NTSB CAROL · Event
Event ENG10IA026
Registry · N535JB
FAA Aircraft Registry record.
Make / Model
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A320-232
Year of manufacture
2002 · 8 years old at event
TCDS
A28NM · AIRBUS SAS
Engine
IAE V2500SERIES
Seats / Engines
200 seats · 2 engines
Last airworthiness date
20020411
ADS-B equipped
Yes — Mode-S A6C3CA
Registrant of record
JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The separation of both halves of the left engine fan cowl assembly due to improper latching and locking of the all the fan cowl latches. The cause of the improper latching and locking of the fan cowls was due to the failure of the mechanic to unstow and properly latch and lock the fan cowl latches after the engine maintenance had been completed, and the failure of the maintenance inspector to detect and identify the unlatched condition. Contributing the incident is the design of the fan cowl latch assembly that can provide a false latch condition when the latch is neither latched or locked. Also contributing incident is the lack of adequate Airbus and Jet Blue fan cowl latch inspection guidance to detect and identify an unlatched condition.
Factual narrative
On April 5, 2010, at about 0629 eastern daylight time (EDT), a Jet Blue Airways Airbus 320-232, registration number N535JB, powered by two International Aero Engines (IAE) V2527 turbofan engines, experienced a left engine fan cowl separation during takeoff from Newark Liberty International airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. The flightcrew was unaware of the fan cowl separation until passengers pointed out the loss of both halves of the left engine fan cowl assembly. The flightcrew informed the control tower of the event and returned to EWR for an uneventful landing. After parking and deplaning the passengers, the flightcrew noted additional damage to the left engine pylon, leading edge flaps, left main landing gear, and horizontal stabilator. The separated fan cowls were recovered from the airport property by the EWR airport authority and were examined for evidence of failure with the latching mechanisms, the hinges, or structure by the Safety Board. The incident flight was operated as an instrument flight rules 14 CFR Part 121 passenger flight from EWR en route to Fort Lauderdale, FL. There were no injuries to the 6 flightcrew or 134 passengers. Examination of the engine fan cowls revealed that the cowl latch assemblies and their respective keeper housing assemblies were intact, showed no evidence of malfunction, and exhibited no distortion or damage. The fan cowlings structure revealed no evidence of failure. Some delamination was observed but determined to not be contributory to the separation. According to Jet Blue maintenance records, a scheduled maintenance inspection of the left engine had been performed prior to the flight which required the opening and closing of the fan cowls. According to the Jet Blue maintenance records, the left engine maintenance sign-off sheet revealed that a mechanic had latched and locked the fan cowls and this task had been verify by another mechanic. Both the ‘action’ (performance of the properly closing and locking of the fan cowls) and ‘inspection’ (verification of properly closing and locking of the fan cowls) signature blocks on the left engine maintenance sign-off sheet for the fan cowl latch procedure had been signed off as part of the Jet Blue Required Inspection Item (RII) procedures. The Jet Blue RII program requires that for safety of flight items, such as fan cowling latching, that a second mechanic or inspector who had not performed the initial task, must review and inspect the work and sign-off that the work had been performed correctly. In the case of the fan cowling latch task, the RII procedure requires that the second mechanic or inspector visually inspect the latches to verify that they are in the locked position. To provide a visual highlight indicating whether the fan cowl latches are fully locked or not, each latch is normally weighted, and the inside and the sides of the latch handle are painted a different color (typically red or orange) than the cowling skin. If the latch is properly locked, the latch handle is flush with the cowling skin and the painted portion of the latch handle is not visible. If the latch assembly is not properly locked, the latch handle swings down exposing the painted surfaces. Examination of the latch assemblies on the incident airplane revealed that they were all properly painted and weighted. Examination of an exemplar Jet Blue Airbus A320 engine fan cowl revealed the possibility of a false latch condition that could mask an otherwise unlatched position. Mechanics at Jet Blue reported that while working on the engine, they routinely push the latch assembly up against the latch keeper housing assembly in order to stow the latch to avoid inadvertent head injuries while working underneath engine. In this position, the latch is neither latched nor locked but the latch assembly may be flush with the cowling so that the paint on the latch handle is not visible giving a false indication that the latch is properly locked. NTSB staff and Jet Blue safety investigators performed this