NTSB CAROL · Event
Event ANC05FA008
Aircraft involved
Probable cause & findings
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and collision with water during maneuvering flight. Factors contributing to the accident were fog and low ceilings.
Factual narrative
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On October 15, 2004, about 1406 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped Piper PA-18 airplane, N4126E, was destroyed when it collided with the ocean waters of Knik Arm and sank, about 1.6 nautical miles north of the southern shoreline bordering Anchorage, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) local area personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The airplane was operated by the pilot. The private certificated pilot, the sole occupant, is presumed to have received fatal injuries. Neither the airplane or the pilot have been located or recovered. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the Class D surface area of the accident. The flight originated at the Lake Hood Seaplane Base, Anchorage, about 1403. No flight plan was filed, nor was one required. The accident airplane was one of two, unrelated float-equipped Piper PA-18 airplanes that departed Lake Hood Seaplane Base within 1 minute of each other for local flights northbound across the Knik Arm of Cook Inlet. This route of flight is commonly used by light aircraft departing the Class D Airspace that encompasses the Lake Hood Seaplane Base. The weather at the time of departure was below VFR minimums. The first Piper airplane to depart Lake Hood, N40463, requested a special VFR (SVFR) clearance for a northbound departure. The departure route utilizes Point Mackenzie, or the hull of a boat located west of Point Mackenzie on the north shore of the Knik Arm, as a VFR reporting point. The distance between the north and south shorelines of the Knik Arm, between Point Mackenzie and Anchorage, is about 2.3 nautical miles. About 1 minute after the first request, the accident Piper airplane pilot made a similar request for a northbound SVFR clearance. About 1351, the first Piper was given SVFR clearance for a north departure by the Lake Hood Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) controller. About 1352, the pilot of the accident Piper contacted the Lake Hood ATCT and requested a SVFR departure, and was subsequently given the clearance: "26E, begin a taxi along the west shoreline for a north departure. Cleared out of the Lake Hood Tower Delta surface area north of Lake Hood Tower via the north shore departure. Maintain special VFR conditions at or below 1,100 feet. Departure frequency, 119.1, squawk 0122." At 1402:14, the first Piper was cleared for takeoff. The Lake Hood ATCT controller inquired from the pilot of accident Piper if he could maintain visual separation from the departing first Piper, and the accident pilot replied "...Yes I can." At 1403:04 the Lake Hood ATCT controller stated, "Piper 4126E maintain visual separation from the departing Piper, cleared for takeoff." At 1404:03, the Lake Hood ATCT controller advised the accident Piper to contact departure control, and at 1404:10, the controller stated: "and Piper 26E, not receiving your transponder, recycle it please." There was no response on the Lake Hood ATCT frequency from the pilot. At 1404:12, the accident Piper contacted the Anchorage Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) north radar approach controller, followed by the first Piper at 1404:20, as both airplanes proceeded across the inlet toward Point Mackenzie. Neither airplane reported clear of the Class D airspace. At 1405:16, the accident Piper contacted the TRACON controller and stated: "Piper 26E, I'm turning back, it's really thick out here." At 1405:21, the controller replied, "Piper 26E, I need you to hold outside the surface area and standby." There was no response from the pilot. At 1405:48, the TRACON controller contacted the Lake Hood ATCT controller and reported: "That Piper, 26E called me, said it's too bad, he's coming back. Now he won't answer me so I don't know where he is." At 1406:03, the first Piper contacted the TRACON controller and stated: "And departure, Cub 463, I'm also turning around, Point Mackenzie, headed back towards Lake Hood." The TRACON controller inquired if the first Piper had the accident Piper in-sight, to which the pilot replied, "negative, they were behind me, they were to keep me in sight." The controller asked if the first Piper could hold at Point Mackenzie, "for a few turns." The pilot replied, "I can hold along the south shore here. I'd prefer that I don't, I've got clear visibility of Lake Hood and the tower. I can maintain visual separation from that Cub." The TRACON controller inquired if the first Piper had visual sight of the accident Piper, to which the first Piper stated, "not at this time, but I can