NTSB CAROL · Event
Event LAX05LA159
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
a loss of engine power due to the fatigue fracture and separation of the mixture control cable. The fatigue crack resulted from inadequate installation techniques by unknown maintenance personnel.
Factual narrative
On May 7, 2005, at 0901 mountain standard time, a Beech 23, N2388Q, lost engine power during takeoff and made a forced landing at the Tucson International Airport, Tucson, Arizona. The private pilot, also the registered owner of the airplane, was operating it under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot sustained minor injuries; the airplane was substantially damaged. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed. The local area, personal flight was originating at the time of the accident. According to the pilot, the run-up check was uneventful. He departed and when the airplane was about 400 feet above ground level turning the left crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern, the engine lost power completely. He made a forced landing between a taxiway and the perimeter fence on the airport. The approximate length from the airplane's touchdown point to where the airplane came to rest was about 200 feet. During the forced landing, the left main and nose landing gears were sheared from the airplane and the left wing was pulled aft. The pilot had about 50 gallons of fuel onboard. A fuel sample was drained from the right fuel tank by the Tucson Airport Police. The color and smell of the fuel was consistent with 100 low lead and no water or other contaminants were evident in the sample. There was no obvious oil spill at the accident site. According to aircraft recovery personnel, the left fuel tank sump would not drain fuel. In order to drain the fuel from the wing, he bent the drain with pliers until the fuel flowed from it. Approximately 1/2-cup of water was drained from the tank. The fuel selector was positioned to the right tank. The engine was test-run in the presence of the Federal Aviation Administration accident coordinator. The engine was started successfully; however, when full engine power was applied, the engine lost power. Closer examination revealed that the cable seemed loose between the mixture cockpit control and the attach point at the carburetor. Further examination showed that the mixture control cable attach point to the carburetor was fractured. This fracture was not evident until the outer sheath was removed from the cable. With this fracture, the mixture arm was free to move into any position, uncommanded. No other operational anomalies were noted. The fractured cable absent of its outer sheath, was sent to the National Transportation Safety Board Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C., for examination. The mixture control cable examination was completed on August 23. The control cable fractured approximately 0.35 inches from the set screw, which attaches it to the carburetor. With the fracture surfaces realigned, the wire appeared to have been bent nearly 90 degrees from its normally straight path. A scanning electron microscopy (SEM) of both surfaces revealed the existence of a fatigue crack about 1/4 of the wire's cross-sectional area and perpendicular to the wire's surface. The origin of the fatigue crack was on the outside surface of the 90-degree bend in the wire. The engine lost power during the takeoff initial climb and the airplane was damaged during a forced landing. The run-up check was uneventful. When the airplane was about 400 feet above ground level turning the left crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern, the engine lost power completely. The pilot made a forced landing between a taxiway and the perimeter fence on the airport. Post accident test-run of the engine revealed that the mixture control cable was fractured 0.35 inches from the set screw, which attaches it to the carburetor, and the carburetor mixture arm was free to move, uncommanded. This fracture was hidden by the outer sheath that covers the mixture control cable and movement of the cockpit mixture control did not produce corresponding movement of the carburetor mixture arm. With the fracture surfaces realigned, the wire appeared to have been bent nearly 90 degrees from its normally straight path. A scanning electron microscopy (SEM) of both fracture surfaces of the wire revealed the existence of a fatigue crack about 1/4 of the wire's cross-sectional area and perpendicular to the wire's surface. The origin of the fatigue crack was on the outside surface of the 90-degree bend in the wire, which suggests that the crack initiated and propagated during service while the main portion of the wire was under compression loads. The presence of the fatigue crack is indicative of an installation problem, such as overtorquing of the set screw. The fracture of this cable would not allow the pilot to properly set the mixture from the cockpit control to the carburetor. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2005_LAX05LA159.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
Beyond the agency record
Search this event elsewhere.
Pre-filled searches into the sources where news + community discussion of aviation events lives. External sources are reported, not agency. Treat them as signal that something happened, not as fact about what happened.
Entity-clustered aviation events in the press — last 24 hr + 30-day archive.
Official agency record + docket.
Investigative docket: factual reports, photos, transcripts.
Long-running aviation incident database (Flight Safety Foundation).
Community NTSB synthesis blog — often has photos and witness reports.
Gold-standard aviation incident blog.
Aviation industry news search.
GA pilot forum — informed but rumor-prone.
GA pilot subreddit search.
Tail-number page — flight history (free tier limited).
AOPA Air Safety Institute search.
Mainstream press coverage. Recent events only.
Privacy-preserving news search.
External links open in a new tab. We don't ingest their content; we deep-link search queries.
Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (stall, maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- NASA NTRS 2026 · Contractor Report (CR)
Icing Physics Studies Using the 3D SIDRM Test Article: 2023 Icing Tests Analysis
In-flight icing is an important safety issue and is a factor that affects aircraft design and performance. Newer regulations are driving a need for improvements in airframe and engine icing simulation…
- Flight Safety Foundation 2024 · FSF / AeroSafety World
Helicopter Safety Performance Data 2023
Foundation 2023 helicopter safety performance data — global accident rates by mission profile (HEMS, off-shore oil, air-tour, agricultural, news/utility).
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Exploring the atmospheric and weather conditions for hoar frost formation at OR Tambo International Airport: A case study of ground aircraft icing events for the period 2017-2023.
Ground aircraft icing has an adverse effect on the aerodynamic performance of aircrafts as well as the efficient operations of airlines and airports.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Large-eddy simulations of the NACA23012 airfoil with laser-scanned ice shapes
In this study, five ice shapes generated at NASA Glenn's Icing Research Tunnel (IRT) are simulated at multiple angles of attack (Broeren et al., J. of Aircraft, 2018).
- NASA NTRS 2023 · Presentation
NASA Icing Overview 2023
This presentation summarizes NASA icing research for an invited talk to be presented on June 22, 2023, at the SAE International Conference on Icing of Aircraft, Engines, and Structures.
- Flight Safety Foundation 2023 · FSF / AeroSafety World
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) — A 2023 Industry Refresh
Foundation 2023 CFIT data refresh — three decades after the original CFIT Task Force eliminated >95% of air-carrier CFIT, the GA + Part 135 communities still account for most CFIT fatalities.
Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