NYC07LA032
2006-11-17 · Somerville, New Jersey, United States · None · 1 aircraft · Status: Completed
Airport SMQ
Current FAA registration · N1442E
- Make / Model
- COLUMBIA AIRCRAFT MFG LC41-550FG
- Year of manufacture
- 2006 · 0 years old at event
- Engine
- CONT MOTOR TSIO-550-C (310 hp)
- Seats / Engines
- 4 seats · 1 engine
- Last airworthiness date
- 20060924
- ADS-B equipped
- Yes — Mode-S A0B42F
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The tug driver's inadequate lookout for landing traffic before crossing the runway.
Factual narrative
On November 17, 2006, about 1600 eastern standard time, a Columbia Aircraft LC41-550FG, N1442E, was substantially damaged during a landing when it impacted another airplane being towed across the runway at Somerset Airport (SMQ), Somerville, New Jersey. The certificated commercial pilot, the certificated student pilot, and two passengers onboard the Columbia were not injured, nor was the tug driver. The local sales demonstration flight was being conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the commercial pilot reported that during the 30-minute demonstration flight, the student pilot, as the prospective customer, was in the left seat, and the commercial pilot was in the right seat. The commercial pilot also stated that he made all the necessary radio calls, "such as base and final approach," for a runway 30 landing, and that the student pilot was on the controls with him. During the final approach segment, the airplane's airspeed was 80 knots, and the commercial pilot was focusing on the point of intended touchdown. He kept the point of intended touchdown on the windscreen until "level off," did not look down the runway until the main wheels touched down, and did not notice the airplane in tow until the nose wheel touched down. At that point, both he and the student pilot were on the brakes. He tried to steer behind the towed airplane, but was unsuccessful. A review of airman records revealed that the commercial pilot was also a certificated flight instructor. When interviewed, the student pilot confirmed that the flight was a sales demonstration flight. The airplane departed Somerset, and headed west, toward Allentown where, among other things, he practiced turns and stalls. When the airplane returned to Somerset, the student pilot, with the instructor assisting, flew a normal, left pattern approach. On final approach, the student pilot did not see anything on the runway, and just prior to the flare, he still did not see anything on the runway. As soon as the airplane's nose wheel touched down for the landing, the student pilot saw the nose of the towed airplane on the right side of the runway, and the tail on the left side of the runway. The tug driver jumped off the vehicle, and the Columbia impacted the tail of the airplane in tow. According to the tug driver's written statement, when he was [about to] cross the runway with an airplane in tow, he "did not see any aircraft." However, as he was crossing the runway, he saw "a small plane landing out of nowhere." He tried to go forward and clear the runway quickly, but did not clear it in time. The landing airplane's pilot "hit his brakes but began to skid into the aircraft I was towing," and the landing airplane struck the towed airplane's tail. The student pilot reported that the tug driver was wearing hearing protection over his ears when the collision occurred, and the commercial pilot noted that he was not carrying a radio. A witness in another airplane, in a left crosswind of the landing pattern, heard the accident airplane's pilot transmit an "initial call." He did not see the airplane at first, but as he turned downwind, he located the accident airplane on short final. The witness then completed his downwind turn, and noticed two airplanes stopped on the runway, about midfield. He then realized that the runway was closed. The witness subsequently reiterated that he "only recalled hearing the initial position report from the landing aircraft, [and] the airport was relatively quiet, with little traffic." Runway 30 was 2,733 long and 65 feet wide. According to "Airport Ground Vehicles Operations, An FAA Guide," when a ground vehicle nears a runway, the driver is to "Slow down! Look both ways, and then look UP for aircraft that are landing or taking off....If an aircraft is about to land on a runway that you need to cross, stop and yield to the aircraft until it has landed and taxied clear of the runway. Then proceed." The guide also noted that "extra vigilance is key at nontowered airports. Aircraft do not have to communicate or announce their position in the pattern or on the surface...You can be lulled into complacency at nontowered airports because they usually aren't very busy, hence they don't justify a control tower." The airplane flew a normal airport traffic pattern at the non-towered airport with the pilot announcing his intention to land over the radio. During the landing roll-out, the airplane struck another airplane that was being towed across the runway. The tug driver stated that as he approached the runway, he "did not see any aircraft," but as he was crossing the runway, he saw "a small plane landing out of nowhere." He tried to go forward and clear the runway quickly, but did not clear it in time. The landing airplane skidded into the towed airplane's tail. Federal Aviation Administration written guidance reiterates that when a ground vehicle nears a runway, the driver is to slow it down, look both ways, and look up for aircraft that are landing or taking off. If an aircraft is about to land on the runway, the driver shall stop and yield to it until it has landed and taxied clear of the runway. Guidance also notes that extra driver vigilance is a key at non-towered airports. "Aircraft do not have to communicate or announce their position in the pattern or on the surface...You can be lulled into complacency at non-towered airports because they usually aren't very busy, hence they don't justify a control tower." Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2006_NYC07LA032.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
Search this event elsewhere
External sources are reported, not agency: signal that something happened, not fact about what happened.
- TallyAero Live Wire Aviation press
- NTSB CAROL Agency ↗
- NTSB Docket Agency ↗
- Aviation Safety Network Aviation press ↗
- Kathryn's Report Aviation press ↗
- Aviation Herald Aviation press ↗
- AVweb Aviation press ↗
- Pilots of America Community ↗
- Reddit /r/flying Community ↗
- FlightAware Aviation press ↗
- AOPA accident database Aviation press ↗
- Google News News ↗
- DuckDuckGo News ↗
Related research
Matched on aircraft type or causal vocabulary (stall). All research papers
- NASA NTRS 2026 · Conference Paper Computational Analysis of Steady State Aerodynamics of Transonic Truss-Braced Wing Configuration in Deep Stall
This study presents a computational investigation of steady state aerodynamics of the Subsonic Ultra-Green Aircraft Research (SUGAR) Transonic Truss-Braced Wing (TTBW) configuration over a wide range …
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint Automating Bird Diverter Installation through Multi-Aerial Robots and Signal Temporal Logic Specifications
This paper tackles the task assignment and trajectory generation problem for bird diverter installation using a fleet of multi-rotors.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint Variation of Critical Crystallization Pressure for the Formation of Square Ice in Graphene Nanocapillaries
Two-dimensional square ice in graphene nanocapillaries at room temperature is a fascinating phenomenon and has been confirmed experimentally.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint Polycrystallinity enhances stress build-up around ice
Damage caused by freezing wet, porous materials is a widespread problem, but is hard to predict or control. Here, we show that polycrystallinity makes a great difference to the stress build-up process…
- arXiv 2022 · arXiv preprint Enhanced Prediction of Three-dimensional Finite Iced Wing Separated Flow Near Stall
Icing on three-dimensional wings causes severe flow separation near stall. Standard improved delayed detached eddy simulation (IDDES) is unable to correctly predict the separating reattaching flow due…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2021 · Journal article (JAAER) Analysis on the Negative Emotional, Physiological, and Cognitive Responses Elicited from of the Activation of a Stall Alarm
Failing to identify an aerodynamic stall can lead to the inability of an aircraft to sustain flight. To warn pilots of an impending or fully-developed stall, many aircraft have safety devices installe…