NTSB CAROL · Event
Event ERA23LA112
Registry · N101MA
FAA Aircraft Registry record.
Make / Model
PIPER PA-31-350
Year of manufacture
1977 · 46 years old at event
Engine
LYCOMING TI0-540 SER (310 hp)
Seats / Engines
8 seats · 2 engines
Last airworthiness date
19771008
ADS-B equipped
Yes — Mode-S A0097F
Registrant of record
PABLO AIR CHARTERS LLC
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
A runway overrun during a precautionary landing following a total loss of right engine power due to detonation and subsequent oil starvation. Contributing was the pilot’s failure to lower the flaps and the excessive airspeed at touchdown.
Factual narrative
On January 18, 2023, at 0903 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-31-350, N101MA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Geauga County Airport (7GA), Middlefield, Ohio. The airline transport pilot and five passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 non-scheduled passenger flight. The purpose of the flight was to pick up a sixth passenger in Detroit, Michigan, before continuing to Minneapolis, Minnesota. As the airplane climbed through about 6,000 ft mean sea level (msl) in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the pilot observed oil leaking from the right engine nacelle. When the airplane reached about 7,400 ft msl, the pilot noted a loss of right engine power. He secured the engine, declared an emergency, requested to divert to the closest airport, and the air traffic controller vectored the airplane for the RNAV RWY 11 approach at 7GA. The pilot successfully completed the approach and reported that the airplane touched down in the “first one-third” of the landing runway at an airspeed “about 120 knots with zero flaps.” The pilot reported to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that he visually acquired the runway about 500 ft above the ground and knew he would not stop the airplane before it reached the departure end of the 3,500-ft-long runway, but chose to continue rather than abort the landing with one engine inoperative and climb the airplane back into IMC for another instrument approach. The airplane overran the departure end of the runway, continued through the grass overrun, and impacted a hill and a fence before coming to rest upright about 600 ft beyond the runway end. All three landing gear collapsed and the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 1977 and was powered by two Lycoming TIO-540-J2BD, 350-horsepower engines. The airplane’s most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on December 12, 2022, at 17,154.5 total aircraft hours, which was 42 hours before the accident. The right engine had accrued 1,662.5 total hours since major overhaul. Examination of photographs revealed substantial wrinkling of the fuselage and both wings as well as torn flight control surfaces. The right engine cowling was opened and examination revealed cracks in the engine crankcase. The engine was removed and examined at a local aircraft technician’s school. A large crack in the crankcase was visible above the No. 5 cylinder and the crankshaft nose seal was found partially displaced. Oil streaks originated from that point and covered the engine case. Oil streaking was also visible on the right engine cowling at the scene. Crankshaft rotation attempts were unsuccessful. Borescope examination of the No. 5 cylinder revealed damage consistent with detonation. The remaining cylinders did not appear to have the same extensive damage via the borescope. Attempts to remove the No. 5 cylinder were unsuccessful. Removal of the No. 3 cylinder showed minor detonation signatures in the combustion chamber and on the piston. The No. 5 cylinder was then removed, and the connecting rod was found broken at the large bearing end. Excessive heat and oil starvation signatures were observed at the connecting rod end. The partially-melted piston was removed from the No. 5 cylinder and a large crater was observed in the combustion chamber from the exhaust valve to the spark plug hole. Attempts to rotate the crankshaft with the two cylinders removed were unsuccessful, likely due oil starvation and heat damage to the crankshaft. The remaining rocker box covers were removed for visual examination with no discrepancies noted. The spark plugs displayed an “excessively rich mixture” coloration and were sent to Lycoming engines for analysis in their materials lab. The top spark plug from the No. 5 cylinder displayed a “badly damaged” insulator. When asked, the Lycoming engines representative said that detonation events are typically associated with a lean fuel mixture, and the damage displayed was the likely the result of detonation in the No. 5 cylinder. No source or anomaly that would result in engine detonation was identified. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane, during a single-engine inoperative approach, the pilot should maintain an airspeed of 116 kts indicated (KIAS) or above until landing is assured. Once landing is assured, the pilot should extend the gear and flaps, slowly retard the power on the operative engine, and land normally. The airplane’s best single-engine rate of climb speed (blue line) was 106 KIAS, and its minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative (Vmca) was 76 KIAS. The maximum speed for full flap extension (40°) was 132 KIAS. The POH also stated that a single-engine go-around should be avoided if at all possible. While enroute in instrument meteorological (IMC) conditions, the pilot of the twin-engine, piston-powered airplane declared an emergency following a loss of power to the right engine. The pilot secured the engine and was provided vectors by air traffic control for an instrument approach procedure at the nearest airport, which he successfully completed. The pilot reported that he flew the approach and landing with the wing flaps retracted and visually acquired the runway about 500 ft above the ground. The airplane touched down on the first third of the runway at 120 knots. The pilot knew he would not be able to stop the airplane on the 3,500-ft-long runway but committed to the landing rather than risking a single-engine go-around in IMC. After landing, the airplane continued beyond the departure end of the runway and impacted a berm, collapsing the landing gear and resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. Examination of the engine revealed catastrophic damage consistent with detonation and oil starvation. The damage to the No. 5 cylinder was consistent with a subsequent overpressurization of the crankcase, which likely expelled the crankshaft nose seal and the oil supply. Detonation of the cylinder(s) can create excessive crankcase pressures capable of expelling the crankshaft nose seal. The crankshaft nose seal displacement likely created a rapid loss of oil and the resulting oil starvation of the engine. The fractured connecting rod and high-temperature signatures were consistent with oil starvation. No source or anomaly that would result in engine detonation was identified. According to the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the accident airplane, during a single-engine inoperative approach, the pilot should maintain an airspeed of 116 kts indicated (KIAS) or above until landing is assured. Once landing is assured, the pilot should extend the gear and flaps, slowly retard the power on the operative engine, and land normally. The airplane’s best single-engine rate of climb speed (blue line) was 106 KIAS, and its minimum controllable airspeed with one engine inoperative (Vmca) was 76 KIAS. The maximum speed for full flap extension (40°) was 132 KIAS. The POH also stated that a single-engine go-around should be avoided if at all possible. The pilot’s decision to commit to the landing was reasonable given the circumstances and the guidance provided by the POH; however, it is likely that his decision to conduct the landing without flaps and the airplane’s excessive airspeed at touchdown resulted in the runway overrun. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).
- — Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Surface speed/braking-Capability exceeded
- — Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot
- — Aircraft-Aircraft power plant-Engine (reciprocating)-Recip engine power section-Failure
- — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Lack of action-Pilot
- — Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Flight control system-TE flap control system-Not used/operated
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2023_ERA23LA112.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (go-around, imc, maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
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- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
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Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