Event ANC13LA021

Factual narrative

On February 5, 2013, at 1612 Alaska standard time, a Cessna 172N airplane, N5290J, sustained substantial damage after impacting a snow covered, frozen river shortly after takeoff from the Kalskag Airport, Kalskag, Alaska. Of the three people aboard, the pilot and one passenger sustained minor injuries, and one passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was owned by the Kuspuk School District, Aniak, Alaska, and was being operated by the pilot as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross country flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions were reported at the Kalskag airport around the time of departure, and no flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time, and was destined to Aniak. In a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge on February 7, the pilot stated that he had flown from Aniak to Kalskag to pick up two individuals, and return to Aniak. He said the weather was VFR upon his departure from Aniak, and that the Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) at Kalskag was reporting 10 statute miles visibility. As he approached the airport, he said that his flight visibility had reduced to about 2 statute miles. He said he was only on the ground long enough to off load some packages, and get the two passengers on board. He did not check the ASOS again prior to the departure. He stated that he took off and climbed to approximately 300 feet above the ground, and that he could see the trees on both sides of the river that runs adjacent to the airport. The next thing he remembered was that the airplane was on the ground and inverted. During an interview with the NTSB IIC, the rear seat passenger stated that, after the airplane was unloaded, he and the front seat passenger boarded the airplane. He stated that he fastened his seatbelt, and the pilot asked if they were ready to go, but did not discuss the weather in the area. The passenger said that the weather had been deteriorating, and that he wasn't very comfortable, but he assumed that the weather would clear after takeoff. He said that during the climb, everything seemed normal, and he thought that the airplane got to about 200 to 300 feet in the air, but he did not remember anything after that. A witness that was observing the takeoff stated that the weather was deteriorating rapidly. He saw the accident airplane depart, and climb to just about tree level. Shortly thereafter, he heard "a strange sound" and then the airplane's engine stopped making noise. He said that he got on his snow machine, and proceeded down the river to look for the airplane. The witness said that while driving toward where he thought the airplane was located, the snow, visibility, and light conditions made it very difficult to distinguish any detail in the terrain. He located the airplane on the frozen river, and assisted in transporting the injured occupants to the village clinic. The airplane came to rest inverted and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, empennage, and wings. The rear seat passenger was ejected from the airplane during the accident sequence. A postaccident examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that the right, rear seat belt floor attachment had separated from the track that it attaches to. Further review of the seatbelt installation by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) revealed that the rear seatbelts had not been installed in accordance with the Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for the rear seat, and was missing a required fitting. A mandatory service bulletin was issued by the manufacturer holding the STC to inspect and correct any improperly installed components. A copy of the service bulletin can be found in the public docket for this accident. Data retrieved from an onboard portable GPS, showed that the airplane departed the Kalskag Airport approximately 1611, and climbed to a maximum GPS altitude of 171 feet. The airplane's groundspeed at the point of impact was about 103 knots. A copy of the airplane's GPS track and associated data are available in the public docket for this accident. The nearest official reporting station is the Kalskag Airport (PALG). About 2 minutes after the accident, at 1614, the weather was reported as: Wind, variable at 3 knots; visibility, .25 statute miles in light snow and freezing fog; sky condition, broken clouds at 300 feet above ground level (agl), broken clouds at 1,300 feet agl, overcast at 2,700 feet agl; temperature, 16 degrees F; dew point, 12 degrees F; altimeter, 29.55 inches Hg. The noninstrument-rated private pilot was departing on the second leg of a cross-country flight to pick up passengers from an outlying airport and return them to their home airport. The pilot said that, on the inbound flight, the weather reporting station at the destination airport was reporting visual flight rules conditions with 10 statute miles (sm) visibility, but that, as he approached the airport, the visibility had reduced to about 2 sm. After landing and then loading the passengers, the flight took off. He reported that he climbed the airplane to about 300 feet above the ground and that he could still see the river adjacent to the airport but that was all he could remember until impact. The airplane came to rest inverted on the frozen river. One witness and one of the passengers stated that the weather had been deteriorating. The witness stated that, around the time of the airplane's departure, the visibility was poor in snow and fog. The rear seat passenger was ejected from the airplane during the accident sequence. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right, rear seat belt floor attachment had separated from its track. Examination of the rear seat belts revealed that the belts had not been installed in accordance with the supplemental type certificate (STC) for the rear seat. The improper installation of the right, rear seat belt allowed it to fully separate from the floor attachment point and the seat during the accident. Since the accident, the manufacturer holding the STC has issued a mandatory service bulletin to inspect and correct any improperly installed components. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• C Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Decision making/judgment-Pilot - C
• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Ceiling/visibility/precip-Below VFR minima-Contributed to outcome
• F Personnel issues-Task performance-Maintenance-Installation-Maintenance personnel - F
• F Aircraft-Aircraft structures-Fuselage-Seat/cargo attach fitting-Incorrect service/maintenance - F