NTSB CAROL · Event
Event NYC01LA052
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
Water/ice in the fuel system and the pilot's inadequate preflight inspection.
Factual narrative
On December 5, 2000, at 1138 eastern standard time, a Mooney M20J, N4101H, was substantially damaged during a forced landing, shortly after takeoff from Danbury Municipal Airport (DXR), Danbury, Connecticut. The certificated airline transport pilot received minor injuries, while the two passengers were uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. A visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight, between Danbury and Michael J. Smith Field (MRH), Beaufort, North Carolina. The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported that on the day of the accident, 10 gallons of fuel were added to the airplane. The pilot conducted a preflight inspection, started the engine, and allowed it to warm up before taxiing the airplane to runway 26. The pilot then conducted an engine run-up at 1,900 rpm, including cycling the propeller three times and a magneto check. After a brief delay due to arriving traffic, the pilot made a normal takeoff. About 400 to 500 feet in the air, the engine began to run roughly. Approximately 30 seconds later, the engine quit, and the pilot turned the airplane about 30 degrees to the left and performed the forced landing. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, during the forced landing, the airplane stuck a soccer field goalpost, rotated about 100 degrees to the right, and struck small trees and bramble bushes before coming to a stop about 40 feet from the goalpost. During the on-scene examination, the inspector found fuel in both tanks, and the fuel selector was in the "right tank" position. The fuel in the right fuel tank was blue and "clear of contaminants." The fuel in the left tank and gascolater was not checked due to the position of the wreckage. The electric fuel pump, which had no visible damage, was inoperative. Fuel cap seal integrity was confirmed. After the wreckage was moved to the airport, fuel was drained from the gascolater and from the fuel line to the flow divider, and "was clear of contaminants." Fuel drained from the electric fuel pump was "a little milky." The pilot reported to the inspector that the airplane had sat on the ramp for about 2 1/2 weeks with the fuel tanks half filled, and that he did not check the fuel for water prior to the accident flight. A mechanic who recovered the airplane informed the inspector that he and another employee pumped all of the fuel out of the airplane into clean 5-gallon plastic containers prior to the airplane's removal. The fuel was later moved to a clean and dry 40-gallon plastic trash container, normally used to store fuel when maintenance was being performed on other aircraft. The 40-gallon container was subsequently stored outside the hangar in sub-freezing weather with the lid secured by a bungee chord. One morning, when the mechanic came to work, he found that the plastic container had been blown over. In the bottom of the container, he found about 2 quarts of water in the form of ice. According to weather observations at Danbury, the outside air temperature had dipped to about 18 degrees Fahrenheit during the night before the accident. The temperature had remained below freezing until approximately 3 hours prior to the accident. The temperature at the time of the accident was about 43 degrees Fahrenheit. The electric fuel pump was subsequently forwarded to the manufacturer for testing under FAA supervision. The manufacturer determined that the pump had failed due to motor bearing failure, resulting from lubricant wash-out. A representative from Mooney Aircraft Company stated that the failure of the boost pump would not have resulted in the engine failure. The airplane sat on the ramp for about 2 1/2 weeks with the fuel tanks half filled. Outside air temperature had dipped to 18 degrees Fahrenheit the previous night, and was still below freezing about 3 hours before the accident. Temperature at the time of the accident was 43 degrees Fahrenheit. The pilot did not check the fuel for water prior to the accident flight. After a normal start, run-up, and takeoff, the engine failed at 400 to 500 feet in the air, and the pilot made a forced landing. Evidence of water was subsequently found in a container that held fuel removed from the airplane. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2000_NYC01LA052.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
Beyond the agency record
Search this event elsewhere.
Pre-filled searches into the sources where news + community discussion of aviation events lives. External sources are reported, not agency. Treat them as signal that something happened, not as fact about what happened.
Entity-clustered aviation events in the press — last 24 hr + 30-day archive.
Official agency record + docket.
Investigative docket: factual reports, photos, transcripts.
Long-running aviation incident database (Flight Safety Foundation).
Community NTSB synthesis blog — often has photos and witness reports.
Gold-standard aviation incident blog.
Aviation industry news search.
GA pilot forum — informed but rumor-prone.
GA pilot subreddit search.
Tail-number page — flight history (free tier limited).
AOPA Air Safety Institute search.
Mainstream press coverage. Recent events only.
Privacy-preserving news search.
External links open in a new tab. We don't ingest their content; we deep-link search queries.
Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (engine failure, maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2026 · Journal article (IJAAA)
From Reactive to Predictive: A hybrid Trust-Mediated Adoption Framework for Data-Driven Maintenance in Distributed-Authority Aviation Environments
Modern aviation maintenance operates within increasingly data-intensive technological environments, yet the operational integration of predictive maintenance into routine decision-making remains incon…
- Semantic Scholar 2025 · Article (Applied Sciences)
Decision-Making Framework for Aviation Safety in Predictive Maintenance Strategies
The implementation of predictive maintenance (PM) in aviation presents unique challenges due to strict safety requirements, complex operational environments, and regulatory constraints.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
Low-Resource Automatic Speech Recognition Domain Adaptation – A Case-Study in Aviation Maintenance
With timeliness and efficiency being critical in the aviation maintenance industry, the need has been growing for smart technological solutions that optimize and streamline the different underlying ta…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
A New Trajectory in UAV Safety: Leveraging Reinforcement Learning for Distance Maintenance Under Wind Variations
In the field of aviation, safety is a critical cornerstone, and the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems is deeply connected with this principle.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Just Culture in Aviation: A Metaphorical Study on Aircraft Maintenance Students
Just Culture, a sub-dimension of safety culture, has been a prominent and debated topic in aviation safety in recent years.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Performance PRISM: A Comprehensive Framework For Performance Measurement In Aircraft Maintenance
Aircraft maintenance is governed by rigorous safety requirements and high operational complexity, demanding robust performance measurement frameworks to ensure optimal maintenance practices.
Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