Event GAA15LA284

On September 20, 2015, about 2015 Alaska daylight time (AKD), a Champion 7ECA airplane, N9132L, had a total loss of engine power during takeoff initial climb from the Talkeetna Airport (TKA), Talkeetna, Alaska. The pilot subsequently made a forced landing in trees beyond the departure end of the runway. The airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to a private individual, leased to Above Alaska Aviation LLC, Talkeetna, and operated by the pilot under the provision of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated from the Talkeetna Airport (TKA). According to the pilot, during an interview with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator in charge (IIC) on September 30, he was conducting stop-and-go landings and touch-and-go landings at a local airport to build his tailwheel time. The pilot stated that he departed between 1400 to 1500 for the flight. He reported that after takeoff from a stop-and-go landing, he had a "sudden engine failure." The pilot attempted unsuccessfully to troubleshoot the loss of engine power. During the forced landing beyond the departure end of the runway, the airplane's wings struck trees and the fuselage impacted terrain. The pilot reported that the time of the accident was 2015. The pilot reported that at the time of the loss of engine power, he had one hour of fuel remaining, the left wing fuel gauge was covered by headliner material and was not visible, and the right fuel gauge indicated a quarter full. He further stated that before the flight, he topped off both fuel tanks. The pilot reported that during the flight, the engine "ran rough" a few times. He also reported that once during the flight, the engine "dropped a couple of hundred revolutions per minute." The owner/operator reported that during rental operations, "we inform them [customers] to plan on a 7 gallon per hour fuel burn" and that the airplane has a 26 gallon fuel capacity. He reported that the outbound Hobbs meter time was 579.6 hours and that the Hobbs meter was damaged in the accident sequence. He further reported that the outbound tachometer time was 2087.94 and the tachometer time at the time of the accident was 2091.25. He estimated that the renter had operated the airplane for just over 4 hours. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety inspector (ASI) who responded to the accident site reported that no usable fuel was found in the fuel tanks and that no fuel was found on the ground at the accident site. He reported that apparent fuel starvation caused the engine to quit. He further reported that the airplane's low altitude along with an uncoordinated left turn put the airplane into a spin at an altitude too low to allow for a spin recovery (about 100 feet), and the airplane impacted terrain at a steep, left wing low attitude.

COMMUNICATIONS

An FAA flight service station is located at the accident airport, and a review of the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) recording by an FAA ASI revealed that from 1532 to 1949, the pilot was performing touch-and-go landings.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The FAA ASI who responded to the accident site reported that the airplane impacted 1000 feet north of, and approximately 200 feet west of, the extended centerline of the departure end of runway 36. He further reported that the airplane came to rest at a 70 degree nose down attitude in a grove of small trees. The accident photographs supplied by the FAA ASI showed substantial damage to both wings and the fuselage.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Champion Citabria Owner's Manual The Champion Citabria Owner's Manual (1969) discusses the fuel gauge system for the 7ECA model and states in part: Fuel quantity, expressed as a fraction of the total fuel, is read from a mechanical float-type gauge located on the right side of the cabin over the door. The gauge indicates correctly only in level flight attitude. Since the fuel tanks are interconnected, both tanks will always contain the same amount of fuel (except immediately after adding fuel to one side), and thus only one tank gauge is necessary. A separate, similar gauge for the left wing tank is optional. 14 CFR Part 23.1337 Powerplant Instruments Installation 14 CFR Part 23.1337 Powerplant Instruments Installation discusses indication requirements for fuel quantity and states in part: Each fuel quantity indicator must be calibrated to read ''zero'' during level flight when the quantity of fuel remaining in the tank is equal to the unusable fuel supply determined under 14 CFR 23.959 Unusable Fuel Supply. Fuel Management The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety Foundation has published Safety Advisor SA16-01/05 Fuel Awareness (2005). This document discusses recommendations regarding fuel management for pilots and states in part: 1. Know How Much Fuel You Have - The first step in knowing how much fuel you have is to think of fuel not in gallons or pounds but hours and minutes. The Air Safety Foundation recommends that pilots of unfamiliar airplanes add one or two gallons per hour to their computed fuel consumption until they see how much that airplane actually burns. 2. Know Your Airplane's Fuel System - Pilots must also be familiar with and proficient in operating the fuel system on their airplanes. 3. Know What's in Your Fuel Tanks - Pilots must ensure their airplane contains the proper grade of uncontaminated fuel. 4. Update Your Fuel Status Regularly During Flight - It's good to do thorough preflight planning but, once in the air, things can change. Winds are rarely exactly as forecast and weather deviations add miles and minutes to your trip. The Air Safety Foundation recommends that pilots evaluate their fuel status each hour. 5. Always Land with Adequate Reserve Fuel - Aviation regulations require different fuel reserves for different operations. The Air Safety Foundation recommends that pilots never land with less than one hour of fuel in the tanks. That way all the regulatory reserve requirements are met and exceeded by at least 15 minutes. The airline transport pilot reported that, before the flight, he topped off both fuel tanks. The pilot subsequently began conducting stop-and-go and touch-and-go landings at a local airport to gain tailwheel time. He reported that, after takeoff from a stop-and-go landing, the engine suddenly failed. The pilot attempted to troubleshoot the loss of engine power but was unsuccessful. During the forced landing beyond the departure end of the runway, the airplane's wings struck trees, and the fuselage impacted terrain at a steep, left-wing-low attitude. The pilot reported that, at the time of the total loss of engine power, he had 1 hour of fuel remaining, the left wing fuel gauge was covered by headliner material and was not visible, and the right fuel gauge indicated a quarter full. The pilot added that, during the flight, the engine "ran rough" a few times and that, once during the flight, the engine "dropped a couple of hundred revolutions per minute." The owner/operator reported that, during rental operations, customers were informed "to plan on a 7 gallon per hour fuel burn" and that the airplane had a 26-gallon fuel capacity. He estimated that the pilot had been operating the airplane for just over 4 hours at the time of the accident. Despite the pilot's statement, during examination of the wreckage at the accident site, no usable fuel was found in the fuel tanks, and no fuel was found on the ground. Based on the evidence, the pilot did properly calculate the fuel consumption rate, likely failing to take into account the extra fuel burned during the multiple touch-and-go and stop-and-go landings, and he did not properly monitor the fuel in flight, which led to him continuing to fly the airplane until the fuel was exhausted despite signs of an engine problem and resulted in the subsequent total loss of engine power. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12