NTSB CAROL · Event
Event WPR18LA003
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The failure of both pilots to see and avoid the other airplane while maneuvering in the traffic pattern, which resulted in a midair collision. Contributing to the accident was the controller's failure to provide adequate traffic information, issue necessary traffic advisories, and establish a safe traffic sequence for airplanes under his control in the Class D airspace.
Factual narrative
On October 7, 2017, about 1024 mountain standard time, an experimental, amateur-built Long EZ airplane, N966EZ, and a Piper PA-28-180 airplane, N15664, sustained substantial damage and minor damage, respectively, when they were involved in an accident near Tucson, Arizona. The pilot of the Long EZ and the pilot and passenger of the Piper were not injured. Both airplanes were operated as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flights. According to the air traffic control (ATC) tower transcript, at 1019:31, the Long EZ pilot reported to the RYN ATC tower, that he was over Wasson Peak, about 9 miles north of RYN, and was inbound for a full-stop landing. The controller instructed the pilot to make left traffic to runway 6L and to report 2 miles on the 45° to runway 6L. The Long EZ pilot acknowledged the transmission. At 1020:26, the Piper pilot reported about 8.5 miles northwest of RYN and that he was inbound for a full-stop landing. He was instructed to enter a left base for runway 6L. The Piper pilot acknowledged the transmission. At 1021:33, the controller instructed the Long EZ pilot to make a left 360° turn for traffic west of him that was turning for a base. The Long EZ pilot acknowledged the transmission and said he was making the turn. He was then cleared to be “number two” to land on runway 6L, following a Cessna on a left base. The Long EZ pilot acknowledged his clearance. Shortly thereafter, a garbled transmission was made, to which the controller replied, "uh got step[ped] on there say again." Another garbled transmission was made. The controller then asked who was requesting runway 6R; the Long EZ pilot responded that he was not requesting runway 6R but wanted to confirm that traffic was landing on runway 6R. The controller stated that he had a Cessna on short final for runway 6L, followed by a Long EZ, and a Piper Cherokee on about a 1-mile final for runway 6R. The Long EZ pilot transmitted that he had the wrong traffic in sight and that he now had the other landing traffic in sight on final. The controller told the Long EZ pilot to follow the traffic just over the numbers on runway 6L. In a postaccident statement, the Long EZ pilot reported that while he was on downwind, he saw a Piper “passing rapidly directly above” him from the right. The Piper pilot indicated in a postaccident statement that he began his turn for a left base for runway 6L when he noticed an airplane coming toward him from downwind. The Piper pilot stated that he attempted to avoid the other airplane but that his airplane's landing gear struck the Long EZ; the airplanes were about 1 mile northwest of RYN when they collided in midair. At 1024:39, the Piper pilot declared an emergency and advised the controller that a midair collision had occurred. The Long EZ pilot also declared an emergency, and both airplanes landed uneventfully at RYN. The Long EZ sustained substantial damage to the left rudder, and the Piper sustained minor damage to the landing gear assembly. Title 14 CFR 91.113 states that “[w]hen weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules [IFR] or visual flight rules [VFR], vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.” In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airplane Flying Handbook states the following: All pilots must be alert to the potential for midair collision and impending loss of separation. The general operating and flight rules in 14 CFR part 91 set forth the concept of "See and Avoid." This concept requires that vigilance shall be maintained at all times by each person operating an aircraft regardless of whether the operation is conducted under IFR or VFR.…Most of these accidents/incidents occur within 5 miles of an airport and/or near navigation aids. The handbook further states, "Pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vision, as well as periodically scanning the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure detection of conflicting traffic.". Regarding ATC rules and procedures, FAA Joint Order (JO) 7110.65 X, chapter 3, Airport Traffic Control—Terminal, section 1, paragraph 3-1-1, Provide Service, stated the following: Provide airport traffic control service based only upon observed or known traffic and airport conditions. NOTE-- When operating in accordance with CFRs, it is the responsibility of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft. However, due to the limited space around terminal locations, traffic information can aid pilots in avoiding collision between aircraft operating within Class B, Class C, or Class D surface areas and the terminal radar service areas, and transiting aircraft operating in proximity to terminal locations. FAA JO 7110.65 X, paragraph, 3-8-1, Sequence/Spacing Application, stated, “Establish the sequence of arriving and departing