Event FTW01LA140

Factual narrative

On June 9, 2001, at 0959 central daylight time, a Beech BE-35, single-engine airplane, N2963V, struck the terrain following a loss of engine power during the takeoff/initial climb at the Springdale Municipal Airport, Springdale, Arkansas. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The private pilot and his passenger received serious injuries, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the planned cross-country flight to Morristown, Tennessee, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight departed Springdale, at 0955. The witnesses descriptions of the airplane included: "lost altitude after takeoff, flying very low, struggling, low airspeed, low rpm's, yawing to gain altitude, struggling for power, not enough forward speed to sustain flight, and yawing just above a stall." Some of the witnesses described the engine as follows: "sounded very flat, having trouble getting full revs, and cutting out." Other witnesses "heard no engine" sounds. Witnesses reported observing the airplane turn left "sharply, waver, swerve back and forth, strike a power line, dive down, gain altitude, and strike the second power line." Subsequently, the witnesses observed the airplane impact the ground with the left wing, and spin around about 80 degrees before coming to rest near a school building. Local authorities reported to the FAA inspector, who responded to the site, that the left fuel tank was empty, the right fuel tank was full, and fuel was leaking from the aircraft. Local authorities turned off switches in the cockpit and de-activated the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT). Further, airport personnel reported to the inspector that the fuel tanks were topped on June 5, 2001, with 10.3 gallons, and the accident flight was the first known flight since that refueling. The FAA inspector reported "no usable fuel found in the left wing tank. No fuel found on ground under the left wing. No dead grass. No stained grass. No strong odor of fuel." Further, the inspector reported the fuel selector had the "left tank selected." The right wing tank was full. The flaps were found in the retracted position, and the landing gear were found extended. The Beech BE-35, serial number (S/N) D-358, airplane was manufactured in May 1947. A review of the available maintenance records revealed that a Teledyne Continental engine model E-185-8, S/N 26186-D-5-8, was installed. In September 1959, the Hartzell propeller model HC12X20-7D, S/N 6502, was installed. In October 1977, the Duke electric fuel boost pump was installed in the main fuel line between the wobble pump and the fuel strainer; however, "the function and operation of the wobble pump was not altered." The Airplane Flight Manual Section VII, System Description, AUXILIARY (WOBBLE) FUEL PUMP, states in part: A manually operated pump incorporated with the fuel selector unit. The pump is operated by working the handle up and down. Leave fuel unit handle in full down position and engaged in selector valve when not using wobble pump. In June 1989, the aircraft was modified in accordance with STC number SA2045CE for the use of automotive fuel. The last annual inspection was performed on August 4, 2000, at which time the carburetor was overhauled. On December 12, 2000, the engine driven fuel pump was removed and reinstalled following overhaul. On June 10, 2001, the aircraft representative, the engine representative, and an FAA inspector examined the airplane at the accident site. Ground scars and airplane deformation were consistent with a left wing low, nose low attitude at the initial ground impact. The energy distribution path was on a measured magnetic heading of 053 degrees. The aircraft came to rest (36 degrees 09.88 minutes north; 94 degrees 07.70 minutes west) on a measured magnetic heading of 272 degrees, which was located 0.79 nautical miles southeast of the airport. Flight control continuity was confirmed. The wobble pump handle was in the full up position. The electric boost pump switch in the cockpit was found in the "OFF" position. The vacuum pump and carburetor were found separated from the engine. The engine driven fuel pump was dislodged from its mounting pad and held in place by the fuel lines. The fuel pump was rotated and a few drops of fuel were found in the fuel pump lines. The engine crankshaft was rotated and continuity was confirmed to all cylinders and the accessory drive gears. During the crankshaft rotation, "thumb compression" was noted on all the cylinders. The propeller remained attached to the hub. One propeller blade was curled and twisted with gouges on the outboard trailing edge. The second propeller blade exhibited chordwise scoring and gouges. The aircraft was recovered by Dawson Aircraft, Clinton, Arkansas. During the recovery process, both wings and one horizontal stabilizer were removed from the aircraft. On July 10, 2001, an FAA inspector and the aircraft representative examined the airplane at Clinton, Arkansas. During the examination, the integrity of the left wing fuel tank was confirmed. Fuel line continuity was established from the three fuel tanks to the fuel selector valve. No anomalies were found that would have prevented fuel flow through the fuel system. The auxiliary fuel tank was found full of fuel. On the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident report, the pilot stated that he did not have any memory of the events before or after the accident. The initial on scene response of local authorites, airport personnel, and other numerous individuals, precluded a determination of the cockpit switch positions, the fuel selector position, and the amount of fuel on board prior to the accident. Shoulder harnesses were not installed in the airplane, and new seat belts were installed in June 1982. Beechcraft issued Service Instructions, Number 1020, in June, 1985, to announce the availability of kits for the installation of shoulder harnesses with incentives to encourage operator compliance. In September, 1990, Beechcraft issued Mandatory Service Bulletin, Number 2031, for the installation of the shoulder harnesses. The single-engine airplane struck wires and the terrain following a loss of engine power during the takeoff/initial climb. Witness descriptions were: "lost altitude after takeoff, flying very low, struggling, low airspeed, low rpm's, yawing to gain altitude, struggling for power, not enough forward speed to sustain flight, and yawing just above a stall." Witness descriptions of the engine were: "sounded very flat, having trouble getting full revs, and cutting out." Witnesses observed the airplane turn left "sharply, waver, swerve back and forth, strike a power line, dive down, gain altitude, and strike the second power line." Subsequently, the witnesses observed the airplane impact the ground with the left wing and spin around about 80 degrees before coming to rest. Local authorities reported that the left fuel tank was empty, the right fuel tank was full, and fuel was leaking from the aircraft. Local authorities turned off switches in the cockpit and de-activated the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT). Airport personnel reported that the fuel tanks were topped the day before the accident, with 10.3 gallons, and the accident flight was the first known flight since that refueling. The FAA inspector reported "no usable fuel found in the left wing tank. No fuel found on ground under the left wing. No dead grass. No stained grass. No strong odor of fuel." The inspector reported the fuel selector had the "left tank selected." The right wing tank was full. The airframe and engine representative confirmed the integrity of the left wing fuel tank and fuel line continuity from the three fuel tanks to the fuel selector valve. The auxiliary fuel tank was full of fuel. The fuel pump was rotated and a few drops of fuel were found in the fuel pump lines. No anomalies were found that would have prevented fuel flow through the fuel system. The pilot does not have any memory of the events before or after the accident. The initial on scene response of local authorities, airport personnel, and other numerous individuals, precluded a determination of the cockpit switch positions, the fuel selector position, and the amount of fuel on board prior to the accident. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12