maintain visual separation from him." At 1406:52, the first Piper stated to the TRACON controller, "Hold on Lake Hood, hold on. Departure, I gotta check something out here. Do you have, did you talk to the other Cub. Has tower talked to him." The TRACON controller queried the Lake Hood controller, but no radio contact from the accident Piper was made with Lake Hood tower. Both controllers conferred about the location of both airplanes, and at 1407:11, the Lake Hood tower controller told the TRACON controller, "Alright, let me see if I can, I got, looks like I got something showing up right at mid-channel, but that may be something off Anchorage." The controller then stated, "Piper 26E, Lake Hood tower." There was no reply. At 1407:38, the Lake Hood tower controller established visual contact with the first Piper as the airplane flew along the south shoreline of the inlet. At 1408:03, the Lake Hood tower controller established radio contact with the first Piper and requested a position report. The pilot replied, "463 is landing in the inlet. Did you talk to that other Cub." The controller replied to the negative. At 1408:54, the first Piper informed the Lake Hood ATCT controller, "Okay, I have that Cub in sight. They are nose down in the inlet. I'm pulling up to them." The pilot reported his position as, "Directly midway between Point Mackenzie and Lake Hood," and then reported, "Okay, I see no, no people. The Cub is nose down, standby." The Lake Hood ATCT controller told the pilot that rescue personnel were being sent. At 1412:28, the first Piper reported, "Okay, that, that Cub has sank out of sight now. I'll stay here on the area." The pilot of the first Piper reported to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) that there was an area of fog over the inlet with a base about 400 feet agl, but about mid-channel, the fog layer was about 200 feet. He said that the fog was not as thick further to the west, but was thicker to the east of his position. He indicated he descended below the fog and then began to climb to about 300 feet as he passed mid-channel. As he approached the north shore of the inlet, he said he could see that a thick fog bank was obscuring his destination, and he radioed to TRACON north radar that he was returning to Anchorage. He then proceeded southbound toward Anchorage, and about mid-channel, observed something on the surface of the water. He said that he recognized the tail of the accident Piper protruding vertically from the water. He made a northerly turn near the south shore of the inlet, and proceeded to land on the surface of the inlet and taxied to the accident Piper. He informed the air traffic controllers of the situation and looked for any occupants of the accident Piper. None were visible. The first Piper pilot said that within about 2 minutes of his landing, the accident Piper sank. The first Piper was not equipped with global positioning system (GPS) equipment. The location, described by the pilot utilizing visually referenced geographic points, was mid-channel, about 2.6 nautical miles north of the Lake Hood Seaplane Base. The first Piper pilot provided the NTSB IIC with a map of the inlet, indicating his estimate of the accident location. A witness was parked at Airport Park, a small parking lot adjacent to the south shoreline bluff of the inlet, near the intersection of Northern Lights Boulevard and Post Mark Drive. He indicated that he was facing north when he saw a PA-18 airplane appear from a fog bank that was over the inlet. He said the airplane appeared from the base of the fog, southbound, about 100 feet above the water, and it appeared to be in a left bank of about 45 degrees left wing down, and about 20 degrees nose down. The airplane descended in a left bank until it collided with the surface of the water about mid-channel. The airplane impacted the water with the left wing first, and immediately began to sink. He used his cell phone to call 911, to notify emergency personnel. About 1 minute later, he observed N40463 appear from the fog further to the west of the impact site. It made a left bank toward the accident site, and then land on the water. A second witness, sitting at the intersection of Northern Lights Boulevard and Post Mark Drive, located about 200 yards south of the south shoreline of the inlet, reported that he observed a PA-18 airplane fly in an arc from west to east, near the south shoreline of the inlet. He described the arc as ascending into his view from below the south shoreline bluff of the inlet, and then descending out of his view as it passed from left to right. He said the upper surface of the airplane was visible to him, with the right wing oriented 90 degrees wing down from a wings-level attitude. He said he felt this was not a usual attitude for an airplane to fly, and it indicated to him that airplane was in trouble. He drove about 