Event LAX03LA186

Factual narrative

On June 8, 2003, at 1442 mountain standard time, a Cessna 172S, N519ER, veered off the runway, collapsing the right main and nose landing gear at Ernest A. Love Field (PRC), Prescott, Arizona. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The student pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The local solo instructional flight departed Prescott about 1410. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The student had logged about 36 hours and was on his second supervised solo, practicing touch-and-go landings on runway 21R. Immediately prior to the accident, a dual flight with his instructor went uneventfully. The winds were from 250 degrees at 13 knots, gusting to 18 knots. On the solo flight that followed, three successful takeoffs and landings were accomplished. Like the landings before it, the fourth was performed using a forward slip to compensate for the crosswind condition. Believing that the wind was coming from the left side of the runway, the student lowered the left wing into the wind and applied right ruder. Ground contact was first made with the left main landing gear followed by the right main, and nose gear. Upon adding power to takeoff again, the left wing lifted and the aircraft pivoted around the right main gear. The aircraft then veered off the left side of the runway before the student was able to regain control. The left main gear and nose gear collapsed as a result, and damage was sustained to the left wing tip, aileron, and horizontal stabilizer. The student stated that he believed he departed the runway because he did not compensate for the crosswind with enough right rudder. The student's instructor was standing near the end of runway 21L. He had a handheld transceiver and was monitoring the student's progress throughout the flight. Having just flown with the student prior to the solo, the instructor was satisfied with the student's performance under the conditions present. As he recalled, there was a left quartering head wind of approximately 6 to 10 knots with no gusts at the approach end of the runway. However, at the departure end the winds suddenly shifted and were from the right side. In the instructor's opinion, the student simply "went back to his old habit of not maintaining a crosswind correction after touching down" and thus lost control of the airplane. The student's flight training records and ERAU's curriculum were reviewed. Throughout his training and leading up to his first solo flight 1 day prior to the accident, his instructor had noted that the student was having trouble with certain flight maneuvers, including forward slips. The ERAU curriculum sets no crosswind limits for students on their initial supervised solo flights. In a METAR weather report generated by an ASOS about 10 minutes after the accident, winds were reported to be out of 250 degrees magnetic heading at 13, gusting to 18 knots. Measurements from the hours preceding the accident and hours after the accident show differing angles of crosswind direction but similar speeds and gusts. As reported by an airport operations supervisor, the equipment that measures this data is found on the south side of the airport, about 100 yards southeast of the runway 12-30 and 21L-3R intersection. According to a Cessna 172S Skyhawk Information Manual, the maximum demonstrated crosswind is 15 knots. Using the reported METAR winds immediately after the accident, the crosswind experienced would be approximately 13 knots. In an unofficial weather report conducted by ERAU, it is stated that "employees of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University reported very strong wind gusts in the Prescott Valley area earlier that afternoon in association with shower and microburst activity." When asked what he believed to be an appropriate crosswind for a student pilot to safely solo in, the Chief Flight Instructor stated that he would solo a student in a maximum of "7 to 10 knots of crosswind or 10 to 15 knots of head wind" depending on the student's skill level. However, it would be unusual to allow a student on their initial solo flights to fly under such conditions unless the student has been performing "exceptionally well." In his belief, 30 percent of the time students might find themselves having to fly in the less than favorable conditions of the afternoon due to schedule conflicts and availability of aircraft. Having flown earlier on the day of the accident, the Chief Instructor had noticed virga, but did not experience any microbursts. While practicing touch-and-go landings on his second supervised solo, the student pilot lost control of the airplane and veered off the left side of the runway. He had been compensating for a crosswind estimated by himself and his instructor to be around 10 knots, and from the left side of the runway, 21R. This compensation was accomplished using a forward slip, with the left wing down into the wind and right rudder. In the past his instructor had noted problems with the student's execution of forward slips, and attributes the accident to the student not maintaining adequate wind correction. At the time of the accident, winds at the airport were from 250 degrees at 13, gusting to 18 knots. Measurements from in the hours preceding the accident and hours after the accident show differing angles of crosswind direction but similar speeds and gusts. The airplane's performance charts indicate that a 13-knot crosswind would have been experienced under such conditions, and states that maximum demonstrated crosswind to be 15 knots. The Chief Flight Instructor stated that he would solo a student in a maximum of "7 to 10 knots of crosswind," but only if the student had been performing exceptionally well. The school's curriculum sets no crosswind limits for students on their initial supervised solo flights. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12