NTSB CAROL · Event
Event GAA16CA527
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The pilot-in-command’s failure to extend the landing gear before landing and his failure to use the Before Landing checklist. Contributing to the accident was the pilots’ failure to maintain a sterile cockpit during landing.
Factual narrative
According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," and seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. During the approach, he recalled that they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up". During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended, as he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the knee of SIC obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that following the flare he heard the airplane propellers hit the runway, and he made the decision not to go-around because of the unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down, and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in VFR conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy, and during the approach he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that during recovery the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main gear doors, the main landing gear was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn, was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. Both pilots were wearing noise canceling headsets, and the landing gear warning horn is presented by an aural tone in the cockpit, and is not configured to be heard through the crew's headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual (AFM) before landing checklist. According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).
- C Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Landing gear system-Gear extension and retract sys-Not used/operated - C
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of checklist-Pilot - C
- C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Pilot - C
- C Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Lack of action-Pilot - C
- F Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-(general)-Flight crew - F
- — Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Task monitoring/vigilance-Flight crew
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2016_GAA16CA527.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (go-around). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- NASA NTRS 2025 · Conference Paper
A Training Study to Improve Monitoring During A Go-Around
As part of an FAA program to improve go-around (GA) safety, we were asked to determine if we could improve the performance of the Pilot Monitoring (PM) during a GA maneuver.
- Flight Safety Foundation 2024 · FSF / AeroSafety World
Go-Around Safety Forum Findings
Foundation Go-Around Safety Forum technical findings — examines why pilots fail to execute go-arounds when criteria are met (stabilized approach gate not met, energy state out of envelope, traffic con…
- Semantic Scholar 2022 · Article (Journal of Safety Research)
Go-around accidents and general aviation safety.
INTRODUCTION Changes in General Aviation (GA) accident rates, specifically in the go-around phase, are examined by comparing the number of accidents, the proportion of fatal accidents, and the proport…
- Semantic Scholar 2021 · Article (Aerospace)
Classification and Analysis of Go-Arounds in Commercial Aviation Using ADS-B Data
Go-arounds are a necessary aspect of commercial aviation and are conducted after a landing attempt has been aborted. It is necessary to conduct go-arounds in the safest possible manner, as go-arounds …
- NASA NTRS 2021 · Accepted Manuscript (Version with final changes)
Go-Around Criteria Refinement for Transport Category Aircraft
Presently, airline pilots are trained to go around if, when lower than 500 ft above the ground, they are outside of a handful of parameters such as airspeed, position, and rate of descent.
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Conference Paper
Validation of Proposed Go-Around Criteria Under Various Environmental Conditions
This paper evaluates the effects of environmental conditions on touchdown performance under varying approach states and validates proposed go-around criteria developed using data from a previously con…
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