1/4 mile east of the sighting and walked to the south edge of the bluff, but he could not see any aircraft because fog was obscuring his view of the inlet. He later noticed N40463 taxiing on the surface of the inlet. The first Piper remained on the surface of the Cook Inlet while rescue personnel responded to the area. He reported that he had trouble keeping visual contact with the shoreline due to low fog. In addition, the outgoing tide in the inlet was moving his airplane. At 1425:13, the Lake Hood ATCT controller alerted the first Piper that a hovercraft was on its way to the scene. The pilot reaffirmed the accident position as, "...when it sank out of sight (the accident airplane), it was, best I could make out, directly between the boat hull, and I could see the FedEx hangar, right about in a straight line there; midway in between." At 1437:48, the pilot asked the Lake Hood ATCT controller if the responding hovercraft had a radio frequency, but the controller did not have that information. At 1439:17, a new ATCT controller took over the local control position at Lake Hood tower. The pilot of the first Piper expressed some concern about the low visibility, the possibility of stranding his airplane, and the status of his passengers (his daughters). At 1443:42, the Lake Hood ATCT controller contacted the first Piper and stated, "Piper 463, the, the boat did said that they don't need you anymore. Whatever you need to do to be safe is, is what you need to do now." At 1446:18, the first Piper reported, "Believe I have the hovercraft in sight now," and he indicated that he was going to shut down his engine and talk to the hovercraft crew. At 1507:42, the pilot of the first Piper inquired about getting his passengers off the airplane and headed to their home, and at 1510:38, the pilot was informed that, "AFD rescue boat is coming back, and they'll assist in getting the kids off." The first Piper remained on the inlet until the visibility improved, and then departed for Lake Hood.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, and airplane single-engine sea ratings. His most recent third-class medical certificate was issued on August 20, 2004, and contained the limitation that he must wear lenses for distant vision, and possess glasses for near vision. According to the pilot's logbook, his total aeronautical experience consisted of about 774 hours. In the preceding 90 and 30 days prior to the accident, the logbook lists a total of 20.17, and 8.64 hours, respectively.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane's maintenance records revealed that the most recent annual inspection of the airframe and engine, was accomplished on July 28, 2004. At the time of the annual inspection, the airplane and engine had accumulated a total time in service of 1,172.3 hours.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1353, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) at Lake Hood was reporting, in part: Wind, 030 degrees (true) at 3 knots; visibility, 2 statute miles in mist; clouds and sky condition, 400 feet overcast; temperature, 39 degrees F; dew point, 39 degrees F; altimeter, 30.07 inHg; remarks, surface visibility, 5 statute miles. At 1353, a METAR at the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport was reporting, in part: Wind, 060 degrees (true) at 4 knots; visibility, 2 statute miles in mist; clouds and sky condition, few clouds at 100 feet, 500 feet broken, 3,000 feet overcast; temperature, 41 degrees F; dew point, 37 degrees F; altimeter, 30.06 inHg; remarks, surface visibility, 3 statute miles, ceiling 300 feet, variable to 700 feet in mist, few clouds at ground level.
COMMUNICATIONS
A transcript of the air to ground communications between the accident Piper, and the first Piper, and the Anchorage ATCT and TRACON facilities, are included in the public docket of this accident. Continuous data recording (CDR) radar data recorded at the Anchorage TRACON facility, was reviewed in an effort to document position data of the two involved Piper airplanes. During the review, only one or two momentary radar returns were noted. Radar identification of the two airplanes was never established.
AERODROME AND GROUND FACILITIES
The Lake Hood Seaplane Base is adjacent to the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport. The seaplane base has two north/south waterlanes, an east/west waterlane, and one northwest/southeast waterlane. The seaplane base is served by an air traffic control position, located within the Anchorage Air Traffic Control Tower cab. Arrivals and departures are served by the Anchorage Terminal Radar Approach Control facility. The seaplane base is within Class D airspace. The Anchorage airspace is subject to Federal Aviation Regulation Part 93 (FAR 93). FAR 93 outlines geographic segments and special rules for operating at airports within the Anchorage area.
