SEA02LA186
2002-09-28 · Spokane, Washington, United States · None · 1 aircraft · Status: Completed
Airport KGEG
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The flight instructor's delay of the remedial action necessary to correct for the student pilot's error during the landing flare. Factors include the student pilot's misjudgment of the aircraft's height above the runway when he initiated the flare.
Factual narrative
On September 28, 2002, approximately 1525 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N132ND, experienced a hard landing at Spokane International Airport, Spokane, Washington. The flight instructor and his student were not injured, but the aircraft, which is owned and operated by the University of North Dakota, sustained substantial damage. The 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight, which departed the same location about 25 minutes earlier, was being operated in visual meteorological conditions. No flight plan had been filed. There was no report of an ELT activation. According to the flight instructor, he told his student to make his landing on the second centerline stripe of the runway. After turning final, the student established a stabilized approach at the correct airspeed, but with a glideslope that would take him passed the desired second stripe touchdown point. Because runway length was not a critical factor, the instructor decided to let the student continue on the higher than desired glideslope so that he would learn that it would take him past the desired point of touchdown. Reportedly, when the aircraft was still about 20 feet above the runway surface, the student reduced the power to idle and started to flare prematurely, and the aircraft ultimately leveled off about 10 feet above the runway. The instructor then advised the student that they were too high, and that if they landed from that height "...it would be rough." The student therefore added power (about one-quarter throttle) and lowered the nose in order to descend to a point closer to the runway. Soon after starting to make this adjustment, the student flared a second time, and the aircraft fell to the runway surface from an altitude that was still too high. As the aircraft began to fall toward the runway, the instructor reached for the throttle in order to initiate a go-around, but just as he made contact with it, the aircraft impacted the runway with sufficient force to result in substantial damage. At that point, the instructor took control of the aircraft, completed the landing sequence, and then taxied to an area where the aircraft could be checked for damage. According to the instructor, there was no indication of any problem with the engine or flight control system that would have contributed to the accident, and the FAA Inspector who looked at the aircraft did not find evidence of any such anomaly. The flight instructor told his student to make his landing on the second centerline stripe of the runway. After turning final, the student established a stabilized approach at the correct airspeed, but with a glideslope that would take him past the desired second stripe touchdown point. Because runway length was not a critical factor, the instructor decided to let the student continue on the higher than desired glideslope so that he would learn that it would take him past the desired point of touchdown. Reportedly, when the aircraft was still about 20 feet above the runway surface, the student reduced the power to idle and started to flare prematurely, and the aircraft ultimately leveled off about 10 feet above the runway. The instructor then advised the student that they were too high, and that if they landed from that height "...it would be rough." The student therefore added power (about one-quarter throttle) and lowered the nose in order to descend to a point closer to the runway. Soon after starting to make this adjustment, the student flared a second time, and the aircraft fell to the runway surface from an altitude that was still too high. As the aircraft began to fall toward the runway, the instructor reached for the throttle in order to initiate a go-around, but just as he made contact with it, the aircraft impacted the runway with sufficient force to result in substantial damage. At that point, the instructor took control of the aircraft, completed the landing sequence, and then taxied to an area where the aircraft could be checked for damage. According to the instructor, there was no indication of any problem with the engine or flight control system that would have contributed to the accident, and the FAA Inspector who looked at the aircraft did not find evidence of any such anomaly. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2002_SEA02LA186.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
Search this event elsewhere
External sources are reported, not agency: signal that something happened, not fact about what happened.
- TallyAero Live Wire Aviation press
- NTSB CAROL Agency ↗
- NTSB Docket Agency ↗
- Aviation Safety Network Aviation press ↗
- Kathryn's Report Aviation press ↗
- Aviation Herald Aviation press ↗
- AVweb Aviation press ↗
- Pilots of America Community ↗
- Reddit /r/flying Community ↗
- FlightAware Aviation press ↗
- AOPA accident database Aviation press ↗
- Google News News ↗
- DuckDuckGo News ↗
Related research
Matched on aircraft type or causal vocabulary (go-around). All research papers
- NASA NTRS 2025 · Conference Paper A Training Study to Improve Monitoring During A Go-Around
As part of an FAA program to improve go-around (GA) safety, we were asked to determine if we could improve the performance of the Pilot Monitoring (PM) during a GA maneuver.
- Flight Safety Foundation 2024 · FSF / AeroSafety World Go-Around Safety Forum Findings
Foundation Go-Around Safety Forum technical findings — examines why pilots fail to execute go-arounds when criteria are met (stabilized approach gate not met, energy state out of envelope, traffic con…
- Semantic Scholar 2022 · Article (Journal of Safety Research) Go-around accidents and general aviation safety.
INTRODUCTION Changes in General Aviation (GA) accident rates, specifically in the go-around phase, are examined by comparing the number of accidents, the proportion of fatal accidents, and the proport…
- Semantic Scholar 2021 · Article (Aerospace) Classification and Analysis of Go-Arounds in Commercial Aviation Using ADS-B Data
Go-arounds are a necessary aspect of commercial aviation and are conducted after a landing attempt has been aborted. It is necessary to conduct go-arounds in the safest possible manner, as go-arounds …
- NASA NTRS 2021 · Accepted Manuscript (Version with final changes) Go-Around Criteria Refinement for Transport Category Aircraft
Presently, airline pilots are trained to go around if, when lower than 500 ft above the ground, they are outside of a handful of parameters such as airspeed, position, and rate of descent.
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Conference Paper Validation of Proposed Go-Around Criteria Under Various Environmental Conditions
This paper evaluates the effects of environmental conditions on touchdown performance under varying approach states and validates proposed go-around criteria developed using data from a previously con…