NTSB CAROL · Event
Event CEN23LA163
Registry · N60860
FAA Aircraft Registry record.
Make / Model
CESSNA 150J
Year of manufacture
1969 · 54 years old at event
Engine
CONT MOTOR 0-200 SERIES (100 hp)
Seats / Engines
2 seats · 1 engine
Last airworthiness date
19970919
ADS-B equipped
Yes — Mode-S A7E83A
Registrant of record
JOEBRAVO AVIATION LLC
Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
A loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion as a result of the pilot’s inadequate preflight planning. Contributing to the accident were the unreliable fuel quantity gauges and the improperly adjusted mixture control, which increased the fuel consumption above that anticipated by the owner’s manual.
Factual narrative
On April 22, 2023, about 0136 central daylight time, a Cessna 150J airplane, N60860, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Buffalo, Iowa. The pilot was not injured and the pilot-rated passenger sustained a minor injury. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the pilot completed 3 flight legs during the evening and night. The accident occurred on the 4th flight leg. He departed Augusta Municipal Airport (3AU) about 1710 (April 21st) and arrived at Tulsa Riverside Airport (RVS) about 1818. The pilot departed RVS about 1913 and arrived at Lamar Municipal Airport (LLU) about 2037. Beginning about 2129, the pilot departed LLU and remained in the traffic pattern. The pilot reported that he completed 3 solo night takeoffs and full stop landings for currency, departed LLU about 2143, and arrived at Omar N. Bradley Airport (MBY) about 2323. The pilot then departed MBY about 0000 (April 22nd) with an intended destination of Davenport Municipal Airport (DVN). The final ADS-B data point was recorded at 0136:35, and the associated barometric altitude was 700 ft. The accident site was located about 280 yards west of the final data point. The pilot reported that the engine lost power when the airplane was about 11 miles south-southwest of the intended destination airport. He noted a rapid drop in engine rpm as if the throttle control had been abruptly moved to idle. The engine seemed to completely lose power for about 30 to 45 seconds before it then regained power, reaching about 2300 rpm. He described it as a “strong burst” of power. About 5 to 10 seconds later, the engine lost power again. His efforts to restore engine power were not successful. The pilot attempted to execute a forced landing to a road; however, a wind gust caused the airplane to impact a light pole and it came to rest on a set of railroad tracks. The nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane was oriented in a nose-down position with damage to the fuselage, engine mount, and both wings. The pilot stated the airplane was fully fueled before departing 3AU and was fueled with 12 gallons (total) at LLU and with 8 gallons (total) at MBY. The passenger joined the flight at RVS, and the pilot limited the amount of fuel taken onboard to remain within the gross weight limitation for the airplane. According to the airplane owner’s manual, the maximum total and useable fuel capacity was 26.0 gallons and 22.5 gallons, respectively. According to the manual, fuel consumption varied from about 5.5 gallons per hour (gph) to about 7.0 gph. The pilot stated the cockpit fuel gauges indicated full before the initial departure from 3AU. However, approaching MBY, they appeared to indicate near empty. At MBY, the pilot determined that each fuel tank contained about 4 gallons and he added 8 gallons. He deemed the fuel gauge indications unreliable since they did not appear to correspond to his visual fuel quantity determination and his preflight fuel calculations. The pilot reported the engine was leaned as appropriate for all stages of flight. He also commented that, after arriving at RVS, the engine took about 2 minutes to shut down after the mixture control was moved to the idle/cutoff position. The same issue occurred upon arrival and shut down at LLU. Postaccident examination did not identify any engine anomalies consistent with an inability to produce rated power. Both main fuel tanks appeared to be intact. The left main fuel tank appeared to contain minimal fuel along with a significant quantity of water consistent with the airplane being stored outside. The right fuel tank appeared to be empty at the time of the examinations. Both fuel caps were securely installed at the time of the initial airplane examination. However, at the time of the engine examination, the left fuel cap was not installed. The initial examination revealed the gascolator bowl contained fluid consistent in appearance to aviation fuel. The bowl was free of debris or sediment. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to carburetor icing as noted in Federal Aviation Administration Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-35. The bulletin noted that carburetor ice can be detected by a drop in engine speed, usually accompanied by a roughness in engine operation. The pilot had completed 3 flight legs immediately before the accident flight without incident. The accident flight proceeded normally until it neared the destination airport. The pilot reported a rapid drop in engine speed as if the throttle control had been abruptly moved to idle. The engine seemed to completely lose power for about 30 to 45 seconds. It then regained a “strong burst” of power. However, about 5 to 10 seconds later, the engine lost power again. His efforts to restore engine power were not successful. He attempted to execute a forced landing to a road; however, a wind gust caused the airplane to impact a light pole before it came to rest on railroad tracks. The nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane was oriented in a nose-down position, with damage to the fuselage, engine mount, and both wings. Postaccident examination did not identify any engine anomalies consistent with an inability to produce rated power. Both main fuel tanks appeared to be intact; however, both appeared to contain only a minimal amount of fuel. The gascolator bowl contained fuel, which was consistent with the airplane resting in a nose-low attitude after the accident. The airplane was fully fueled (22.5 gallons useable) before departing initially and was fueled with 20 additional gallons during the previous flights. According to the airplane owner’s manual, the expected fuel consumption varied from about 5.5 gallons per hour (gph) to about 7.0 gph. The pilot reported the engine was leaned as appropriate for all stages of flight. The pilot also noted that the engine took about 2 minutes to shut down after the mixture control was moved to the idle/cutoff position at 2 of the intermediate stops. This suggests an improperly adjusted mixture control that would have resulted in a slightly rich mixture and higher than anticipated fuel consumption. The pilot also reported the fuel gauges were not reliable as they did not indicate the correct amount of fuel that he visually verified was in the tanks. The total flight time over the 3 preceding flights and the accident flight was about 6 hours. Based on the lack of fuel onboard the airplane, a total fuel consumption of 42.5 gallons would equate to about 7 gallons per hour, within the range of the published fuel consumption for the airplane. Also, the fuel consumption was likely higher than anticipated due to the improperly adjusted mixture. Although weather conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to carburetor icing, the loss of engine power as described by the pilot was not consistent with a carburetor icing scenario. Based on the available information, the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. It is likely that a slightly rich mixture increased the fuel consumption from that anticipated by the owner’s manual. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12
NTSB Findings
Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).
- — Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid level
- — Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Fuel system-Fuel distribution-Damaged/degraded
- — Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Fuel planning-Pilot
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_2023_CEN23LA163.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (icing, stall, fuel exhaustion). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Variation of Critical Crystallization Pressure for the Formation of Square Ice in Graphene Nanocapillaries
Two-dimensional square ice in graphene nanocapillaries at room temperature is a fascinating phenomenon and has been confirmed experimentally.
- arXiv 2022 · arXiv preprint
Enhanced Prediction of Three-dimensional Finite Iced Wing Separated Flow Near Stall
Icing on three-dimensional wings causes severe flow separation near stall. Standard improved delayed detached eddy simulation (IDDES) is unable to correctly predict the separating reattaching flow due…
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Contractor Report (CR)
An Evaluation of an Analytical Simulation of an Airplane with Tailplane Icing by Comparison to Flight Data
This report presents the assessment of an analytical tool developed as part of the NASA/FAA Tailplane Icing Program. The analytical tool is a specialized simulation program called TAILSM4 which was de…
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Technical Publication (TP)
NASA/FAA Tailplane Icing Program: Flight Test Report
This report presents results from research flights that explored the characteristics of an ice-contaminated tailplane using various simulated ice shapes attached to the leading edge of the horizontal …
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Other
[Tail Plane Icing]
The Aviation Safety Program initiated by NASA in 1997 has put greater emphasis in safety related research activities. Ice-contaminated-tailplane stall (ICTS) has been identified by the NASA Lewis Icin…
- NASA NTRS 2019 · Contractor Report (CR)
A study of carburetor/induction system icing in general aviation accidents
An assessment of the frequency and severity of carburetor/induction icing in general-aviation accidents was performed. The available literature and accident data from the National Transportation Safet…
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