Event OPS24LA045

Factual narrative

On September 29, 2024, about 1943 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 525B Citation CJ3, N70FC was involved in a wrong airport landing at the Brunswick Golden Isles Airport (BQK), Brunswick, Georgia. There were no injuries reported to the passengers or crew onboard. The airplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on demand passenger flight from Dallas Love Field Airport (DAL), Dallas, Texas to St. Simons Island Airport (SSI), St. Simons Island, Georgia. According to the crew, the day prior to and the day of the incident, the flight had experienced many delays. They were originally scheduled to land at SSI at dusk, but due to delays in DAL they would land at night. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the flight departed DAL at 1535 central daylight time and landed on runway 25 at BQK 1943 eastern daylight time. After landing at BQK the crew continued taxi to runway 7 and departed to SSI. The captain (CA) was the pilot flying, and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. The FO stated he had flown into SSI many times and was aware of the close proximity of BQK. The CA stated he was not aware there was another airport nearby. SSI and BQK were 8.5 miles apart. Hurricane Helene had impacted this area of Georgia about 48 hours before, leaving the area dark, without power, Wi-Fi, or cell service. Both airports were operating on generator power. The FO had a residence in the area which had sustained hurricane damage and had requested to end his rotation in SSI. Another pilot would replace him to continue the trip rotation. The flight was in contact with air traffic control (ATC) and about 10 miles prior to landing, the crew reported the airport in sight and requested to cancel their instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to proceed visually to the airport. The IFR flight plan was canceled, ATC services were terminated, and the pilots then communicated their intentions on SSI’s common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). The FO stated they had the RNAV 22 approach programmed in the flight management system (FMS), but did not verify their position using automation or the map display because they did not continue flying the RNAV approach. They proceeded visually entering the traffic pattern on an extended right base leg. According to the CA, he asked the FO to program a visual approach into the FMS, which to his recollection the FO did. The CA stated he had the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) displayed on the flight display and said the airplane appeared close to the inbound course for runway 22 at SSI. According to the FO, he made the initial radio call on CTAF for SSI announcing the airplane would enter an extended right base leg entry into the traffic pattern. During this radio transmission he saw the sequenced flashing runway lights turn on at the airport, which they believed to be SSI. “Unfortunately after the fact it came to our understanding another aircraft had transmitted on the frequency for BQK not SSI activating the rabbit lights. This led to the first misidentification of the landing runway.” After the airplane landed, he recognized a building that was located on BQK, and knew they landed at the wrong airport. He saw another airplane taxiing for departure and realized that airplane had most likely turned on the airport lights for BQK because he was communicating on the wrong CTAF for SSI. Figure 1. ADS-b Data (Source: FAA) Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

• — Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-Identification/recognition-Flight crew
• — Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Use of equip/system-Flight crew