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Atlas / NTSB / CEN24LA316

NTSB CAROL · Event

Event CEN24LA316

2024-08-14 Eveleth, Minnesota, United States Airport · 9Y5 None 1 aircraft Status: Completed

Registry · N2248T

FAA Aircraft Registry record.

Make / Model

CESSNA A185E

Year of manufacture

1968 · 56 years old at event

Engine

CONT MOTOR IO 520 SERIES (285 hp)

Seats / Engines

6 seats · 1 engine

Last airworthiness date

19680605

ADS-B equipped

Yes — Mode-S A1F35F

Registrant of record

REGISTRATION PENDING

Source: FAA Aircraft Registry (releasable master file).

Aircraft involved

Probable cause & findings

Water contamination of the fuel system which resulted in a total loss of engine power. Contributing was the pilot’s inadequate preflight.

Factual narrative

On August 14, 2024, about 1500 central daylight time, a Cessna A185E airplane, N2248T, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Eveleth, Minnesota. The pilot and passenger were not injured. The float-equipped airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff from the lake, at an altitude about 75 ft above ground level, the engine suddenly stopped operating. The pilot conducted a forced landing to an open area of grass at the sea plane base. The pilot reported that the airplane touched down very hard with the wings level and skidded upright about 150 ft. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage during the hard landing. Postaccident examination revealed that the wing fuel tanks remained intact. The fuel tanks were drained of fuel by the recovery company and the fuel was collected into a container. About 30 gallons of fuel consistent with 100 low lead aviation fuel was collected. The fuel tanks had rubber bladders, both with wrinkling on the lower surface, as shown in Figure 1. The fuel vents were not obstructed. Figure 1. Left- and right-wing fuel bladders with wrinkles. The left- and right-wing fuel cap seals exhibited deterioration and discoloration around the outer surface but were otherwise pliable. The fuel cap sealing surfaces on both wings were corroded. The fuel that was collected at the accident scene tested positive for water with water finding paste. A visual examination of the collection tank revealed about 1 gallon of water in the bottom of the tank. The engine remained attached to the fuselage. The propeller remained attached to the engine and all three blades remained attached to the hub. All three blades were bent and showed rotational scoring and leading-edge damage. The propeller was removed and replaced with an intact propeller to facilitate an engine test run. Fuel was plumbed into the engine from the left-wing root fuel pickup. The engine started, idled, and accelerated without hesitation. No anomalies were noted during the engine run. The pilot stated that the airplane had sat outside during a significant rain event a few weeks before the accident. The airplane was flown after the rain event in smooth air and had sat again for about two weeks before the accident flight. The pilot drained fuel and checked for water before the flight, but did not observe any water contamination. The pilot reported that after taking off, the airplane made a significant yaw shortly before the loss of engine power. The pilot noted on the day of the accident, the wind was gusting and the air was bumpy. An Airworthiness Directive (AD), 84-10-01 Bladder Fuel Cells Revision 1, was issued on October 4, 1986. The AD requires a fuel cell fluid retention test and recurrent inspections of the fuel cells to prevent power loss or engine stoppage due to water contamination of the fuel system. The AD lists the inspection steps and remedial actions necessary. The AD gives two options if inspection of the fuel cells reveals more than 3 ounces of fluid. One option is to fabricate and install a placard detailing instructions to check for fuel contamination during preflight. A second option is to install reduced diameter (raised filler neck) fuel caps on all fuel filler openings. Compliance with the AD was not properly recorded in the airframe log; however, the airplane had reduced diameter fuel caps installed, which complied with the AD. Additionally, recurrent inspections required by the AD no longer apply with the installation of the reduced diameter filler caps. The pilot reported that the float-equipped airplane had a total loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from a lake. The pilot conducted a forced landing to an open area of grass on the lake shoreline. The pilot reported that the airplane touched down very hard with the wings level and skidded upright about 150 ft. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage during the hard forced landing. The pilot stated that a few weeks before the accident the airplane was exposed to a significant rain event. He stated he drained fuel and checked for water before the flight, but did not observe any water contamination. The left- and right-wing fuel cap seals exhibited deterioration and discoloration around the outer surface but were otherwise pliable. The fuel cap sealing surfaces on both wings were corroded. Examination of the fuel that was collected at the accident scene revealed about 1 gallon of water in the bottom of the collection tank. Based on the airframe examination, it is likely that rainwater entered the fuel tanks due to the poor condition of the fuel caps and their respective wing sealing surfaces. A postaccident engine run was conducted, and the engine started, idled, and accelerated without hesitation. In the absence of a mechanical engine malfunction, the total loss of engine power was likely due to water contamination ingested by the engine shortly after takeoff. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database Retrieved: 2026-02-12

NTSB Findings

Hierarchical cause / factor breakdown from the FAA bulk avdata database. Each finding tagged C (Cause) or F (Factor).

  • Aircraft-Fluids/misc hardware-Fluids-Fuel-Fluid condition
  • Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Fuel system-Fuel storage-Not serviced/maintained
  • Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-(general)-Pilot

Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file NTSB_2024_CEN24LA316.txt. Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb. Full investigation docket on data.ntsb.gov ↗.

Related research

What the literature says.

Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (stall, fuel contamination). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.

Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