SEARCH AND RESCUE
NOTE: All of the time references utilized in this portion of the report about the emergency response is based on each individual responding agencies records. There is no common or consistent time reference contained in the following discussion. A review of emergency responder's agency records revealed that the initial call about the accident was made via cell phone to the Anchorage Police Department's 911 dispatcher at 1406:40. The 911 dispatcher connected the caller with an Anchorage Fire Department dispatcher who coordinated the fire department's response. The caller who described his location as "Earthquake Park, reported observing the accident airplane crash in the water of the inlet. When asked by the dispatcher, "How far out," the caller replied, "approximately, I would say, 1/2 mile; out in the center of the Inlet." The dispatcher replied by stating, "1/2 mile from Earthquake Park out in the Inlet." The caller then informed the dispatcher that a second airplane was landing next to the crashed airplane. The caller also explained that due to the mud, access to the accident airplane would have to be via boat from the downtown docks. The caller then confirmed his location as the parking lot at the end of the runway, near the FedEx building. FAA Anchorage Air Traffic Control Tower According to the FAA's ATCT records, emergency notification of the accident was reported to the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport fire department, and the Kulis Air National Guard Base, via the direct-dial "crash" phone, at 1409. The U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) was notified at 1419. The Federal Aviation Administration's Regional Operations Center was notified at 1420, and the Anchorage Airport police department at 1427. Anchorage Police Department (APD) Following the initial report of the accident to the Anchorage Police Department 911 dispatcher, APD records note that the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport Police and Fire dispatch center was notified at 1407:18. At 1412:25, APD dispatch called the Kulis Air National Guard Base command post, reporting the plane crash. The Kulis command post confirmed they were notified via the airport's "crash" phone, but stated they were waiting for a call from the RCC before responding. At 1415:19, APD dispatchers received a call from the RCC indicating that they received a call from Kulis reporting the accident, and were inquiring about the events so far. Both entities then put each other "on-hold." At 1419:02, the RCC confirmed that they were receiving calls from other agencies, and confirmed that APD was not responding. Following the suspension of the search, APD personnel made notification of the accident to the pilot's next of kin. Anchorage Fire Department (AFD) The management and coordination of the emergency response to the accident was under the control of Anchorage Fire Department personnel, using the incident command system (ICS). The incident commander (IC) was a fire department battalion chief, and an incident command base was established at the Anchorage small boat ramp. Examination of AFD's incident report revealed that the initial notification was received at 1406:33. Engine 4 and Medic 1 responded to the Port of Anchorage where fire department personnel boarded a tug belonging to Cook Inlet Tug and Barge, whom the operator volunteered to assist with a search. Their search located a "floating apple." The coordinates of the apple were relayed to the incident commander. Engine 5 and Truck 5 responded to the area of Earthquake Park. The fire department's Boat 1, along with Engine 2, responded to the Port of Anchorage. A port crane operator assisted in launching the boat by the use of a sling. The boat proceeded to the area of Point Woronzof, to an area described by Engine 5 as 1/2 to 3/4 mile offshore. They performed a circular search of the area, and made contact with the Anchorage Airport's hovercraft. Nothing was located. Battalion 1 was the incident commander. His report of the accident response indicated that Engine 2, with AFD Boat 1 and Medic 4, proceeded to the Port of Anchorage, where personnel boarded a Coast Guard boat. Engine 4, and Medic 1 initially responded to the small boat ramp. The IC requested notification to RCC and requested a helicopter. Engine 5 and Truck 5 were sent to the Point Woronzof area. The IC requested a GPS position, but never received one. Personnel from Engine 4, and Medic 1 boarded a vessel from Manson Construction. A tug from the Cook Inlet Tug and Barge company sent one of their tugs to the crash scene. Boat 1 launched from the Port of Anchorage. The IC was informed that the AIAPF was attempting to launch a hovercraft, but they never established contact with the IC. Engine 5 and Safety 1 told the IC that fog had closed in on the scene. He ordered all boats to proceed at a slow speed, and requested the captain of the Manson Construction vessel to use radar to coordinate the search, and was told that the captain would do so. The captain of