NTSB CAROL · Event
Event LAX97LA244
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
the pilot's inadequate in-flight planning/decision, his failure to obtain the current wind information, his selection of the wrong runway, and his delay in aborting landing.
Factual narrative
On July 11, 1997, at 1700 hours Pacific daylight time, a Smith Aerostar 601, N7435S, landed gear-up after aborting a go-around attempt at the Boulder City, Nevada, Municipal Airport. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and neither the private pilot nor his five passengers were injured. The aircraft was owned and operated by the private pilot and was concluding a personal cross-country flight from French Valley, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. An Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector from the Las Vegas, Nevada, Flight Standards District Office conducted an on-scene investigation. According to the inspector's report, the pilot did not receive any airport related weather information from either the airport UNICOM operator or from other pilots in the area. The FAA inspector reported that the pilot believed he had a 10-knot tailwind when he initiated his landing attempt. The pilot told the inspector that he elected to land on runway 33 despite the fact that he had a tailwind because runway 33 was uphill. According to the inspector, at some point during the landing approach, the pilot said that he realized that he was not going to be able to successfully land the aircraft. He then elected to go-around and retracted his landing gear and applied full power. During the moments after the go-around attempt was initiated, the pilot said that the airframe began to buffet and he elected to set the aircraft back on the runway rather than stall the aircraft. In his written Pilot/Operator report, the pilot stated that "at about 50 feet agl I believe we experienced windshear which caused an accelerated rate of descent . ..at this time I decided to execute a go around [and] retracted gear [and] flaps. . .it was clear to me at this point that the aircraft was not going to obtain flying speed so I decided to put the aircraft down on the remaining runway." Additionally, the pilot reported that he felt "this accident may have been prevented if UNICOM had given the favored runway in use. . .we requested UNICOM to give us this information twice." The aircraft received substantial damage to both engines and propellers, the left wing, the fuselage, and internal structural members of the airframe during the gear-up accident sequence. The FAA inspector also talked with several witnesses who were present at the airport when the accident occurred. The airport UNICOM operator reported that her first contact with the aircraft was after the accident when the pilot called her by radio to ask for a radio check. Additionally, several people interviewed by the FAA inspector reported that the winds were blowing between 30 and 40 mph from a southerly direction when the accident occurred. One party described the windsock as standing straight out. The official aviation weather observation taken at the Las Vegas McCarran Airport (16 miles north of the accident site) was reporting winds from 190 degrees at 21 knots, with higher gusts to 28 knots. Interviews with pilots and the UNICOM operator revealed that the pilot did not receive any airport related weather information prior to his landing attempt. He said that he believed he had only a 10-knot tailwind when he initiated his landing attempt on runway 33, which he chose because it was uphill. The pilot said that he realized that he was not going to be able to successfully land the aircraft and elected to go-around. After retracting the landing gear and applying full power the airframe began to buffet and he elected to set the aircraft on the runway rather than stall the aircraft. The airport UNICOM operator reported that her first contact with the aircraft was after the accident when the pilot called her by radio to ask for a radio check. Additionally, several witnesses reported that the winds were blowing between 30 and 40 mph from a southerly direction when the accident occurred. One party described the windsock as standing straight out. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
Verbatim from NTSB's published report. Source file
NTSB_1997_LAX97LA244.txt.
Findings + structured fields enriched from FAA avall.mdb.
Full investigation docket on
data.ntsb.gov ↗.
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Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (stall, go-around). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- NASA NTRS 2026 · Conference Paper
Computational Analysis of Steady State Aerodynamics of Transonic Truss-Braced Wing Configuration in Deep Stall
This study presents a computational investigation of steady state aerodynamics of the Subsonic Ultra-Green Aircraft Research (SUGAR) Transonic Truss-Braced Wing (TTBW) configuration over a wide range …
- NASA NTRS 2025 · Conference Paper
A Training Study to Improve Monitoring During A Go-Around
As part of an FAA program to improve go-around (GA) safety, we were asked to determine if we could improve the performance of the Pilot Monitoring (PM) during a GA maneuver.
- Flight Safety Foundation 2024 · FSF / AeroSafety World
Go-Around Safety Forum Findings
Foundation Go-Around Safety Forum technical findings — examines why pilots fail to execute go-arounds when criteria are met (stabilized approach gate not met, energy state out of envelope, traffic con…
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Automating Bird Diverter Installation through Multi-Aerial Robots and Signal Temporal Logic Specifications
This paper tackles the task assignment and trajectory generation problem for bird diverter installation using a fleet of multi-rotors.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Variation of Critical Crystallization Pressure for the Formation of Square Ice in Graphene Nanocapillaries
Two-dimensional square ice in graphene nanocapillaries at room temperature is a fascinating phenomenon and has been confirmed experimentally.
- arXiv 2023 · arXiv preprint
Polycrystallinity enhances stress build-up around ice
Damage caused by freezing wet, porous materials is a widespread problem, but is hard to predict or control. Here, we show that polycrystallinity makes a great difference to the stress build-up process…
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