CEN25LA018

Factual narrative

On October 17, 2024, at 0947 central daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-301, N81481, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Van, Texas. The pilot and two passengers received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported to the responding FAA inspector that he had just completed a flight to Terrell Municipal Airport (TRL), Terrell, Texas, where he received 60 gallons of fuel. He departed again and while established in cruise flight the engine began to gradually lose power, so he switched to the left fuel tank and partial power was restored. He then switched back to the right fuel tank, but the engine was unable to regain power. During the descent for an emergency landing, the pilot kept the landing gear and flaps retracted. The airplane collided with a wooden utility pole during landing, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. The FAA inspector examined the airplane and found 30 to 35 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel in each of the fuel tanks. The fuel samples were free of water contamination. The engine remained attached to the firewall and did not exhibit signs of catastrophic failure. Postaccident examination revealed that the air induction filter remained installed and appeared free of blockages. The air induction hose was impact separated from the fuel servo; this orange hose from the airbox to the fuel servo inlet adapter was an orange scat duct with no part numbers or identifying markings. The scat duct had several tears on the outside that were covered with an orange sealant. The sealant was ripped and torn in several places, but appeared to have been previously covering tears in the scat duct. The metal wire on the inside of the scat duct was loose and had been rubbing/chafing on the inside of the airbox. The scat duct was able to collapse easily when light pressure was applied to the outside of the scat duct; the internal wiring shifted easily, allowing the scat duct to collapse. There was no evidence of impact damage to the scat duct or the internal wiring. The orange scat duct was the incorrect part and should have been a double wall flexible air duct, part number 99849-08. The engine was removed from the airframe for a test run, which was completed with no anomalies noted. The airplane’s maintenance logbooks revealed that an annual inspection was completed on March 25, 2024, and another on August 1, 2024. During the March annual inspection, the lower cowl induction air scoop was rebonded to the engine cowling. The logbooks did not document when the scat duct was originally installed or subsequently repaired. On August 6, 2014, the FAA published a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-14-23 for certain Piper models, including the accident airplane model, regarding the air intake inlet hose (scat duct), specifically for structural deterioration and possible collapse of the air inlet hose. The air inlet hose may be between the air filter and the fuel injector, carburetor, or carburetor heat box depending on the airplane model. A collapsed hose reduces airflow to the engine and could result in a rough running engine or a loss of power. The SAIB recommended to inspect the inlet hose within the next 25 hours of time in service, and to verify that it is an approved Piper part and that it does not exhibit broken or loose cords on the external surface, loose or displaced supporting wire, or signs of wear, perforation, deterioration, or collapse. If an air inlet hose is observed exhibiting any of the conditions listed above or is not an approved Piper part, then the SAIB recommended replacement of the hose with an approved Piper part before the next flight. The pilot and two passengers completed an uneventful flight and refueled the airplane. They departed again, and while established in cruise flight, the engine gradually lost power. The pilot’s troubleshooting attempts were unsuccessful in restoring engine power, and the pilot performed a forced landing, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. Postaccident examination revealed that the air induction hose (scat duct) to the fuel servo was the incorrect part and was also damaged and degraded. The scat duct had several tears on the outside that were covered with orange sealant. The sealant was torn open in several places but appeared to have been previously covering tears in the scat duct. The scat duct’s internal metal wire was loose and had been rubbing/chafing on the inside of the airbox. The scat duct was able to collapse easily when light pressure was applied to the outside; the internal wiring shifted easily and allowed the scat duct to collapse. The collapsed duct would have restricted airflow to the engine and resulted in a loss of engine power. During an annual inspection about 7 months before the accident, the lower cowl induction air scoop was rebonded to the engine cowling. The failed scat duct would have likely been removed and reinstalled to the airbox during this work, and the mechanic would have been able to assess its condition and recognize that it was not a manufacturer-approved part. The airplane’s maintenance logbooks did not document when the scat duct was originally installed or subsequently repaired. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

FAA avdata. C = Cause, F = Factor.

• — Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Misc hardware-Hoses and tubes-Not serviced/maintained
• — Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Misc hardware-Hoses and tubes-Incorrect use/operation
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Maintenance-Repair-Maintenance personnel
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Maintenance-Replacement-Maintenance personnel