temporary stowing of the latch assembly on several different Airbus A320 airplanes and demonstrated that latch assembly can get stuck within the latch keeper housing giving the false impression that the cowling latch is properly latched and locked. Examination of the latch hardware revealed no mechanical damage consistent such as would be expected if the latches were secured and locked at the time of the cowling separation. An Airbus A320 airplane experienced a left engine fan cowl separation during takeoff. The flight crew was unaware of the fan cowl separation until passengers pointed out the loss of both halves of the left engine fan cowl assembly. The flight crew returned for an uneventful landing. After parking and deplaning the passengers, the flight crew noted additional damage to the left engine pylon, leading edge flaps, left main landing gear, and horizontal stabilator. Examination of the engine fan cowls revealed that the cowl latch assembly and keeper housing assembly were intact, showed no evidence of malfunction, and exhibited no distortion or damage and that the cowling structure revealed no evidence of failure. Some delamination was found, but determined to not be contributory to the separation. Maintenance records revealed that a scheduled maintenance inspection of the left engine had been performed prior to the flight which required the opening and closing of the engine fan cowls. According to the operator’s maintenance records, the left engine maintenance sign-off sheet revealed that a mechanic had latched and locked the fan cowls and this task had been verify by another mechanic. Both the ‘action’ and ‘inspection’ signature blocks on the left engine maintenance sign-off sheet for the fan cowl latch procedure had been signed off as part of the Required Inspection Item (RII) procedure. The latch assembly is normally weighted and the inside and the sides of the latch handle are painted a different color (typically red or orange) than the cowling skin to visually highlight whether the latch is fully locked or not. If the latch is properly locked, the latch handle is flush with the cowling skin and painted portion of the latch handle is not visible. Examination of an exemplar Airbus A320 engine fan cowl revealed the possibility of a false latch condition that would mask an otherwise unlatched position. It was reported that mechanics working on the engine routinely push the latch assembly up against the latch keeper housing assembly in order to stow the latch to avoid inadvertent head injuries while working underneath engine. In this position, the latch is neither latched nor locked but the latch assembly may be flush with the cowling so that the paint on the latch handle is not visible, giving a false indication that the latch is properly locked Examination of the latch hardware revealed no mechanical damage such as would be expected if the latches were secured and locked at the time of the cowling separation. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).
- C Aircraft-Aircraft structures-Nacelles/pylons structure-Main frame (on nacelles/pylon)-Malfunction - C
- C Aircraft-Aircraft structures-Nacelles/pylons structure-(general)-Failure - C
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2010_ENG10IA026.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2015 · Journal article (JAAER)
Is “Green Dot” Always the Optimum Engines-Out Glide Speed on the Airbus A320 Aircraft?
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- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2026 · Journal article (IJAAA)
From Reactive to Predictive: A hybrid Trust-Mediated Adoption Framework for Data-Driven Maintenance in Distributed-Authority Aviation Environments
Modern aviation maintenance operates within increasingly data-intensive technological environments, yet the operational integration of predictive maintenance into routine decision-making remains incon…
- Semantic Scholar 2025 · Article (Applied Sciences)
Decision-Making Framework for Aviation Safety in Predictive Maintenance Strategies
The implementation of predictive maintenance (PM) in aviation presents unique challenges due to strict safety requirements, complex operational environments, and regulatory constraints.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
Low-Resource Automatic Speech Recognition Domain Adaptation – A Case-Study in Aviation Maintenance
With timeliness and efficiency being critical in the aviation maintenance industry, the need has been growing for smart technological solutions that optimize and streamline the different underlying ta…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
A New Trajectory in UAV Safety: Leveraging Reinforcement Learning for Distance Maintenance Under Wind Variations
In the field of aviation, safety is a critical cornerstone, and the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems is deeply connected with this principle.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Just Culture in Aviation: A Metaphorical Study on Aircraft Maintenance Students
Just Culture, a sub-dimension of safety culture, has been a prominent and debated topic in aviation safety in recent years.
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