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Atlas / NTSB / WPR22LA060

NTSB CAROL · Event

Event WPR22LA060

2021-12-09 Hillsboro, Oregon, United States Airport · 7S3 None 1 aircraft Status: Completed

Registry · N152BT

FAA Aircraft Registry record.

Make / Model

CESSNA P210N

Year of manufacture

1980 · 41 years old at event

Engine

CONT MOTOR TSIO-520 SER (300 hp)

Seats / Engines

6 seats · 1 engine

Last airworthiness date

19800301

ADS-B equipped

Yes — Mode-S A0D1C8

Registrant of record

COHO AVIATION LLC

Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).

Aircraft involved

Probable cause & findings

The on-ground collision with a tree during an off airport precautionary landing.  Contributing was the partial loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

Factual narrative

On December 9, 2021, about 1544 Pacific standard time, a Cessna P210N, N152BT, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Hillsboro, Oregon. The pilot sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that the airplane had just been returned to service following its annual inspection when the accident occurred. He departed and turned northbound towards his destination airport, which was about 7 nautical miles (nm) away. The pilot stated that the airplane “struggled” to climb and at an altitude of about 1,100 ft agl the airplane began to lose altitude. He decided that the airplane wouldn’t reach the runway at the destination airport, so he turned back towards the departure airport for a precautionary landing. During this time, he verified that his magnetos, fuel, mixture, propeller, and throttle settings were in their correct positions. Shortly after, he saw spikes in the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) of three cylinders; he adjusted the mixture to try to cool the cylinders but the EGTs remained in the red arc. The pilot then initiated a precautionary landing in an orchard and the airplane came to rest upright between trees. The right and left horizontal stabilizers sustained substantial damage. A postaccident engine run was performed. When the right magneto was selected the engine ran up to 30 inches of manifold pressure and 2500-2600 rpm. When the left magneto was selected, the engine sound changed consistent with the engine shutting down. When both magnetos were selected, the engine ran up to 22 inches of manifold pressure and about 2200 rpm. When the magnetos were turned to the OFF position, the engine changed sound, consistent with the engine shutting down. The ignition harness was examined and the wires from the magneto to the ignition block revealed that the left magneto was set to the right switch terminal and the right magneto was set to the left switch terminal. Subsequently, both magnetos were removed and examined. The left magneto was unremarkable. The right magneto was found to have corrosion and green residue built up within the magneto. A chemical analysis of the residue revealed that the substance was primarily composed of copper and silicon (dirt), along with polyamide, which likely originated from the nylon gears. A review of the engine logbook revealed that the right magneto was last removed and serviced about 609 hours before the accident. Furthermore, the recommended Champion Aerospace 4300-6300 Series Magneto Maintenance and Overhaul Manual (500-hour overhaul) was last performed on the right magneto about 850.7 hours and the last overhaul was completed about 1389 hours (19 years) before the accident. According to the magneto manufacturer, corrosion is not an acceptable condition and corroded components should be cleaned or replaced as necessary. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no additional mechanical anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot was flying the airplane to an airport 7 miles from the departure airport after it had just received an annual inspection when the accident occurred. He reported the airplane was struggling to climb and maintain altitude and, being unsure he would make it to the destination airport, he elected to return to the departure airport. After he verified that the engine controls were at their correct positions, he saw the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) spike on three cylinders. He adjusted the mixture to cool the cylinders but the EGTs remained elevated, so he landed the airplane in an orchard, which resulted in substantial damage to the horizontal stabilizers. A postaccident engine run and examination of the engine revealed that the right magneto was not operational due to corrosion build-up inside the magneto. A review of the maintenance records revealed that the right magneto was last serviced about 609 hours before the accident; the last 500-hour inspection was completed about 850.7 hours; and the last overhaul was completed 1,386 hours (about 19 years) before the accident, respectively. It is likely that the inoperable magneto reduced the power output and prevented the pilot from maintaining altitude. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

  • Aircraft-Aircraft power plant-Ignition system-Magneto/distributor-Inoperative
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Scheduled/routine inspection-Owner/builder
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Inspection-Scheduled/routine inspection-Maintenance personnel

Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file NTSB_2021_WPR22LA060.txt. Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb. Full investigation docket on data.ntsb.gov ↗.

Related research

What the literature says.

Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.

Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