Event CEN24LA360

Factual narrative

On September 20, 2024, at 12:04 central daylight time, a Piper PA-44-180 airplane, N2083D, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Shakopee, Minnesota. Both pilots were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. One of the pilots, a flight instructor, was recently hired to instruct in the airplane and was receiving a check out flight from the assistant chief flight instructor. According to both pilots, they departed Flying Cloud Airport (FCM) for a local one-hour flight. The run-up, taxi, and takeoff were all normal. The airplane departed to the southwest and climbed to about 5,500 ft mean sea level. The flight instructor receiving the check-out performed several flight maneuvers in the airplane, then began a descent and proceeded back to FCM. About 3 miles from FCM, and about 800 ft to 1,000 ft above ground level, the right engine began to lose power followed by a loss of manifold pressure. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power accompanied by a decrease in manifold pressure. Then both engines lost power completely. The assistant chief flight instructor took control of the airplane while the other pilot pushed the mixture, propeller, and throttle controls to their full forward position, but the airplane continued to lose altitude. The pilots executed a forced landing to a field southwest of FCM. The assistant chief flight instructor stated that they did not execute an emergency checklist because there was no checklist for a dual engine failure, nor did they have time due to their proximity to the ground. The wings, fuselage, and empennage sustained substantial damage. A postaccident examination revealed that there were about 25 gallons of fuel in each nacelle, and both fuel selectors were in the “on” position. No water was detected in the fuel contained in either engine carburetor float bowl. Valvetrain continuity was established in both engines. Compression was achieved on all cylinders when the crankshaft was rotated in each engine. The magnetos on both engines produced spark when their respective impulse couplings were rotated. The carburetor heat for both engines were in the up or “off” position. The temperature, 24°C, and dew point, 12°C, recorded at the destination airport were conducive to “serious icing” at glide power setting. According to the pilot operating handbook for the airplane, carburetor heat should be used “as required” during approach and landing and if engine roughness occurs. One of the pilots, a flight instructor, was recently hired to instruct in the airplane and was receiving a check out flight from the assistant chief flight instructor. The pilots reported that they were preparing to enter the traffic pattern, so they began a descent from their cruising altitude of about 5,500 ft msl to 1,000 ft msl. About three miles from the airport, both engines on the multi-engine airplane began to run rough. Shortly thereafter, both engines lost all power. Despite the pilots advancing the propellers, mixtures, and throttles to their full forward position, engine power was not restored. The airplane continued to descend, and the pilots performed an off-airport landing onto a field. One of the pilots stated that they did not perform an emergency checklist because there was no checklist for a dual engine failure. Also, due to their proximity to the ground, they did not have time to perform an emergency checklist. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings. A postaccident examination revealed that there were about 25 gallons of fuel in each nacelle, and both fuel selectors were in the “ON” position. The carburetor heat for each engine was in the “OFF” position. Examination of the engines and fuel system did not reveal any mechanical anomalies or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The recorded temperature and dew point near the accident site were conducive to “serious icing” at glide power settings. The pilot operating handbook for the airplane stated that carburetor heat should be used “as required” during approach and landing or if engine roughness occurs. Based on this information, it is likely that carburetor ice formed while the throttles were retarded during the descent which resulted in the initial engine roughness and subsequent loss of engine power due to carburetor ice. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Ice/rain protection system-Intake anti-ice, deice-Not used/operated
• — Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Temp/humidity/pressure-Conducive to carburetor icing-Response/compensation
• — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Lack of action-Flight crew
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of checklist-Flight crew