the Manson vessel reported that he had started to grid-search the area. The IC indicated that he spoke by phone to RCC. An agreement was reached that the IC would coordinate the search. The IC then spoke with the CGRCC and explained that the search was operating under cold-water drowning guidelines, which state that one hour is the normal expected maximum survival time. The IC reported that the CGRCC agreed to have the IC continue to coordinate the search. The IC conferred with AFD command personnel, and was directed to terminate the search at the point at which survivability was no longer viable. The IC attempted to coordinate vessel search activities on Marine Channel 16 on his portable radio, but was unable to do so. He contacted the captain of the Manson vessel for an estimate of completion of his grid search, and asked the captain to coordinate that part (griding) of the operation. The IC recontacted RCC and told them that the search was rapidly approaching the limit on survivability, the airplane had sunk, and they were unable to locate it. The IC reported that RCC agreed that the rescue operation could be terminated. The IC then contacted CGRCC to inform them of his discussions with RCC, and received CGRCC support of his decision to terminate the search. The IC directed the boats in the inlet that the search was being terminated, but agreed to allow the Manson vessel to finish griding the suspected crash site. Boat 1 was directed to pick up the children aboard the first Piper. The IC reported that at one point during the search, he was given the coordinates of a floating object (an apple), and indicated that there was speculation that the apple might have been from the accident airplane. The IC directed the captain of Engine 4 aboard the Manson vessel to tell the other boats in the search area that when they left the area, the official public rescue attempt had been terminated, and if they chose to remain in the area, they were doing so of their own volition. The IC indicated that during the search, he was informed that a vessel belonging to Terra Survey LLC was in the search area, and was equipped with some form of bottom scanning sonar. He was notified that the AIAPF hovercraft had withdrawn. The IC reported that he had discussions with RCC, CGRCC, and Alaska State Trooper personnel at the termination of the search, and discussed the operation. Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport Police and Fire Department (AIAPF) AIAPF records reflect that the airport's dispatch center was called by APD at 1407 as a "courtesy call", indicating that AFD was responding to a report of a crash in the inlet. The AIAPF records also note that according to the APD dispatcher, AFD did not need any additional help; however, the AIAPF dispatch center initiated an Alert III (aircraft accident) to their police and fire crews at 1409. The airport's rescue response included fire and police personnel, and deployment of Rescue 4, a hovercraft from Point Woronzof at 1445. AIAPF units stood down about 1600. An FAA Airport Safety/Compliance Officer from the FAA Alaska Region, Airports Division, reported that he was at the Anchorage International Airport conducting an airport inspection when the accident notification was received by airport personnel. He accompanied airport personnel to the Point Woronzof parking lot, and assisted with the launch of the airport's hovercraft from the Point Woronzof area. He reported that the hovercraft, on its trailer, was driven down the airport bluff toward the water. Access from the parking lot to the water of the inlet is via a graded dirt ramp. The hovercraft trailer was unable to reach the water because a portion of the ramp had been washed away, forming a gully across the ramp. The compliance officer related that with the help of about four other airport personnel, they attempted to carry the hovercraft across the gully, but were unable to do so because of its size and weight. The hovercraft was then dragged across the ground about 100 yards, through the gully, and placed at the water's edge. Two airport personnel wearing drysuits, boarded the hovercraft and started the engine. The hovercraft was able to lift up, and the propulsion propeller was turning, but the crew could not initially get the hovercraft to move. The speculation at the time was that the air cushion skirt was torn. Eventually, the crew was able to get the hovercraft on the water, but had trouble maneuvering. The crew returned to shore and unloaded some equipment, and then proceeded toward the area of the accident. From the initial call, to when the hovercraft was able to proceed toward the accident scene, the compliance officer estimated 30 to 45 minutes had elapsed. After the hovercraft returned to the point of launch, airport personnel brought a tractor to the area and graded the ramp to facilitate the retrieval of the hovercraft onto its trailer. 