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Atlas / NTSB / ERA24LA054

NTSB CAROL · Event

Event ERA24LA054

2023-12-03 Millington, Tennessee, United States Airport · NQA Minor 1 aircraft Status: Completed

Registry · N7748J

FAA Aircraft Registry record.

Make / Model

PIPER PA-32-260

Year of manufacture

1969 · 54 years old at event

Engine

LYCOMING 0-540 SERIES (250 hp)

Seats / Engines

6 seats · 1 engine

Last airworthiness date

19690423

ADS-B equipped

Yes — Mode-S AA7B5C

Registrant of record

BAS PART SALES LLC

Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).

Aircraft involved

Probable cause & findings

The pilots’ fuel mismanagement during the cross-country flight and incorrect fuel tank selection for the landing approach, which resulted in fuel starvation, a momentary loss of engine power, and collision with terrain short of the runway.

Factual narrative

On December 3, 2023, about 2104 central standard time, a Piper PA-32-260 airplane, N7748J, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Millington, Tennessee. The private pilot was not injured, and the flight instructor sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to the flight instructor, the afternoon and evening involved a roundtrip flight from the airplane’s base airport of Millington/Memphis Airport (NQA), Millington, Tennessee, to Gulf Shores International Airport (JKA), Gulf Shores, Alabama. The private pilot was the pilot flying for both flights, as he was accumulating flight time in his airplane for insurance purposes. The flight instructor reported that the flight to JKA was uneventful, and they requested that the fixed-base operator ground personnel top off the airplane’s fuel tanks. According to a fuel receipt, 40.3 gallons of fuel were added to the airplane and a top-off was noted. The flight departed for NQA at 1832 and cruised uneventfully at 4,500 ft mean sea level. While enroute, the pilots switched between the left and right main fuel tanks and did not use the wingtip tanks during cruise. During the approach to land, the before-landing check was completed and the fuel selector was positioned to the left main tank. The instructor recalled that, during the approach, the left and right main inboard tanks indicated a little less than 10 gallons, and the wingtip tanks were indicating full; however, the fuel gauges were “bobbing” throughout the flight. The flight instructor further reported that, about 500 ft above ground level on final approach to runway 22 with full flaps, the engine suddenly “went quiet” and lost all power. The private pilot continued to fly the airplane, and the flight instructor stated, “best glide” airspeed, which the private pilot continued to maintain. Subsequently, the fuel selector was moved from the left main tank position to the left wingtip tank. Shortly after the fuel tank selector was moved, engine power began increasing; however, nearly simultaneously with this restoration of power, the airplane impacted terrain about 900 ft short of the runway threshold. The private pilot’s statement was consistent with the flight instructor’s description of the loss of engine power and collision with terrain. According to a Federal Aviation Administration inspector who examined the airplane at the accident site, the fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage. There was no fuel located in either the left main tank or left wingtip tank. About 15 gallons of fuel was drained from the right wingtip tank and about 3 gallons was drained from the right main tank. Examination of the airplane and engine found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel system was evaluated for blockages, with none observed. The left main tank was evaluated for any evidence of leakage, with none observed. The left wingtip tank sustained impact damage and was breached near the leading edge. The right main and wingtip tank were undamaged. According to the owner’s manual, the airplane was equipped with two inboard main wing fuel tanks that each held 25 gallons, and two outboard wingtip tanks that held 17 gallons of fuel. A fuel selector located on the floor center section of the cockpit enabled a selection of each tank individually, in addition to an OFF position. Fuel was delivered from the tank selected directly to the engine. The owner’s manual stated that the unusable fuel was about one pint per fuel tank. The owner’s manual further stated with regard to fuel management: Avoid switching tanks at low altitude since little recovery time is available in event of an error in tank selection. To preclude making a hasty decision, and to provide continuity of flow, the selector should be changed before fuel is exhausted from the tank in use. The owner’s manual stated that, “The main or tip tank with the highest quantity of fuel should be selected for landing.” According to the airplane flight manual, one of the placards required to be installed in the airplane stated, “USE MAIN TANKS FIRST.” This placard was present in the accident airplane’s cockpit. The flight instructor and private pilot initiated a round-trip, cross-country flight. The first leg of the trip was uneventful, and at the intermediate airport, the fuel tanks were topped off for the return flight. While on final approach at the destination airport, the engine lost total power. The private pilot, who was the pilot flying, switched the fuel selector from the left main tank to the left tip tank and continued to maintain glide airspeed. Shortly after the fuel tank selector was moved, engine power began increasing; however, nearly simultaneously with this restoration of power, the airplane impacted terrain about 900 ft short of the runway threshold. The fuselage and wings sustained substantial damage. The flight instructor reported that fuel was drawn from the left and right main tanks throughout the flight, and the tip tanks were not used before the loss of engine power. The instructor recalled that, during the approach, the left and right main tanks indicated a little less than 10 gallons, and the tip tanks were indicating full; however, the fuel gauges were bobbing throughout the flight. No fuel was observed in either the left main tank or left tip tank at the accident site. About 15 gallons of fuel was drained from the right wingtip tank and about 3 gallons were drained from the right main tank. Examination of the airplane and engine found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the fuel system revealed no evidence of blockages. The left main tank was evaluated for any evidence of leakage, and none was observed. The left wingtip tank sustained impact damage and was breached near the leading edge, which likely allowed for its contents to leak at the accident site. The right main and wingtip tanks were undamaged. The airplane owner’s manual stated the pilot should, “Avoid switching tanks at low altitude since little recovery time is available in event of an error in tank selection. To preclude making a hasty decision, and to provide continuity of flow, the selector should be changed before fuel is exhausted from the tank in use.” The owner’s manual further stated that, “The main or tip tank with the highest quantity of fuel should be selected for landing.” It is likely that the pilots’ fuel management during the nearly 2 hour and 30-minute flight resulted in the exhaustion of the left tank fuel supply on final approach at low altitude. Had the tank with the highest quantity of fuel been selected for landing, as recommended by the owner’s manual, the fuel starvation, and subsequent momentary loss of engine power, would have been avoided. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

  • Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Flight crew
  • Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid management
  • Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incorrect action selection-Flight crew

Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file NTSB_2023_ERA24LA054.txt. Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb. Full investigation docket on data.ntsb.gov ↗.

Related research

What the literature says.

Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (stall, fuel starvation). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.

Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