Event MIA05LA143

Factual narrative

On August 4, 2005, about 1200 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N513CD, sustained substantial damage when the right main landing gear brake assembly caught fire following an aborted takeoff from the Orlando Executive Airport, Orlando, Florida. The airplane was being operated as an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The airplane was operated by the pilot. The commercial certificated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an IFR flight plan was filed. The flight was en route to Tampa, Florida. The pilot reported that during the takeoff roll, he noted an intermittent loss of airspeed on the airplane's multifunction display. He said he had not achieved rotation speed, and he aborted the takeoff. After exiting the runway, he stopped the airplane on a taxiway, shut off the engine, and exited to check the pitot/static tube. He then smelled an odor, and looked under the airplane. He saw white smoke coming from the right main landing gear tire wheel pant. He heard a "poof" sound, and saw flames engulf the right wheel. Airport fire department personnel arrived and extinguished the flames. The airplane sustained fire damage to the wheel pant, and structural damage to the right main landing gear strut, the underside of the right wing, and the right wing flap. Aircraft Information The airplane has fixed, tricycle landing gear, with a free-castering nose wheel. Ground steering is accomplished by differential braking of the main landing gear wheels. The airplane's Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) contains a caution when taxiing, that states, in part: "Taxi with minimum power needed for forward movement. Excessive braking may result in overheating or damaged brakes. Damage due to overheated brakes may result in brake malfunction or failure." The manufacturer issued an Owner Service Advisory (OSA), SA 05-04, on June 30, 2005, titled "Proper Braking Practices." The advisory stated, in part: "Do not ride the brakes. Pilots should consciously remove pressure from the brakes while taxiing. Failure to do so results in excessive heat, premature brake wear, and increased possibility of brake failure." After recovery, the airplane was examined by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector from the Orlando Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), Orlando. He was assisted by an investigator from the manufacturer. The examination revealed that the right brake caliper was heat damaged, cracked and deformed. The O-rings around the caliper pistons were thermally damaged. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accrued a total of 511 hours, and 56 hours since the most recent annual inspection. The airplane's maintenance records contained several entries about the brake system. On December 16, 2004, the left brake pads were replaced, and the brake reservoir needed servicing. On December 29, the right brake was reported as leaking, and the maintenance discrepancy noted, "Removed brake calipers, found O-rings on pistons to be excessively heated due to excessive brake usage, causing piston to blow out. Found linings with cracks and chips missing. Replaced linings as needed with new, O-rings on pistons, bleed brakes, performed ops check." During the most recent annual inspection on June 3, 2005, all the brake linings were again replaced. Following the accident, the manufacturer issued Service Bulletin SB2X-32-13, on December 15, 2005, which called for the installation of improved brake assemblies. On January 18, 2006, the manufacturer issued Mandatory Service Bulletin, SB2X-32-14, that added temperature indicators on the brake assemblies, modified the wheel pant assemblies to provide access to the temperature indicators, and revised the airplane's POH. On February 9, 2006, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB), CE-06-30, which recommended compliance with the manufacturer's service bulletins. The commercial certificated pilot was departing on an IFR cross-country personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91. During the takeoff roll, he noted an intermittent loss of airspeed indication, and aborted the takeoff. After exiting the runway, he stopped the airplane on a taxiway, shut off the engine, and exited to check the pitot/static tube. He smelled an odor, and saw white smoke coming from the right main landing gear tire wheel pant. He heard a "poof", and saw flames engulf the right wheel. Postaccident examination of the right brake assembly revealed that the right brake caliper was heat damaged, cracked and deformed. The O-rings around the caliper pistons were thermally damaged. The airplane's nose wheel casters freely, and ground steering is accomplished by differential braking of the main landing gear wheels. The airplane's Pilot's Operating handbook (POH) cautions pilots that when taxiing, they should use minimum power, and notes that excessive braking may result in overheated or damaged brakes. Two months before the accident, the manufacturer issued an Owner Service Advisory (OSA), which advised pilots to not ride the brakes, which could produce excessive heat, premature brake wear, and the increased possibility of brake failure. The airplane's maintenance records contained several entries about the brake system. Eight months before the accident, the left brake pads were replaced, and the brake reservoir needed servicing. Two weeks later, the right brake was reported as leaking, and the maintenance discrepancy noted, in part: "Removed brake calipers, found O-rings on pistons to be excessively heated due to excessive brake usage, causing piston to blow out. Found linings with cracks and chips missing." Two months before the wheel fire, all the brake linings were again replaced. Following the accident, the manufacturer issued Service Bulletin SB2X-32-13, on December 15, 2005, which called for the installation of improved brake assemblies. On January 18, 2006, the manufacturer issued Mandatory Service Bulletin, SB2X-32-14, that added temperature indicators on the brake assemblies, modified the wheel pant assemblies to provide access to the temperature indicators, and revised the airplane's POH. On February 9, 2006, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB), CE-06-30, which recommended compliance with the manufacturer's service bulletins. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12