11th Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) The mission logs from the 11th Rescue Coordination Center indicated that it was notified of the accident by APD at 1424. The initial location given for the accident was 1/2 mile from Earthquake Park, in the Cook Inlet. RCC personnel queried the U.S. Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center (CGRCC), Juneau, Alaska, about the availability of a Coast Guard vessel to assist in a search. The Coast Guard indicated they had no vessels available. At 1428, the RCC called AFD and received a briefing about the event, and received a request for helicopter support. A military helicopter departed from Kulis Air National Guard Base at 1450, but an aerial search was hampered by the low visibility conditions. The RCC received information from AFD at 1502 that two vessels were assisting in the search. At 1511, the RCC was notified by the CGRCC that a Coast Guard small boat was participating in the search and had AFD paramedics aboard. At 1545, the RCC was notified by the AFD incident commander that he was recalling all of his assets, and no longer required assistance. The AFD incident commander indicated that surface vessels could continue searching of their own volition. U.S. Coast Guard The U.S. Coast Guard's records of the accident response indicated that at 1428, they received a report of an aircraft emergency in upper Cook Inlet, between Fire Island and Point Woronzof via cell phone. The Anchorage Fire Department made a request for transportation of fire department personnel. At the time of the accident, the Coast Guard was conducting commissioning ceremonies for Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) vessels at the Port of Anchorage. The Coast Guard initiated an emergency response with an MSST vessel CG493, which was underway at 1440 with AFD personnel aboard. The Coast Guard was notified at 1442 that AFD was the search and rescue [SAR] mission coordinator (SMC). At 1508, the Coast Guard was notified by AFD that assistance was no longer needed, but the Coast Guard directed the crew of CG493 to standby. At 1530, the crew of CG493 reported that they were returning to their base due to a elevated risk to the vessel and crew from decreased visibility. The Coast Guard's records indicated that three vessels from the Anchorage port area assisted in search and transportation of fire department personnel. Commercial/Volunteer Resources Several commercial vessels participated in the response to the accident. These were a tug from the Cook Inlet Tug and Barge, the vessel from Manson Construction, and the vessel "Sea Ducer" from Terra Survey. The first two vessels were utilized to transport AFD personnel, and conduct a visual search of the area. The Manson Construction vessel reported finding a floating apple, which was located about 1/2 mile from the south shore of the inlet. The lead hydrographer aboard the vessel Sea Ducer reported that they were working near the northeast end of Fire Island. The crew of the vessel were not aware of the accident until they overheard radio traffic on Marine Channel 16 that an accident had occurred between Fire Island and Point Woronzof. The Sea Ducer began moving toward the area because it is equipped with a multibeam transducer utilized for underwater mapping. The crew conferred with the Manson Construction vessel and upon arrival in the area of the floating apple about 1535, began running search lines that each were about a 60 foot-wide swath. The Sea Ducer located a "blip" on their fathometer about 1/2 mile from the south shoreline. About 20 minutes after arriving in the area, the hydrographer reported that the search was terminated by AFD, but they stayed in the area and continued to search. The hydrographer indicated that his vessel did not receive any direction for use of its mapping capabilities. He noted that AFD was talking to other civilian vessels. Water Response Search and Rescue Resources The Anchorage International Airport Police and Fire Department has two fiberglass hull hovercraft that are about 15-feet long, and normally staffed by two crewmembers. The vessel carries one, eight-person life raft. The vessel could accommodate two additional passengers, or several additional life rafts. The hovercraft can reportedly operate over any surface, but is not designed for rough water. The Anchorage Fire Department's Rescue Boat 1 is a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RIB) about 26 feet long with two engines. It is an open boat design with a center console, normally staffed by three, or four crewmembers. The vessel carries a 10 to 12 person enclosed life raft, and could carry about 20 total personnel. In addition, AFD has a two person, 16-foot RIB with one engine. AFD personnel reported that a new addition to their fleet is an air boat, which is being evaluated by the department. The AFD vessels are not designed for operations in icy waters. The U.S. Coast Guard's MSST is a 25-foot RIB with an enclosed cockpit/cabin. It is designed for high speed response in support of the MSST mission of port security. It has a law enforcement crew of three, and could accommodate about 6 or 7 additional passengers. It is not a rescue vessel, and carries no additional rescue equipment. It is not designed for operations in icy waters. A Port of Anchorage 24-foot workboat, and a commercial tug from Cook Inlet Tug and Barge may be available for response to emergencies in the inlet.