Event WPR10LA219

Factual narrative

On April 28, 2010, about 1740 mountain standard time, a Rogers Rutan Defiant 40 multi-engine airplane, N23TR, sustained substantial damage following a nose landing gear collapse during landing roll at the Phoenix Deer Valley Airport (DVT), Phoenix, Arizona. The certificated airline transport pilot, the sole occupant of the airplane, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal cross-country flight, which was being operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight departed the Ontario International Airport (ONT), Ontario, California, about 1605, with DVT as its destination. In a report submitted to the Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC), the pilot reported that after turning on to base leg he lowered the nose gear and initiated a “landing check.” The pilot stated that the airplane touched down about 1,000 feet down the runway at the “normal rate of descent” and with a slight left crab. The pilot reported, “following initial touchdown and immediately upon placing weight on the nose gear, the nose of the aircraft settled to the ground and the nose gear handle quickly popped out [of] the down position. The aircraft came to a stop left of centerline.” A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector assigned to the Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), Scottsdale, Arizona , examined the airplane and reported that its forward-mounted rudder had sustained substantial damage. On May 6, 2010, a FAA airworthiness inspector assigned to the Fresno FSDO, Fresno, California, conducted an examination of the accident airplane’s nose landing gear’s extension/retraction system. The inspector reported that it was his assessment during an evaluation of the nose landing gear operation that the gear may not have been “positively” down and locked, as witnessed by the alignment marks or witness marks for the nose landing gear. The inspector further reported that during the examination the system was operated several times, and that each time if the gear handle was not placed “down firmly and hard” the alignment marks were not indicating a “SAFE” condition. The inspector stated, “When placing the gear handle down but not hard it ‘appears’ that the nose gear could be safe and down and locked, but it’s not. Taxiing on the ground that causes any sudden bounce or bump could assist the nose gear to collapse, since it’s not positively down and locked.” The pilot further reported that the down and lock indication consisted of a mechanical alignment of arrows placed down by the right ankle of the pilot. At the conclusion of the gear swings, it was found that the nose gear could be placed in "transition" vice down and locked. He also reported that the indicator arrow misalignment is extremely difficult to perceive. The pilot has since redesigned the nose gear down and locked indicator to be more easily viewed. At 1753, about 13 minutes after the accident, the automated surface observing system located at DVT reported wind 240 degrees at 18 knots with gusts to 29 knots. Peak wind of 240 degrees at 29 knots was reported at 48 minutes passed the hour, or about 8 minutes after the accident. The pilot reported that while on base leg he initiated a landing check and lowered the nose landing gear. Following initial touchdown and immediately upon placing weight on the nose gear, the nose of the airplane settled to the ground and the nose gear handle quickly popped out of the down position. During a postaccident examination of the airplane, a Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness inspector reported that the nose gear may not have been "positively" down and locked as witnessed by the alignment/witness marks. The inspector stated that when placing the gear handle down, but not “hard,” the gear indication could appear to be down and locked, but the gear could actually not be in the down and locked position. The inspector added that during the examination the gear system was operated several times. Each time if the gear handle was not placed down “firmly and hard” the alignment marks were not indicating a “SAFE” condition. The pilot further added that the mechanical alignment arrows are down by the right ankle of the pilot. In this location, an arrow misalignment is extremely difficult to perceive and the nose gear could easily be placed in "transition" vice down and locked. The pilot reported that he has since redesigned the nose gear down-and-locked indicator to be more easily viewed. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• C Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incomplete action-Pilot - C
• F Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Landing gear system-Gear position and warning-Design - F