aircraft by requiring them to adjust flight or ground operation, as necessary, to achieve proper spacing.” In addition, FAA JO 7110.65 X, paragraph 3-1-6, Traffic Information, stated, “Describe the relative position of traffic in an easy to understand manner, such as ‘to your right’ or ‘ahead of you.’” Two airplanes, a Long EZ and a Piper PA-28, collided in midair while in the traffic pattern about 1 mile northwest of the airport. The Long EZ pilot reported to the air traffic control (ATC) tower about 9 miles north of the airport that he was inbound for a full-stop landing. The controller instructed the Long EZ pilot to make left traffic to runway 6L and to report 2 miles on the 45° to runway 6L, which the pilot acknowledged. About 1 minute later, the Piper pilot reported about 8.5 miles northwest of the airport that he was inbound for a full-stop landing. He was instructed to enter a left base for runway 6L, which he acknowledged. The controller then instructed the Long EZ pilot to make a left 360° turn for traffic, which the pilot acknowledged. He then cleared the Long EZ to be “number two” to land on runway 6L, following a Cessna on a left base. The Long EZ pilot acknowledged his clearance. Shortly thereafter, two garbled transmissions were made. The controller then asked who was requesting runway 6R; the Long EZ pilot responded that he was not requesting runway 6R but wanted to confirm that traffic was landing on runway 6R. The controller stated that he had a Cessna on short final for runway 6L and a Piper Cherokee on about a 1-mile final for runway 6R. The Long EZ pilot transmitted that he had the wrong traffic in sight and that he now had the other landing traffic in sight on final. The controller told the Long EZ pilot to follow the traffic just over the numbers on runway 6L. The Long EZ pilot stated that while he was on downwind, he saw a Piper “passing rapidly directly above” him from the right. According to the Piper pilot, he began his turn for a left base to the runway when he noticed an airplane coming toward him from downwind. He further stated that he attempted to avoid the other airplane but that his airplane's landing gear struck the Long EZ. Both airplanes declared an emergency and landed uneventfully. The Long EZ sustained substantial damage to the left rudder, and the Piper sustained minor damage to the landing gear assembly. The pilots of both airplanes had the final authority for the operation of their airplanes and were required to see and avoid other airplanes. Further, although no specific ATC separations were applicable during the visual flight rules pattern operation, the controller was still required to be vigilant for traffic conflicts, provide traffic information and issue traffic advisories when necessary, and establish a safe traffic sequence to the runway. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).
- C Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Monitoring other aircraft-Pilot
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Issuing instructions-ATC personnel
- C Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Monitoring other aircraft-Pilot
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Issuing instructions-ATC personnel
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2017_WPR18LA003.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (midair collision). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Airspace Saturation and Midair Collision Risk: A Case Study at a Class D Airport
Near midair collisions are precursor events to actual collisions and may be an indicator of risk. While previous studies have used reports of near midair collisions to relate factors such as airspace …
- NASA NTRS 2023 · Presentation
The Viability of See-and-Avoid for Midair Collision Avoidance for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)
Urban Air Mobility (UAM) is an emerging aviation concept that could supplement today’s ground and air transportation systems.
- NASA NTRS 2023 · Presentation
The Viability of See-and-Avoid for Midair Collision Avoidance for UAM
Urban Air Mobility (UAM) is an emerging aviation concept that could supplement today’s ground and air transportation systems.
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Other - Patent
Apparatus for aiding a pilot in avoiding a midair collision between aircraft
An apparatus for aiding a pilot in avoiding a midair collision between aircraft is described. A protected aircraft carries a transmitter, a transponder, a receiver, and a data processor; and an intrud…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2018 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Evaluating Small UAS Near Midair Collision Risk Using AeroScope and ADS-B
As small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) continue to proliferate in the National Airspace System (NAS), near midair collisions are becoming more common.
- NASA NTRS 2011 · Reprint (Version printed in journal)
Midair collisions - The accidents, the systems, and the Realpolitik
Two midair collisions occurring in 1978 are described, and the air traffic control system and procedures in use at the time, human factors implications and political consequences of the accidents are …
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