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Airport Emergency Plan Emergency response by airport rescue and fire fighting personnel is required by the FAA for airports that have scheduled passenger operations. The required amount and type of emergency response is specified in Title 14, CFR Part 139, and are augmented by FAA Advisory Circulars that contain methods and procedures for compliance with Part 139. CFR Part 139.325 contains a requirement that airports develop an Airport Emergency Plan. Advisory Circulars FAA Advisory circular AC 150/5200-31A, Airport Emergency Plan (AEP), contains guidance to an airport operator in developing and implementing an airport emergency plan. Its chapters address the elements of a plan, functional areas that need to be included, and in Chapter 7, Hazard-Specific Sections, contains unique and regulatory response planning details that apply to a particular hazard. Section 8, Water Rescue Situations, of AC 150/5200-31A, prescribes procedures to respond to water rescue situations, including those in 14 CFR 139.325 (f), which states: "The plan required by this section shall contain provisions to the extent practicable, for the rescue of aircraft accident victims from significant bodies of water or marsh lands adjacent to the airport which are crossed by the approach and departure paths of air carriers. A body of water or marsh is significant if the area exceeds one-quarter square mile, and cannot be traversed by conventional land rescue vehicles. To the extent practicable, the plan shall provide for rescue vehicles with a combined capacity for handling the maximum number of persons that can be carried on board the largest air carrier aircraft that the airport can reasonably be expected to serve. Significant bodies of water as defined above located within at least 2 miles of the end of an airport runway should be included in the emergency plan area of response." FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5210-13B, Water Rescue Plans, Facilities and Equipment, contains additional guidance on the special considerations that airport operators must consider when preparing for water rescue operations in the vicinity of an airport. It covers important topics involved with water rescue, and it notes the results of an NTSB safety study that found contact with water occurred primarily during approach and departure, and was typically inadvertent, with no preparation time, and discusses the develop a water rescue plan that addresses the unique character, or type of water around the airport. The advisory circular covers survival factors, including water temperature; water rescue responsibilities, including identification of the primary response agency, if it is other than the airport; water rescue planning, including the handling of survivors, and the handling of spontaneous volunteers; training, which includes boat handling and rescue swimmers, initial and recurrent training; communications, including notification, command and control, in which marine communications are recommended on Channel 16 or 22; and a discussion of the variety and use of rescue vehicles, including boats, rafts, helicopters and hovercraft. Anchorage International Airport Emergency Plan The Anchorage International Airport's Emergency Plan does not contain a water rescue plan. It does contain a Water Rescue Notification document, which is pages 107 through 110, plus three map pages, within the AEP. The document outlines the airport's responsibility, and lists other agencies and their rescue assets. The document states, in part: "...When notified of an aircraft accident in a significant body of water, or marshlands, adjacent to the airport which are crossed by the approach and departure flight paths of both general aviation and air carrier aircraft, Airport Dispatch will notify those local agencies equipped to respond. The Alaska State Troopers have statutory jurisdiction for search and rescue missions statewide. They will appoint an Incident Commander to coordinate the rescue effort from the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center... The Alaska State Troopers will dispatch an On Scene Commander, who will provide overall Command and Control at the accident scene." The Water Rescue Notification document's list of agency resources, and their rescue equipment include personnel, vessels, aircraft, and the number of life rafts available. Under the U.S. Coast Guard resource, the document indicates that: "The U.S. Coast Guard has the responsibility for water rescue operations; however, they are not equipped to handle actual rescue missions on the upper reaches of the Cook Inlet." The private certificated pilot of a float-equipped airplane was the second of two, unrelated Piper airplanes that requested a special VFR (SVFR) clearance from a seaplane base within 1 minute of each other, for a local flight over an ocean inlet that was about 2.3 nautical miles wide. The weather conditions at the airport included overcast skies at 400 feet, and a visibility of 2 miles in mist. About 2 minutes after departure, the accident pilot requested to return to the seaplane base, stating in part, "it's really thick out here." No further communication was received from the pilot. The pilot of the first Piper airplane to depart also decided to return, and spotted the tail of the accident Piper protruding from the water about mid-channel of the inlet. The first Piper pilot notified air traffic control (ATC) of the situation, and then landed on the water to render any assistance. The first Piper was not equipped with any position locating equipment, consequently, the accident location was an estimate by the pilot. The accident Piper sank within about 2 minutes, and no survivor was observed. The accident pilot and the airplane have not been found. A witness located on the shore of the inlet saw the accident Piper appear from the base of a fog bank that was over the inlet. The airplane descended out of the fog about 100 feet above the water in a left bank of about 45 degrees, and about 20 degrees nose down. The airplane descended until it collided with the water about mid-channel, impacting the water with the left wing first, and immediately began to sink. Water search efforts were initiated that involved the use of a 2-crew hovercraft, a Coast Guard rigid-hull inflatable boat (RIB), a fire department rescue RIB, a commercial tug, and a volunteer underwater mapping vessel. The use of helicopters was unsuccessful because of low ceilings and low visibility. The search for the accident pilot and airplane was suspended by the fire department about 1.5 hours after the accident. Source: NTSB Aviation Accident Database (Pre-2008 Archive) Retrieved: 2026-02-12
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Long-running aviation incident database (Flight Safety Foundation).
Community NTSB synthesis blog — often has photos and witness reports.
Gold-standard aviation incident blog.
Aviation industry news search.
GA pilot forum — informed but rumor-prone.
GA pilot subreddit search.
Tail-number page — flight history (free tier limited).
AOPA Air Safety Institute search.
Mainstream press coverage. Recent events only.
Privacy-preserving news search.
External links open in a new tab. We don't ingest their content; we deep-link search queries.
Related research
What the literature says.
Academic papers and agency reports matching this event's aircraft type or causal vocabulary (spatial disorientation, maintenance). Sourced from NASA NTRS, NTSB Safety Studies, FAA CAMI, AOPA Air Safety Institute, Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons, arXiv, and the Semantic Scholar academic graph.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2026 · Journal article (IJAAA)
From Reactive to Predictive: A hybrid Trust-Mediated Adoption Framework for Data-Driven Maintenance in Distributed-Authority Aviation Environments
Modern aviation maintenance operates within increasingly data-intensive technological environments, yet the operational integration of predictive maintenance into routine decision-making remains incon…
- Semantic Scholar 2025 · Article (Applied Sciences)
Decision-Making Framework for Aviation Safety in Predictive Maintenance Strategies
The implementation of predictive maintenance (PM) in aviation presents unique challenges due to strict safety requirements, complex operational environments, and regulatory constraints.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2025 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Design, Implementation, and Testing of Spatial Disorientation Scenarios in a Modified Hexapod Motion Simulator
Abstract Investigations into aviation accidents aim to identify root causes and enhance safety. Despite advancements in safety measures, technology, and education, general aviation accident rates rema…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
Low-Resource Automatic Speech Recognition Domain Adaptation – A Case-Study in Aviation Maintenance
With timeliness and efficiency being critical in the aviation maintenance industry, the need has been growing for smart technological solutions that optimize and streamline the different underlying ta…
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (JAAER)
A New Trajectory in UAV Safety: Leveraging Reinforcement Learning for Distance Maintenance Under Wind Variations
In the field of aviation, safety is a critical cornerstone, and the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems is deeply connected with this principle.
- Embry-Riddle Scholarly Commons 2024 · Journal article (IJAAA)
Just Culture in Aviation: A Metaphorical Study on Aircraft Maintenance Students
Just Culture, a sub-dimension of safety culture, has been a prominent and debated topic in aviation safety in recent years.
Browse the full corpus — academia portal ↗