Event ANC05LA063

Factual narrative

On April 27, 2005, about 1809 Alaska daylight time, a wheel/ski-equipped Cessna 185F airplane, N2658S, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing, about 2 miles east of the Merrill Field Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The certificated commercial pilot and the two passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated about 1710, from the Merrill Field Airport. During an on-site interview with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on April 27, the pilot reported that during the initial descent to the Merrill Field Airport, as the airplane descended to about 1,000 msl, all engine power was lost. The pilot said that in an attempt to restore engine power, he switched the airplane's fuel tank selector valve from the "both" position to the "left", and then to the "right" position. He said that when he was unable to restore engine power, he switched the airplane's fuel tank selector valve back to the original position of "both." The pilot noted that he did not activate the airplane's auxiliary fuel pump while he was performing engine emergency procedures. During the emergency descent, he said he originally selected a forced landing site on a residential street, but had to discontinue the approach because of children playing in the street. As an alternative landing site, he selected a small open area that was surrounded by trees, and high voltage power lines. During the forced landing approach, the airplane collided with the power lines and trees, and sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. During an on-site inspection of the airplane by the NTSB IIC on April 27, the cockpit fuel selector valve was found in the "both" position. The accident airplane was equipped with optional long-range fuel tanks, which provided a maximum fuel capacity of 84 gallons, with 78 gallons of usable fuel. The unusable fuel is 6 gallons total, or 3 gallons per side. On April 28, another on-site inspection of the airplane by the NTSB IIC discovered about 6 gallons of fuel in the right fuel tank, and about 1.5 gallons of fuel in the left fuel tank. Fuel was present in the airplane's fuel lines, and the fuel manifold assembly. On April 28, two Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness inspectors from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office reviewed the accident airplane's maintenance records. The FAA inspectors said that their inspection revealed that the last annual inspection was completed with on July 8, 2003, 111.5 hours before the accident. No additional logbook entries were noted indicating that a more recent annual inspection had been complied with. The airplane was equipped with a Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-520-D engine. According to a representative from Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., as part of the airplane's annual inspection, all engine control systems are to be inspected in accordance with service information directive SID97-3C. On April 28, the wreckage was recovered by the owner and stored in his hangar, located at the Merrill Field Airport. The engine remained attached to the airframe during the accident and subsequent wreckage recovery efforts. On May 2, the accident airplane's fuselage and engine were transported to Alaskan Aircraft Engines, Inc., also located on the Merrill Field Airport. At the direction of the NTSB IIC, who was accompanied by an FAA airworthiness inspector from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office, an airframe and engine inspection was accomplished. The engine examination revealed that the brass fuel control-mounted mixture control lever, was loose on the mixture control shaft. The mixture control shaft was noted to be in the closed (off) position. Once the fuel control shaft was manually moved to the open position, the engine was started and operated at various power settings for an extended time. The engine produced its full rated rpm. No additional preaccident mechanical anomalies were noted. The commercial pilot, with two passengers, was preparing to land following a Title 14, CFR Part 91 personal flight. The pilot said that as the airplane descended to about 1,000 msl, all engine power was lost. In an attempt to restore engine power, he switched the airplane's fuel tank selector valve from the "both" position to the "left", then to the "right" position, and back to "both." The pilot noted that he did not activate the airplane's auxiliary fuel pump while he was switching fuel tanks. The pilot selected a small open area that was surrounded by trees and power lines for a forced landing. During the landing approach, the airplane collided with the power lines and trees, receiving substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. The accident airplane's maximum fuel capacity is 84 gallons, with 78 gallons of usable fuel. The unusable fuel is 6 gallons, or 3 gallons per side. During an on-site postaccident inspection, about 6 gallons of fuel was drained from the right fuel tank, and about 1.5 gallons of fuel from the left fuel tank. A postaccident engine examination revealed that the brass, fuel control-mounted mixture control lever, was loose on the mixture control shaft. The mixture control shaft was in the closed (off) position. Once the fuel control shaft was manually moved to the open position, the engine was started and operated at various power settings for an extended time. The engine produced its full rated rpm. According to an FAA airworthiness inspector, the accident airplane was about 10 months overdue for an annual inspection, and the mixture control linkage is an item required to be checked during the annual inspection. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12