Event ERA24LA080

Factual narrative

On January 2, 2024, about 1111 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28R-201, N125MT, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Green Pond, South Carolina. The private pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot’s husband provided a detailed written account of events on her behalf due to her injuries. According to his written account and air traffic control information, about 1054 the pilot departed Beaufort Executive Airport (ARW), Beaufort, South Carolina and contacted Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station Radar Approach Control. She requested flight following services from air traffic control while flying at 3,000 ft to Sumter Airport (SMS), then was assigned a transponder code and was identified 4 miles east of ARW. About 1105, the pilot advised the controller that the engine had “stopped” and declared a “mayday” while looking for a place to land. The controller offered multiple potential landing options to the pilot; however, she stated that she could not make the nearest (ARW) and that she was going to land in a field. ADS-B track data indicated that after departure, the airplane climbed on runway heading for about 4.5 miles before turning north in a continued climb. About 2,800 ft agl, the airplane leveled briefly before it descended and turned west. The descent continued and groundspeed decreased until track data was lost about 1107 at 625 ft. The airplane came to rest upright on private property about 1.2 miles west of the last ADS-B data point, partially submerged in a pond. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine compartment, firewall, and cockpit areas. There was no evidence of fire. The right wing was impact-damaged and partially separated. The left wing was submerged in the pond. The cabin and empennage were intact. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. The instrument panel was impact-damaged and displaced forward. The lower portion of the firewall was impact-damaged and displaced aft. The left sidewall of the cockpit was impact-damaged and torn from the firewall to just aft of the fuel selector valve. The fuel selector cover was impact-damaged, broken, and separated from the sidewall. The selector handle was pointed to about the 7 o’clock position as viewed from inside the cockpit. The fuel lines immediately surrounding the fuel selector valve were impact-damaged and deformed. When low pressure air was applied to the inlets of the fuel selector valve, the air passed through the valve when the handle was rotated to the left and right tank selector detents. When electrical power was applied to the wires on the electric fuel pump located on the forward side of the firewall, it operated. The fuel pump rocker switch was impact-separated from the instrument panel and found in the Off position. The fuel strainer bowl mount on the firewall was impact-damaged and the strainer bowl was loose on its mount. The strainer bowl was removed for examination and appeared to contain a small amount of pond water and mud. The fuel strainer screen, air induction filter housing, and filter element appeared free of blockage. The throttle, mixture, and propeller control cables in the cockpit were continuous from the cockpit levers to the respective attachment points on the fuel injector and propeller governor. Flight control cable continuity was visually established from the cockpit controls to the respective flight surfaces. The left wing leading edge exhibited impact damage that started mid-span and worsened toward the wing tip. The aileron and flap remained partially attached to the wing by their hinges. The aileron bellcrank remained installed and the aileron drive and balance cables remained attached to the bellcrank arms. The fuel tank cap remained installed in the fuel filler neck opening. Low pressure air was applied to the fuel tank vent on the lower surface of the wing and was expelled at the opening inside the fuel tank adjacent to the fuel filler opening. The finger screen was free of blockage. The pitot mast was impact-damaged and partially displaced from its mount. The right wing leading edge exhibited impact damage along its span, with the most significant damage on the outer 1/3 of the wing. The aileron and flap remained attached to the wing by their hinges. The aileron bellcrank was separated from its mount and pulled inward inside the wing. The aileron drive and balance cables remained attached to the bellcrank arms, which were deformed consistent with impact. The fuel tank cap remained installed in the fuel filler neck opening. Low pressure air was applied to the fuel tank vent on the lower surface of the wing and was expelled at the opening inside the fuel tank adjacent to the fuel filler opening. The finger screen was free of blockage. The vertical stabilizer remained intact on the tailcone and the rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer. Recovery personnel cut the stabilator chordwise about 12 inches from either side of the aircraft centerline. The center portion of the stabilator remained attached to the tailcone by its hinge, and the balance tube remained attached to the stabiliator. The stabilator trim tab remained attached to the stabilator by its hinge. The stabilator trim jackscrew was extended above the drum with about six threads exposed, which corresponds to an approximately neutral trim setting. The two-blade constant-speed propeller remained attached to the crankshaft propeller flange. One blade was straight and the other blade was bent aft 15° beginning 10 inches from the hub. The oil suction screen and oil filter were removed and carbon deposits were present in both. The engine contained 6 quarts of oil as indicated on the oil level gauge. The crankshaft rotated 720° when force was applied to it, and thumb compression was established on all cylinders. Continuity of the crankshaft to the camshaft was confirmed through the engine, and valve action movement was observed on all cylinders. The engine was sent to the manufacturer for a test run. Internal timing of the engine was confirmed. Magneto timing was checked, but the right magneto did not indicate on the timing light. The engine was installed in a test cell and ran with no discrepancies outside of the inoperative right magneto. A fuel receipt received from the Beaufort Executive Airport showed that the pilot purchased 76.8 gallons of aviation fuel just over a month before the accident. The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed about 2 months before the accident, at 7,529.2 total aircraft hours. The engine time since major overhaul was 1,570.2 hours, with an overhaul date of November 25, 2015. The pilot departed, requested flight following services from air traffic control while flying at 3,000 ft msl, and was then assigned a transponder code and identified 4 miles east of the departure airport. The airplane climbed on the runway heading for about 4.5 miles before turning north in a continued climb. The pilot subsequently advised the controller that the engine had “stopped” and declared a “mayday” while looking for a place to land. The controller offered multiple potential landing options to the pilot; however, she stated that she could not make the nearest and that she was going to land in a field. The airplane’s descent continued and groundspeed decreased until track data was lost about 1.2 miles from the accident site. The airplane came to rest partially submerged in a pond. Postaccident examination of the airframe and fuel-injected engine, including an engine test run, did not reveal evidence any preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. During a magneto timing check, the right magneto would not time to the engine. However, the engine started and operated with the right-hand magneto in the as-found condition. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Not determined-Not determined-(general)-(general)-Unknown/Not determined