Event CEN16LA381

Factual narrative

On September 22, 2016, about 1055 central daylight time, a Scottish Aviation Series 100 Model 101 airplane, N432BD, was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a loss of engine power near Wichita, Kansas. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger were not injured. The airplane was registered to the pilot-rated passenger and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not operated on a flight plan. The flight originated from the Augusta Municipal Airport (3AU), Augusta, Kansas, about 1040.The pilot reported that he planned to complete a three-leg local flight from 3AU to the Cpt Jack Thomas Memorial Airport (EQA), to the Col. James Jabara Airport (AAO), and return to 3AU. He proceeded to EQA and completed a takeoff and landing. He then flew to AAO for two additional takeoffs and landings. After departing from AAO to return to 3AU, about 2,500 ft mean sea level, the engine "sputtered and went to idle." His attempts to restore engine power were not successful. The airplane struck a wooden fence during the subsequent forced landing. The airplane sustained damage to the leading edges of the wings. A postaccident examination was conducted by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector. During that examination, about 1.5 gallons of fuel was recovered from the accident airplane. The inspector did not observe any evidence of a fuel spill at the accident site. The fuel totalizer indicated that 7.3 gallons remained. A postrecovery engine exam was conducted under the supervision of an FAA inspector. Five gallons of fuel were added to each fuel tank. A slow leak (approximately 1 drip every 10 seconds) was observed from the left-wing fuel tank at two rivets near the area of the fence post strike. No leaks were observed from the right-wing fuel tank. The engine started and ran smoothly at idle and about 1,000 rpm. No anomalies with respect to the engine were observed. The pilot reported that about 16 gallons of fuel were on-board upon the initial departure from 3AU, with about 8 gallons remaining at the time of the takeoff from AAO. He added that "the aircraft utilizes a fuel totalizer to calculate fuel on board. A method to verify the totalizer's measurement of fuel remaining versus the actual fuel in [the] tanks is suggested." The pilot informed an FAA inspector that the airplane fuel gauges were unreliable so he used the fuel totalizer for that information. The fuel totalizer operating instructions noted that "the fuel remaining displayed by the FP-5(L) is not a measurement of the fuel in the tanks. . . . Even after verifying the calibration of the FP-5(L) it should never be used as the primary indicator of fuel quantity in the tanks." The instructions also added that "the use of the FP-5(L) does not eliminate or reduce the necessity for the pilot to use good flight planning, preflight and in-flight techniques for managing fuel." Federal regulations [14 CFR 91.205(b)(9)] require an operable fuel gauge indicating the quantity of fuel in each tank for all types of operations. The private pilot reported that the engine "sputtered and went to idle" during cruise flight while returning to the departure airport after a local flight. His attempts to restore engine power were not successful. The pilot subsequently conducted a forced landing, during which the airplane impacted a fence and sustained substantial damage. During postaccident examination, the fuel totalizer indicated that 7.3 gallons of fuel remained; however, only about 1.5 gallons of fuel was recovered from the airplane. After fuel was added to each tank, an engine run was conducted, and the engine ran smoothly at idle and about 1,000 rpm, and no anomalies were noted. The pilot reported that the airplane fuel gauges were unreliable, so he used the fuel totalizer for fuel quantity information. However, the totalizer's operating instructions stated that the instrument does not provide a measurement of the fuel in the tanks and that it "should never be used as the primary indicator of the fuel quantity." The pilot should not have used the totalizer to determine the amount of fuel onboard the airplane and his reliance on the instrument without ensuring that sufficient fuel was on board for the flight led to fuel exhaustion and a total loss of engine power. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Preflight inspection-Pilot - C
• C Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot - C
• C Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid level - C
• — Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Fence/fence post-Contributed to outcome