frameworks to ensure optimal maintenance practices.
Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