NASA · Aviation Safety Reporting System
Air carrier flight crew reported the FMS not flying correctly during departure and having to manually turn the aircraft to avoid a possible airspace violation.
What is ASRS?
The Aviation Safety Reporting System is NASA's voluntary, confidential, non- punitive incident-reporting system, established 1976. Pilots, controllers, dispatchers, and maintenance technicians file reports describing safety- relevant events. NASA de-identifies every report before adding it to the public database. Reports are not investigated by NASA, the FAA, or the NTSB — they represent the reporter's perspective.
Pilot narratives
Verbatim from the de-identified NASA record. First-person account by the
reporter. NASA strips identifying details (names, company, specific time);
anonymization placeholders are ZZZ,
X, Y.
Reporter 1
Takeoff and initial climb from DCA, Runway 01. Captain Pilot Monitoring, First Officer Pilot Flying. Pre-flight duties completed and route review completed at gate. Engine start and taxi was normal to Runway 01, before takeoff checklist completed to the line before crossing Runway 04, below the line after crossing Runway 04. As we taxied to runway, Aircraft Y was cleared to cross Runway 04 before us on another taxiway then into the box. As we were approaching Runway 01, Tower Controller asked Aircraft Y if they were ready for departure, Aircraft Y responded they needed 2 minutes. Tower asked if we were ready for departure and we responded we were ready, completed final checklist items. We lined up on Runway 01 and were cleared for takeoff. I do not recall checking FMA for NAV annunciation as we taxied on to the runway and checked final for traffic. Light passenger load/light takeoff weight. After takeoff, aircraft climb was rapid with a quick change to Departure frequency. We were at clean-up altitude quickly after takeoff. After thrust set to climb power and frequency change to departure (prior to check-in on frequency with departure) I noticed FMA annunciation was RWY TRK and we had not yet initiated a left turn for the departure. I told the First Officer to turn left, which he accomplished, initially coming left to approximately a 290-300 degree heading. I cross checked Nav Display for 1 NM circle around point PLVIA and outside references. I do not believe we entered Prohibited Area 56A or Prohibited Area 56B. After initial left turn, we then turned back to the right to rejoin the departure. A turn to point ADAXE would have required an aggressive right turn, so we turned to rejoin the departure between ADAXE and BEBLE After turning to rejoin departure I checked-in with departure control when they asked if we were on frequency. Remainder of the flight was uneventful. This was my (Captain) first flight back on the line after several months away due to combination of leave of absence and quarantine for close contact with [someone] with COVID-19. I had just completed recurrent training the week before this flight. In the pre-flight briefing the First Officer had noted that with light passenger loads the aircraft takeoff and climb would happen quickly. Given my lack of recent flying, I should not have accepted departure prior to the aircraft in front of us on the ground, even though I felt I was in the green. I was slow to notice we had not initiated left turn on the departure where I would normally expect to begin a turn, possibly due to lack of recent line flying experience, the combination of quick climb after takeoff to acceleration altitude and frequency change slowing my monitoring and recognition of aircraft not being in NAV mode. Though I did direct the pilot flying to make a left turn, if I had done so earlier we would have been able to maintain the departure track without tracking close to Prohibited Area 56. The time from takeoff to overshooting the departure turn on takeoff from Runway 01 at DCA happens fast! I would like to see a similar event during simulator training to illustrate just how quickly you can get close to Prohibited Area 56 after takeoff from DCA when combining a timely distraction with lack of aircraft going in to NAV mode. PLVIA with 1 NM ring on NAV display did assist me as a barrier for this event.
Reporter 2
Takeoff and initial climb from DCA, Runway 01. Captain Pilot Monitoring, First Officer Pilot Flying. Pre-flight duties completed and route review completed at gate. Engine start and taxi was normal to Runway 01, before takeoff checklist completed to the line before crossing Runway 04, below the line after crossing Runway 04. As we taxied to runway, Aircraft Y was cleared to cross Runway 04 before us on another taxiway then into the box. As we were approaching Runway 01, Tower Controller asked Aircraft Y if they were ready for departure, Aircraft Y responded they needed 2 minutes. Tower asked if we were ready for departure and we responded we were ready, completed final checklist items. We lined up on Runway 01 and were cleared for takeoff. I do not recall checking FMA for NAV annunciation as we taxied on to the runway. Light passenger load/light takeoff weight. After takeoff, aircraft climb was rapid with a quick change to departure frequency. We were at clean-up altitude quickly after takeoff. After thrust set to climb power and frequency change to departure (prior to check-in on frequency with departure) PM noticed FMA annunciation was RWY TRK and we had not yet initiated a left turn for the departure. PF was focused on aircraft control since it was a light aircraft and I did notice the PLVIA circle rapidly approaching with no direction to turn by the Flight Directors. I also noticed the route was dashed and started a shallow turn to the left primarily due to the PLVIA circle. The PM/Captain having SA told me to turn left, which I accomplished, initially coming left to approximately a 290-300 degree heading. I cross checked Nav Display for 1 NM circle around point PLVIA and outside references. I do not believe we entered Prohibited Area 56A or Prohibited Area 56B. After initial left turn, we then turned back to the right to rejoin the departure. A turn to point ADAXE would have required an aggressive right turn, so we turned to rejoin the departure between ADAXE and BEBLE. After turning to rejoin departure PM checked-in with departure control when they asked if we were on frequency. Remainder of the flight was uneventful. I used a technique taught in the school-house of Red over Blue, Climb/NAV, Flight Dir 1 and 2 while at the gate. I do this on every flight. We are supposed to check NAV again prior to departure and due to the rushed situation and proficiency I don't recall either PM or PF saying anything about NAV. We had briefed the departure in full to include Prohibited Area 56 and the EO SID. I still don't know why it was not in NAV after takeoff roll. I had seen a technique of starting the turn regardless of the flight directors in DCA but up until now I have always used the flight directors. In this case the PLVIA circle was a timely final barrier that prevented me from going into Prohibited Area 56 along with the PM's callout. The time from takeoff to overshooting the departure turn on takeoff from RWY 01 at DCA happens fast! I would like to see a similar event during simulator training to illustrate just how quickly you can get close to Prohibited Area 56 after takeoff from DCA when combining a timely distraction with lack of aircraft going in to NAV mode. Keep the PLVIA circle in the 10-7 and emphasize in training, it is a critical last barrier.
NASA classification — Anomalies
- Airspace Violation
- Deviation - Track / Heading
- Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural
NASA classification — Assessments
- Contributing Factors / Situations
- Aircraft · Human Factors
- Primary Problem
- Aircraft
ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, de-identified by NASA, and represent the reporter's perspective. The presence of reports on a topic cannot be used to infer prevalence in the National Airspace System. The authoritative source is the NASA ASRS Database Online at asrs.arc.nasa.gov ↗.