WPR17LA018
2016-11-10 · Hemet, California, United States · None · 1 aircraft · Status: Completed
Airport HMT
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The pilot’s failure to ensure that sufficient fuel was available for the flight, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Factual narrative
On November 10, 2016, about 1135 Pacific standard time, a Grumman American AA-1C airplane, N9556U, experienced a complete loss of engine power and landed on a field east of Hemet, California. The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were not injured; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to, and operated by, the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a local personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the flight that originated from Hemet-Ryan Airport (HMT), at 1043. The pilot reported that the airplane was last refueled, and operated, about one month prior to the day of the accident. The morning of the accident, he believed the airplane still had about 17-18 gallons of fuel for the flight. The pilot mentioned that the airplane's fuel float gauges are not accurate; therefore, he peered inside of the left fuel tank from the filler cap and observed fuel. He did not check the right fuel tank because the style of tank would restrict his view of any fuel. They departed the airport with the left fuel tank selected and practiced a few standard maneuvers; during which, the engine hesitated for a brief second. The pilot switched to the right fuel tank and they turned back towards the airport; about one minute later he switched to the left fuel tank and continued to fly at full power. After feeling confident there was fuel in the left tank, the pilot switched back to the right fuel tank and climbed to 8,000 feet, continuing the flight as normal. Shortly after, they proceeded back towards the airport when the engine suddenly lost power. The pilot attempted emergency procedures and troubleshooting, but to no avail. The pilot located a suitable field for the emergency landing, however, during the landing roll on the soft, dry, and rocky terrain, the airplane nosed over, coming to rest inverted. Recovery personnel reported that during the recovery process he removed very little fuel from the left auxiliary fuel tank, otherwise, the right auxiliary fuel tank and the main fuel tanks were empty. In addition, he mentioned that he did not observe any breaches in the fuel tanks, nor did he smell any fuel at the accident site. The private pilot reported that the airplane was last refueled and operated about 1 month before the day of the accident. He added that, on the morning of the accident, he believed the airplane still had about 17 to 18 gallons of fuel for the flight. The pilot mentioned that the airplane's fuel float gauges were not accurate; therefore, he looked inside of the left fuel tank from the filler cap and observed fuel. He did not check the right fuel tank because the style of tank restricted his view of any fuel. He departed the airport with the left fuel tank selected. After practicing standard maneuvers, the engine hesitated for a second. The pilot switched to the right fuel tank, which resolved the issue, but he turned back toward the airport. About 1 minute later, he switched to the left fuel tank and continued to fly at full power, which led him to believe fuel was in that tank. One to 2 minutes later, the pilot switched back to the right fuel tank and climbed to 8,000 ft, circled the town once, and then proceeded back toward the airport; the engine then suddenly lost power. The pilot attempted emergency procedures and troubleshooting to no avail. The pilot located a suitable field for the emergency landing; however, during the landing roll on the soft, dry, and rocky terrain, the airplane nosed over and then came to rest inverted. Recovery personnel removed a small amount of fuel from the left auxiliary fuel tank, but the right auxiliary fuel tank and the main fuel tanks were empty. In addition, there were no observable breaches in the fuel tanks nor smell of fuel at the accident site. Given the pilot knew the airplane's fuel gauges were not accurate, he should have ensured that the airplane had sufficient fuel for the flight and his failure to do so led to the subsequent exhaustion of the fuel supply and total loss of engine power. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Fuel planning-Pilot - C
- C Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid level - C
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2016_WPR17LA018.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
Search this event elsewhere
External sources are reported, not agency: signal that something happened, not fact about what happened.
- TallyAero Live Wire Aviation press
- NTSB CAROL Agency ↗
- NTSB Docket Agency ↗
- Aviation Safety Network Aviation press ↗
- Kathryn's Report Aviation press ↗
- Aviation Herald Aviation press ↗
- AVweb Aviation press ↗
- Pilots of America Community ↗
- Reddit /r/flying Community ↗
- FlightAware Aviation press ↗
- AOPA accident database Aviation press ↗
- Google News News ↗
- DuckDuckGo News ↗
Related research
Matched on aircraft type or causal vocabulary (icing, fuel exhaustion). All research papers
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Contractor Report (CR) A study of carburetor/induction system icing in general aviation accidents
An assessment of the frequency and severity of carburetor/induction icing in general-aviation accidents was performed. The available literature and accident data from the National Transportation Safet…
- arXiv 2026 · arXiv preprint Enabling Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight Drones Operation over Open RAN 5G Networks with Slicing
Among the foretold claims of the transition from 5G to 6G, Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight (BVLoS) drone operation has emerged as a prominent Internet-of-Robots enabler.
- NASA NTRS 2026 · Contractor Report (CR) Icing Physics Studies Using the 3D SIDRM Test Article: 2023 Icing Tests Analysis
In-flight icing is an important safety issue and is a factor that affects aircraft design and performance. Newer regulations are driving a need for improvements in airframe and engine icing simulation…
- arXiv 2025 · arXiv preprint Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning for UAV-Assisted 5G Network Slicing: A Comparative Study of MAPPO, MADDPG, and MADQN
The growing demand for robust, scalable wireless networks in the 5G-and-beyond era has led to the deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as mobile base stations to enhance coverage in dense urb…
- NASA NTRS 2025 · Presentation NASA Icing Update – March 2025
This NASA Icing Update was prepared for presentation to the SAE International AC-9C Inflight Icing Technology Committee. This update includes the following topics: planned Rotational Icing Scaling tes…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2025 · Journal article (JAAER) A Mathematical Model on the Temporal Dynamics of Aviation Competitive Pricing
This study investigates the competitive dynamics of airport pricing using U.S. airport data to validate the findings. It employs linear and nonlinear ordinary differential equation models to analyze t…