Event CEN14LA476

Factual narrative

On September 3, 2014, about 1238 mountain daylight time, a Piper model PA-46-350P airplane, N747TH, was substantially damaged while landing at the Cortez Municipal Airport (CEZ), Cortez, Colorado. The commercial pilot and his flight instructor sustained minor injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by Philburto Aviation, LTD, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local instructional flight, which had departed shortly before the accident.The flight instructor reported that the purpose of the flight was to satisfy the pilot's annual insurance currency requirements in the accident airplane. The flight instructor stated that earlier in the morning they had completed several visual flight rules (VFR) flight maneuvers before deciding to conduct takeoff-and-landings at CEZ. The flight instructor reported that following several uneventful landings, they decided to perform a simulated loss of engine power following a takeoff from runway 21 (7,205 feet by 100 feet, asphalt) and return for a downwind landing on runway 3. During initial climb from runway 21, upon reaching 1,200 feet above ground level (agl), the flight instructor reduced engine power to flight idle and feathered the propeller. In response, the pilot reduced airplane pitch and entered a 45-degree bank left turn back toward the airport. The pilot maintained best-glide airspeed (90 knots) throughout the left turn and rolled wings-level when the airplane was aligned with runway 3. The flight instructor stated that, upon rolling wings level, the airplane appeared to be lower than he had expected as it glided toward the runway; however, he believed there was sufficient altitude remaining to safely land on the runway and told the pilot to continue without an increase in engine power. The flight instructor ultimately decided to abort the maneuver as the airplane crossed over the runway 3 threshold at 40 feet agl. He reported that despite the airplane having sufficient altitude remaining to land on the remaining runway, he thought it would be safer to abort the simulated engine failure and recover under powered-flight. He took control of the airplane, advanced the engine power lever to the full forward position, and increased airplane pitch to arrest the descent; however, he did not perceive an increase in thrust from the engine. Without an increase in engine thrust, the airplane's airspeed decreased rapidly and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall about 30 feet above the runway. The airplane impacted the runway, about 500 feet from the approach threshold, before it slid off the runway into a grassy area. The flight instructor reported that the engine continued to operate after the accident, and that he secured it by pulling the condition lever to the full aft position. The main wing spar and fuselage were substantially damaged during the impact sequence. The flight instructor reported that he did not recall advancing the propeller control when he decided to abort the maneuver, and as such, the perceived lack of engine thrust was likely because the propeller remained feathered as he increased engine power. Additionally, the flight instructor reported that neither he or the pilot remember extending the landing gear following the simulated engine failure; however, both pilots recalled seeing the landing gear position lights illuminated during the maneuver. The flight instructor postulated that the airplane's landing gear had not been retracted after takeoff, which resulted in a reduced climb gradient due to the additional aerodynamic drag of the extended landing gear, and as such, the airplane entered the maneuver farther away from the airport than anticipated. Furthermore, with the landing gear extended, the airplane experienced a reduction in glide performance during the simulated forced landing. The flight instructor reported that the accident could have been prevented had he maintained a safe flying airspeed after he took control of the airplane. Additionally, the flight instructor believed that his delayed decision to abort the maneuver had resulted in an insufficient margin of safety. At 1253, the CEZ automated surface observing system (ASOS) reported: wind 220 degrees at 12 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear sky, temperature 29 degrees Celsius; dew point 1 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.07 inches of mercury. The accident occurred during a local instructional flight to satisfy the commercial pilot's annual insurance currency requirements in the accident airplane. The flight instructor reported that the pilot was demonstrating a simulated loss of engine power during initial climb and return for a downwind landing. During initial climb, upon reaching 1,200 ft above ground level (agl), the flight instructor reduced engine power to flight idle and feathered the propeller. In response, the pilot reduced airplane pitch and entered a left, 45-degree-bank turn back toward the airport. The flight instructor stated that, upon rolling wings level, the airplane appeared to be lower than he had expected as it glided toward the runway; however, he believed there was sufficient altitude remaining to safely land on the runway and told the pilot to continue without increasing the engine power. The flight instructor ultimately decided to abort the maneuver as the airplane crossed over the runway threshold at 40 ft agl. The flight instructor advanced the engine power lever to the full-forward position and increased airplane pitch to arrest the descent; however, he did not perceive an increase in engine thrust. Without an increase in engine thrust and with the increased pitch, the airplane's airspeed decreased rapidly, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall about 30 ft above the runway. The airplane impacted the runway before sliding into a grassy area. The flight instructor reported that he did not recall advancing the propeller control when he decided to abort the maneuver, and, as such, the perceived lack of engine thrust was likely because the propeller remained feathered after he increased engine power. Additionally, the flight instructor postulated that the airplane's landing gear had not been retracted after takeoff, which resulted in a reduced climb gradient, and, as such, the airplane entered the maneuver farther away from the airport than anticipated. Further, with the landing gear extended, the airplane experienced a reduction in glide performance during the simulated forced landing. The flight instructor reported that the accident could have been prevented if he had maintained a safe flying airspeed after he took control of the airplane. Additionally, he believed that his delayed decision to abort the maneuver resulted in an insufficient margin of safety. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• C Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Delayed action-Instructor/check pilot - C
• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Instructor/check pilot - C
• C Aircraft-Aircraft propeller/rotor-Propeller system-Propeller feather/reversing-Incorrect use/operation - C
• C Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Not attained/maintained - C
• C Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Pilot - C