Event ERA16LA333

Factual narrative

On September 27, 2016, about 1745 eastern daylight time, a Ryan Navion B, N5327K, was substantially damaged during a forced landing, following a total loss of engine power while in cruise flight near Hurt, Virginia. The private pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR), Culpeper, Virginia, about 1700, destined for Long Island Airport (NC26), Long Island, North Carolina.According to the pilot, about 45 minutes into the flight, at an altitude of 3,000 feet mean sea level, the engine suddenly began to vibrate. He informed Roanoke Approach air traffic control (ATC) of his intent to try to land at the nearest airport, which was New London Airport (W90), Forest, Virginia. A few seconds later he heard a loud bang, the vibration worsened, smoke and oil emanated from the engine compartment, and the engine lost power as the propeller continued to windmill. The pilot then advised ATC that he would not be able to make the airport, and he then performed an emergency landing to a mowed hay field. During the landing rollout, the airplane struck and rolled through a post-and-wire fence resulting in substantial damage to the right wing. Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that the right wing leading edge sustained substantial damage, and fence wire was wrapped around the propeller flange. The top left side of the engine crankcase was damaged, and there were holes in the crankcase near cylinder Nos. 6, 4 and 2. A connecting rod protruded through the hole near cylinder No. 4. No oil was present in the crankcase. A teardown examination of the engine was subsequently performed at the manufacturer's facility, under the supervision of a National Transportation Safety Board investigator. The examination revealed that the internal engine components exhibited heat distress consistent with a lack of lubrication. Further examination revealed that the oil temperature probe was safety wired, however it could be moved by hand. An air pressure hose was attached to the oil cooler and when 30 psi was applied, bubbles were noted around the crush washer seal of the oil temperature probe. Oil residue was also noted all over the oil cooler and surrounding area of the engine. See Figure 1. The oil temperature probe was removed, and the crush washer was found installed backwards. Figure 1. Oil Temperature Probe The temperature probe was considered an airframe item and was not installed by the engine manufacturer. The engine was delivered with a plug in the oil temperature probe port, and the installer could remove the plug and replace it with an oil temperature probe. A review of the 1951 Navion B Service Manual revealed no specific torque values for tightening the oil temperature probe. The maintenance manual for the accident engine provided a torque range for the oil temperature port plug (with crush washer), as 190 in/lbs to 210 in/lbs. The version of the manual in effect at the time of the accident did not specify the orientation of crush washers. Maintenance records revealed that the airplane's most recent annual inspection occurred on September 16, 2016. At that time, the airplane had accrued a total of 4,488 flight hours, and the engine had accrued a total of 832 hours since overhaul. During cruise flight, the private pilot felt the engine suddenly begin to vibrate. He then heard a loud bang; the engine vibration increased, smoke and oil emanated from the engine compartment, and the engine lost total power. The pilot was unable to glide the airplane to a nearby airport and performed a forced landing in a field, during which the airplane struck and rolled through a fence, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. Examination of the engine revealed that its crankcase was absent of oil, and there were holes in the crankcase near cylinder Nos. 2, 4, and 6. Subsequent teardown examination revealed that the internal engine components exhibited heat distress consistent with a lack of lubrication. Further examination revealed that the oil temperature probe port was safety wired but could be moved by hand and that the crush washer between the probe and the cooler was installed backwards. This evidence is likely indicative that the probe had not been properly installed, although it could not be determined when that may have occurred. Air pressure applied to the oil cooler showed a leak between the oil temperature probe and the cooler. Oil residue noted on the exterior of the cooler indicated that the oil leak had likely been present for some time and that it was likely where the engine's oil had leaked out, ultimately resulting in the engine failure due to oil starvation. Had the leak been noted and addressed, by correctly installing the oil temperature probe, during the airplane's most recent annual inspection, which was completed 11 days before the accident, it is likely that the engine would not have been starved of oil. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Maintenance-Installation-Maintenance personnel - C
• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Scheduled/routine inspection-Maintenance personnel - C
• C Aircraft-Aircraft power plant-Power plant-(general)-Failure - C
• C Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Oil-Fluid level - C
• — Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Fence/fence post-Contributed to outcome